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have not yet grasped the internal complexity of early-twentieth-century debates regarding the 
interdependence of human and nonhuman agency. Early-twentieth-century sociologists like Émile 
Durkheim grounded both the autonomy of human culture and the disciplinary authority of sociology on 
the premise of species exceptionalism—the independence of human relations from nature and 
technology. “Inhuman Power” uncovers how the latent epistemological assumptions of Durkheimian 
social theory continue to structure contemporary aesthetic value judgments and literary-historical 
paradigms. The dominant structuring prism of nineteenth-century social theory has led critics to 
understand modernist art as a form of human aesthetic agency responsive to the reifying degradations of 
machines, masses, and media—a symbolic consolation for human alienation from nature (both the 
natural world and the “second nature” of administered society). This model casts modernism within a 
protracted philosophical stalemate between the human and nonhuman that obscures the mixing of 
natural and social agencies. Challenging the presumed dominance of this position, “Inhuman Power” 
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between character and environment, nature and society? Excavating aesthetic strategies developed 
across sociology and literary art to represent the intensifying entanglement of natural, social, and 
technological agencies in the first decade of the twentieth century, “Inhuman Power” reanimates these 
writers’ ambition to imaginatively transform the concepts through which human beings render the 
material world thinkable and thus how human beings interact with that world. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
INHUMAN POWER:  
 
INFRASTRUCTURAL MODERNISM AND THE FICTION OF SOCIAL FORM 
 
Natalie Amleshi 
 
Jed Esty 
 
E.M. Forster’s imperative to “only connect” has long been read as modernist 
slogan for the rarefied depth of authentic interpersonal intimacy. Reframing the historical 
co-emergence of literary modernism and modern social science, this project tells a 
different story—not of connections between exceptional humans, but of connections 
between persons and environments. The prevailing canons of modernism have not yet 
grasped the internal complexity of early-twentieth-century debates regarding the 
interdependence of human and nonhuman agency. Early-twentieth-century sociologists 
like Émile Durkheim grounded both the autonomy of human culture and the disciplinary 
authority of sociology on the premise of species exceptionalism—the independence of 
human relations from nature and technology. “Inhuman Power” uncovers how the latent 
epistemological assumptions of Durkheimian social theory continue to structure 
contemporary aesthetic value judgments and literary-historical paradigms. The dominant 
structuring prism of nineteenth-century social theory has led critics to understand 
modernist art as a form of human aesthetic agency responsive to the reifying degradations 
of machines, masses, and media—a symbolic consolation for human alienation from 
nature (both the natural world and the “second nature” of administered society). This 
model casts modernism within a protracted philosophical stalemate between the human 
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and nonhuman that obscures the mixing of natural and social agencies. Challenging the 
presumed dominance of this position, “Inhuman Power” assembles a set of core texts that 
comprise a significant counter-aesthetic to the dualism of nature and society. Examining 
texts by E.M. Forster, H.G. Wells, Gabriel Tarde, Joseph Conrad, W.E.B. Du Bois, and 
Charles Chesnutt, this project recasts modernism not in terms of subjects alienated from 
nature, but subjectivities co-constituted with environments. A shared formal question 
animates all of the texts that I examine: by what aesthetic concept or literary feature can 
texts reimagine the conceptual relationship between character and environment, nature 
and society? Excavating aesthetic strategies developed across sociology and literary art to 
represent the intensifying entanglement of natural, social, and technological agencies in 
the first decade of the twentieth century, “Inhuman Power” reanimates these writers’ 
ambition to imaginatively transform the concepts through which human beings render the 
material world thinkable and thus how human beings interact with that world.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION: Culture After Infrastructure 
 
 
 
“I see a good deal behind the scenes, and you can take it from me that there is no 
Social Question—except for a few journalists who try to get a living out of the 
phrase.” 
—E.M. Forster, Howards End (1910)  
 
[T]here exists no society to begin with, no reservoir of ties, no big reassuring pot 
of glue to keep all those groups together. If you don’t have the festival now or 
print the newspaper today, you simply lose the grouping, which is not a building 
in need of restoration but a movement in need of continuation. 
—Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social (2005) 
 
 
The Event of the Social, ca. 1900 
When Henry Wilcox says to his soon-to-be wife Margaret Schlegel that “there is 
no Social Question,” he does not presciently anticipate the Actor-Network Theory of 
Bruno Latour. But there is an undeniable echo—an uncanny resemblance between these 
two positions. Both Wilcox and Latour claim professional expertise that demystifies the 
conceptual coherence and political claims of an entity called “society.” The differences 
between their positions are abundant. Wilcox’s proto-Thatcherite free marketeerism casts 
“the Social Question” as the ideological residue of a credulous, feminized reading public. 
To engage seriously with the social-as-question betrays a “sentimental attitude” that 
misapprehends the constitutive, unchanging reality of “the battle of life.”1 But this war 
language leads us to suspect precisely the opposite of Wilcox’s declaration, for to deny 
the contingency of one’s commanding position within the wider social field is of course 
to take a position in the (class) battle. “The social” is a question, but one that the 
 
1 E.M. Forster, Howards End (New York: Penguin, 2000), 163. 
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imperial-capitalist Wilcox would prefer not to engage. On the other hand, Latour’s multi-
faceted career as social theorist can be characterized as an extended re-opening of the 
question of the social. While Latour agrees with Wilcox that “society” is an unhelpful, 
artificial construct—“without sociology there is no society”—he develops that insight to 
wildly different political effect.2 Latour argues that the evident ontological stability of 
“society” has obscured the vital entanglement of human and nonhuman agency in shaping 
social life, conceptually blocking our ability to imagine transformative social change: 
“the apparently reasonable division between material and social becomes just what is 
obfuscating any enquiry on how a collective action is possible….To put it bluntly: if there 
is a society, then no politics is possible.”3 Despite a stark divergence in political desire—
to maintain the world as it is, to imagine it radically otherwise—both Wilcox and Latour 
share a central insight that motivates this dissertation: that “society” is a contingent, 
provisional construction and that this constructed-ness requires mass mediation—be it 
ideological/human (Wilcox), material/nonhuman (Latour), or perhaps something in 
between. 
As we will come to see in more detail, what both Latour’s revisionist history of 
sociology insists and Forster’s novel expresses is the uncertain, contested nature of 
“society” at the turn of the twentieth century, as the newly professionalizing social 
sciences developed languages and epistemologies to describe the formal interaction of 
human beings with each other and their technologically-mediated surroundings. The 
 
2 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 257.  
3 Ibid., 74, 250. 
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terms of these debates have long shaped how literary scholars understand “modernism” in 
both explicit and implicit ways, underwriting the criteria of aesthetic value that structure 
the field of modernist studies. “Inhuman Power” excavates a series of transatlantic 
exchanges between academic social science and Anglophone literary modernism circa 
1900 in order to uncover the hybrid and conceptually daring representational strategies 
through which artists and social theorists (often both at same time!) sought new aesthetic 
modes of imaging, figuring and projecting the social outside the framework of the 
autonomous liberal subject. 
We need to unsettle the sometimes-fixed relationship between modernism and 
sociology in modernist studies. When academic sociology (say, Simmel’s “The 
Metropolis and Mental Life”) appears in modernist scholarship, it often functions as a 
transparent frame through which to understand modernity, implicitly bolstering the idea 
that there is a coherent, knowable thing called “modernity” to which “modernism” 
responds.4 This reliance on sociology as theoretical frame has concealed the complex, 
contested and mixed relationship between literary art and social theory at the turn of the 
twentieth century—occluding the significance of burgeoning sociological discourse not 
only as theoretical frame, but also as real event in the history of modern literary form. 
What do we make, for example, of H.G. Wells’ insistence not only that literature should 
resemble sociology but that “sociology must be neither art simply, nor science, … but 
 
4 Fredric Jameson lucidly encapsulates this idea that sociology mediates and conceptually 
stabilizes “modernity”: “[T]he concept of modernity, which traces its lineage back to the 
founding fathers of sociology—and with which indeed sociology itself is coterminous as 
a field of study—seems respectable and academic enough.” (Jameson, A Singular 
Modernity: An Essay on the Ontology of the Present (London: Verso, 2012), 7.) 
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knowledge rendered through personality, that is to say, in the highest sense of the term, 
literature”?5 Or what of W.E.B. Du Bois’ apprehension that “the Novel” would have a 
crucial role to play in mediating the world-shaping transformations guiding sociological 
discourse: “the study of individual life and motive, the machine-like organizing of human 
economic effort, and the extension of all organization to the ends of the earth”?6 On the 
other hand, sociologists like Gabriel Tarde looked to literature as an aesthetically 
complex expression of diversity, virtuality and potentiality to which sociology should 
aspire: “[O]rder and simplicity are simply mediating terms, alembics in which elementary 
diversity is potently transfigured and, as it were, sublimated. The poet and the 
philosopher…are the terminal flowers of any national tree.”7 To what extent, then, did the 
turn-of-the-century codification of disciplinary sociology enter the texture and form of 
modernist art? Tracing this intellectual convergence between literary art and modern 
sociology allows us to recover the contested nature of “society” and “the social” at the 
turn of the twentieth century and to uncover complex debates regarding how to 
conceptualize, image and represent the distinctiveness of human social relations in the 
technologizing, globalizing world that Du Bois describes—a world in which the 
autonomy of the human was increasingly difficult to disentangle from its technological 
mediation. 
 
5 H.G. Wells, “The So-Called Science of Sociology.” The Living Age, vol. CCXLVI 
(1905): 8. 
6 W.E.B. Du Bois “Sociology Hesitant” in The Problem of the Color Line at the Turn of 
the Twentieth Century, ed. Nahum Dimitri Chandler (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2015), 272. 
7 Gabriel Tarde, Monadology and Sociology, trans. Theo Lorenc (Melbourne: re.press, 
2012), 43. 
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“Inhuman Power,” then, describes two related phenomena: 
 (1.) Firstly, “Inhuman Power” refers simply to a new recognition of the power of 
the nonhuman in modern art and social theory. The texts collected under “infrastructural 
modernism” seek representational strategies to describe the inhuman power of 
infrastructural technology to shape the limits of human agency and the forms of human 
social organization. In literary texts, like Rudyard Kipling’s “Below the Mill Dam” 
(1902), literary character is figured as co-constituted with its material, technological 
environment. In Kipling’s story, the agency of the anthropomorphized animal-
protagonists is figured in differential relation to the infrastructural power of the “Spirt of 
the Mill.” When the mill dam’s water wheel is finally replaced with electric power at the 
story’s conclusion, the very representational status of the characters is transformed: the 
seemingly allegorical Black Rat is jarringly depersonified: stripped of his human 
characteristics, “caught and stuffed” and put “in a glass case.”8 The introduction of 
electric power transforms the very genre we thought we had been reading, dramatizing 
the extent to which our technological environment shapes not only the cultural legibility 
of the world around us, but also our most basic ontological being. In sociology, theorists 
like Georg Simmel sought frameworks that that could explain social cohesion and anomie 
in terms that bridged the gap between individual experience and global-technological 
extension. In Simmel’s Philosophy of Money (1900), for example, the intensification of 
global financial infrastructures mediates between wider social patterning and a modern 
 
8 Rudyard Kipling, “Below the Mill Dam” in Traffics and Discoveries (London: 
Macmillan, 1904), 393. 
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phenomenology of money, and the human subject is displaced by wider agencies of 
infrastructural exchange and interpersonal valuation. Both texts depict technical and 
mediated forms of human agency, coproduced through technology 
 (2.) Secondly, “Inhuman Power” also refers to the inhumanity of human 
collective agency in the twentieth century, mediated by technology. The international 
terrorism of Conrad’s The Secret Agent (1907) or the world-scale “problem of the color-
line” in Du Bois’ The Souls of Black Folk (1903) describe the conceptual and political 
intractability of forms of collective violence that exceed the scale or logic of social 
categories like class and nation. These texts give form to the infrastructural agencies of 
capital, imperialism, patriarchy and racial domination in shaping the socio-technical 
assemblages that aggregate collective human agency to what we today recognize to be 
the geophysical scale of inhuman power. 
“Inhuman Power” centers a core group of writers—Gabriel Tarde, H.G. Wells, 
Joseph Conrad, W.E.B. Du Bois, Charles Chesnutt—that emblematize what I call 
“infrastructural modernism.” These writers all bear either an overt or clearly evident 
relationship to the sociological debates and technological discourses that this dissertation 
describes. This grouping does not constitute an exhaustive or exclusive canon, and a 
longer version of this project would incorporate additional writers (Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman, Olive Schreiner, Henry James, Georg Simmel at the forefront) whose inclusion 
would amplify and elaborate its core claims. But in addition to identifying a subset of 
turn-of-the-century writers overtly engaged in the representational shared space between 
sociological theory and literary art, this project also describes a series of historical 
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transformations that suggest new ways of understanding the wider emergence of 
modernist literary form. The intellectual debates, infrastructural technologies, and new 
scales of human social organization that I describe exert pressure on the modern literary 
imagination outside of this small group of writers. In this way, “infrastructural 
modernism” refers at once to a delimited corpus of writers and texts as well as to a wider 
set of intellectual discourses, historical tensions and ideological contradictions that 
recontextualize modernism and reframe familiar literary-interpretive paradigms. 
In a well-known critical takedown of modernist aesthetics, Georg Lukács begins 
with an animating premise: "Content determines form. But there is no content of which 
Man himself is not the focal point.… [T]he basic question is, and will remain: what is 
Man?”9 Whereas realism casts “Man” as “a social animal,” in modernism the human has 
become “solitary, asocial, unable to enter into relationships with other human beings.”10 
The problem with modernism, Lukács insists, is that “by destroying the complex tissue of 
man’s relations with his environment, it furthered the dissolution of personality. For it is 
just the opposition between a man and his environment that determines the development 
of his personality.”11 Lukács here describes an explicitly “social and historical 
environment.”12 But what about the material environment, the nonhuman agencies of 
nature and technology? How might considering forms of environment in which “Man 
 
9 Georg Lukács, “The Ideology of Modernism” in The Meaning of Contemporary 
Realism, trans. John and Necke Mander (London: Merlin Press, 1969), 19. 
10 Ibid., 19, 20. 
11 Ibid., 28. 
12 Ibid., 19. 
 
 
 
8 
himself” is not the focal point transform our understanding of modernist subjectivity, its 
evidently structuring solipsism?  
This is the essential project of “Inhuman Power,” which argues that the 
unprecedented proliferation of world-scale technical infrastructure and the resulting 
experience of socio-technical entanglement exerted new pressures on both novelistic 
form and social theory at the turn of the twentieth century. Displacing the conceptual 
centrality of Lukács’ humanist subject allows me to reframe modern literary history 
through the short span of years bridging the turn of the twentieth century: the historical 
co-emergence of literary modernism, the professionalizing social sciences, and the world-
scale proliferation of technical infrastructure—the aesthetic, social, and technological 
mediations of what I call “the infrastructure era.”13 What connects literary modernism 
and modern sociology is a shared responsiveness to precisely the material, technological 
and nonhuman aspects of environment that Lukács pushes out of the interpretive frame. 
How might our understanding of modernism transform if we replace Lukács’ isolated 
subject alienated from her social environment with the radically entangled subject of 
infrastructural mediation? 
 
13 In disarticulating and analyzing “infrastructural modernism” via the frame of three 
distinct heuristics—Society, Technology, and Aesthetics—I am adopting the “three 
entryways into the labyrinth of media” suggested by W.J.T. Mitchell and Mark B.N. 
Hansen. But more important than the specificity of these frames, I believe, is their 
injunction to “triangulate” the study of media in order “to avoid the seductions of 
binarism” that trap a great deal of media-theoretical scholarship in an endless series of 
stale binaries and philosophical stalemates: new vs. old, society vs. individual, subject vs. 
object, etc. (xix). (W.J.T. Mitchell and Mark B.N. Hansen, eds. Critical Terms for Media 
Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), vii-xxii.) 
 
 
 
9 
Despite the ubiquity of “modernism” as recognizable aesthetic category, scholars 
have long struggled to reconcile its divergent impulses toward impersonality and 
subjectivity. How can one category accommodate both the radical depersonalization of 
T.S. Eliot—“Poetry…is not the expression of personality, but an escape from 
personality”—and the meticulous interiorization of Virginia Woolf—“concerned at all 
costs to reveal the flickerings of that innermost flame which flashes its messages through 
the brain”14? “Inhuman Power” constructs a new genealogy of transatlantic literary 
modernism that recasts this interpretive impasse as animating historical contradiction. 
The conceptual centrality of the autonomous subject in modernist studies has occluded a 
socio-technical imaginary that contextualizes and reframes these tensions immanent to 
our understanding of modernist literary form. We have misrecognized the dynamic co-
constitution of character and environment for the painful alienation of self and society. It 
is this reversion to the alienated subject that underlies the continual return to aesthetic-
interpretive frameworks—both subjectivism and impersonality—that are structured 
through the conceptual prism of the estranged self. But I argue that the “infrastructure 
era” marked the imaginative opportunity for a generation of literary artists and social 
theorists to project infrastructure in the place of culture, and to put the mutual 
constitution of subjects and environments where the autonomous subject once stood. 
When we reframe the literary history of 1900 through entanglement rather than 
estrangement, this paradoxical contradiction that has split our understanding of 
 
14 T.S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent” in Selected Essays, 1917-1932 (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1932), 10; Virginia Woolf, “Modern Fiction” in Selected 
Essays, ed. David Bradshaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 10. 
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“modernism” dissolves into a shared ambition to develop new narrative modes and 
aesthetic forms through which to describe the dynamic relationship between the effect of 
character and its environmental conditions of emergence.15 
 
15 Of course this characterization of modernist studies paints with a heavy hand, and other 
scholars have similarly tried to displace the autonomous subject at the heart of 
modernism. In this regard, my work builds on that of many scholars. Michael Tratner’s 
Modernism and Mass Politics Politics similarly reframes literary modernism through the 
history of new trans-individual modes of collectivity and social massification in the early-
twentieth century. But Tratner’s account differs from my own in his emphasis on the 
“mass mind;” Tratner reads modernist experimentation as seeking to disrupt the 
conscious personality “in order to reveal and perhaps alter the socially structured 
mentality hidden inside each person’s unconscious,” thus emphasizing psychological 
models of collectivity rather than material conditions of socio-technical entanglement (3). 
Tratner, Modernism and Mass Politics: Joyce, Woolf, Eliot, Yeats (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995). I also build on the example of Michael Levenson’s Modernism 
and the Fate of Individuality to investigate “the relation of character, not to narrative 
form, but to social form.” Levenson analyzes the “dense web of social constraints” and 
“intractable communal norms” that press upon and distort the “image of autonomous 
subjectivity” in modernist art (xii). His work, however, maintains a conceptual 
orientation around the “self” that this dissertation attempts to displace. Levenson, 
Modernism and the Fate of Individuality: Character and Novelistic Form from Conrad to 
Woolf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). In emphasizing the agency of 
environment on modernist conceptions of character, my argument also builds on Douglas 
Mao’s Fateful Beauty, which analyzes a burgeoning turn-of-the-century concern with 
“the scarcely registered workings of environment on the developing human being” (5). 
Mao, however, places special emphasis on aesthetic environments (or, art as 
environment) as well as on the heightened effect of environment on childhood 
development, whereas I describe a heightened awareness of environmental entanglement 
as constitutive of social life in infrastructural modernity. Mao, Fateful Beauty: Aesthetic 
Environments, Juvenile Development, and Literature, 1860-1960 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008). Finally, my work most closely follows Maud Ellmann’s The 
Nets of Modernism in its concern with the “entangled nature of the self” and conception 
of “the human subject as enmeshed in relations of exchange—sexual, linguistic, financial, 
pathogenic—that violate the limits of identity” (1). However, Ellmann’s view of 
entanglement privileges psychodynamics and “interpsychic networks of exchange” over 
the socio-technical, material model of entanglement that I describe, leading Ellmann to 
the more familiar modernist roster of James, Woolf, Joyce and Freud. Ellmann, The Nets 
of Modernism: Henry James, Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, and Sigmund Freud 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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“Shot with the colors of culture”: Forster and the Machine 
In the early-twentieth century, writers began to suspect that the socio-technical 
mediation of infrastructure was coming slowly to overtake the social functions and 
spaces that had once belonged to culture. This is an abstract claim that gains concretion 
through the perhaps unexpected figure of E.M. Forster, whose 1910 novel Howards End 
could be read as a humanist ode to the value of culture as embodied in the novel’s liberal-
intellectual heroine, Margaret Schlegel. But Forster’s short story “The Machine Stops,” 
published just one year before Howards End in 1909, tells the story of a dystopian 
infrastructural world-state that corrodes and undermines the confident cultural humanism 
of Howards End. Read together, the Edwardian novel and apocalyptic short fiction 
dramatize the wider imaginative tension between humanist culture and posthumanist 
infrastructure that this dissertation traces. 
Matthew Arnold’s formulation “to see life steadily and to see it whole,” an 
evident affirmation of culture’s illuminative value, echoes as sort of reflexive mission 
statement throughout Howards End.16 Margaret and her siblings value culture as life’s 
highest pursuit; their days are filled with discussion societies, symphony visits and 
aesthetic contemplation. The problem arises, however, when Margaret tries to look 
 
16 The line “to see life steadily and to see it whole” is one of several phrasal leitmotifs 
that recur throughout the linguistic texture of Howards End (“telegrams and anger,” 
“panic and emptiness,” etc.). The line is a slightly-altered excerpt from Arnold’s poem 
“To a Friend” (1849), an ode to Sophocles, “[w]ho saw life steadily, and saw it whole.” 
Forster discusses the poem in his short essay “A Note on the Way” (1934), published in 
Abinger Harvest (New York: Harvest, 1964). 
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beyond her own cultural edification, to enact the political value of culture that Arnold 
describes in Culture and Anarchy:  
Culture looks beyond machinery, culture hates hatred; culture has one great 
passion, the passion for sweetness and light…. It is not satisfied till we all come 
to a perfect man; it knows that the sweetness and light of the few must be 
imperfect until the raw and unkindly masses of humanity are touched with 
sweetness and light.17  
 
The question Forster poses in Howards End is whether Arnold’s liberal-humanist politics 
of culture, in which the development of the self unfolds in ameliorative co-development 
with society (even those “unkindly masses of humanity”) is a practicable (or even 
thinkable) ideal in the what I have called the infrastructure era. 
The modern pressures placed upon this Arnoldian model are dramatized in the 
character of  Margaret, who struggles to reconcile her privileged social position as liberal 
intellectual with both her burgeoning sense of class vulnerability in relation to the 
thriving industrial-imperialist Wilcoxes, as well as her overwhelming class privilege over 
the “abyss”-teetering Basts. The difficulties for Margaret are evident early in the novel, 
as she breathlessly expresses her personal values to an uncomprehending Mrs. Wilcox: 
“Life's very difficult and full of surprises. At all events, I've got as far as that. To 
be humble and kind, to go straight ahead, to love people rather than pity them, to 
remember the submerged—well, one can't do all these things at once, worse luck, 
because they're so contradictory. It's then that proportion comes in—to live by 
proportion. Don't begin with proportion. Only prigs do that. Let proportion come 
in as a last resource, when the better things have failed, and a deadlock—Gracious 
me, I've started preaching!” 
 
 
17 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy and other writings, ed. Stefan Collini 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 78-79. 
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“Indeed, you put the difficulties of life splendidly,” said Mrs. Wilcox, 
withdrawing her hand into the deeper shadows.18 
 
Margaret’s rambling speech trips over itself, as she stumbles over the contradictory moral 
imperatives underwriting her liberal-humanist values. Margaret can only manage these 
competing pressures through an imaginative mode of “proportion” that scales down the 
contradictory experience of modern history to aesthetic legibility, a way of seeing that 
cordons off Arnold’s universalist cultural humanism into the smaller scale of individual 
comprehension. But this aesthetics of proportion reaches its imaginative limit in the 
dreary figure of Leonard Bast, who finally defies the Arnoldian values that Forster 
elsewhere seems to endorse. After meeting Leonard for the second time, Margaret 
reflects:  
Culture had worked in her own case, but during the last few weeks she had 
doubted whether it humanized the majority, so wide and so widening is the gulf 
that stretches between the natural and the philosophic man, so many the good 
chaps who are wrecked in trying to cross it. (HE 98)  
 
In a surprising exclusion, Margaret, mouthpiece for Forster’s epigraphic injunction to 
“only connect!” evidently cannot do so with the well-meaning Leonard. Margaret’s 
aesthetics of proportion is unable to reconcile the dingy, struggling Leonard with the 
humanizing values of culture, effectively withholding her sweetness and light and 
undermining the wider Arnoldian value-system. What, then, is the value of proportion? 
And what relation does it bear to the wider representational logic of Howards End, itself 
 
18 Forster, Howards End, 62. Further references to this text hereafter cited parenthetically 
by page number and HE. 
 
 
 
14 
an effort to see modern England steadily and whole through the tumult of modern 
history? 
Arnold’s cultural ideal is finally satisfied near the end of the novel when Margaret 
contemplates the English country after the uresting flux of London:  
In these English farms, if anywhere, one might see life steadily and see it whole, 
group in one vision its transitoriness and its eternal youth, connect—connect 
without bitterness until all men are brothers.” (HE 229)  
 
In the more comprehensible scale of country life, Margaret’s aesthetics of proportion can 
activate and visualize the imaginative triumph of culture and connection—to connect, we 
see, is to see life steadily and to see it whole. This Arnoldian aesthetic coup prefigures the 
symbolic reconciliation of the novel’s conclusion in which Helen’s child (fathered by the 
now-deceased Leonard) plays in the hay outside Howards End, figurally reconciling the 
liberal-intellectual, industrial-imperialist and lower-clerical classes—what Lionel Trilling 
declares “the symbol of the classless society” in his well-known reading of Forster.19 
Trilling’s reading—and the wider reading of Howards Ends as triumphant liberal-
humanist reconciliation—relies on Margaret’s aesthetics of proportion, on collapsing the 
difference between character and class while excluding the unkepmt Basts from the 
aesthetic frame. To heroize Margaret (as both Helen and Trilling do) is to assume that the 
aesthetics of proportion (of imaginatively compressing historical complexity and 
contradiction into figural legibility for the individual mind) is a socially ameliorative 
triumph in the vein of Arnold’s model of culture.20 Margaret the character, then, 
 
19 Lionel Trilling, E.M. Forster (New York: New Directions, 1964), 135. 
20 As Helen tells Margaret in a plainly reflexive comment at the novel’s conclusion: 
“Can't it strike you—even for a moment—that your life has been heroic? Can't you 
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dramatizes the very same agency as Howards End the novel, whose late-realist aesthetics 
serve the important social function of helping its readers see modern England whole. But 
to what extent might this conclusion problematize rather than vindicate the cultural 
aesthetics of proportion? Margaret and Helen do briefly acknowledge Leonard from their 
pastoral retreat: 
“A place, as well as a person, may catch the glow. Don't you see that all this leads 
to comfort in the end?  It is part of the battle against sameness. Differences—
eternal differences, planted by God in a single family, so that there may always be 
colour; sorrow perhaps, but colour in the daily grey. Then I can't have you 
worrying about Leonard. Don't drag in the personal when it will not come. Forget 
him.”  
“Yes, yes, but what has Leonard got out of life?” 
“Perhaps an adventure.”   
“Is that enough?” 
“Not for us. But for him.” (HE 288)  
 
Leonard briefly intrudes Margaret’s liberal ode to difference, tolerance and material 
comfort, an unwelcome vestige of the personal that irritates her impersonal moral sermon 
and defies the essential logic of proportion by mixing inharmonious aesthetic scales. But 
what is most interesting is that Margaret frames Leonard’s exclusion in literary-generic 
terms, as adventure. Margaret’s cultural imagination relegates Leonard to the minor genre 
of adventure-romance, withholding him even in death from the fully humanized cultural 
domain of the novel’s concluding reconciliation—and from the complex interiority of 
Howards End’s own realist characterological depth. Margaret can only hold her cultural 
triumph in place, can only bear to see it whole, by consigning Leonard to a different 
genre of experience—a less complex or psychologically deep form of personhood.   
 
remember the two months after Charles's arrest, when you began to act, and did all?” (HE 
289). 
 
 
 
16 
But Howards End elsewhere signals that Margaret’s cultural aesthetics of 
proportion may face a far greater threat than the unmanageable personhood of Leonard—
that the human of Margaret’s liberal humanism way be locked in a larger battle with an 
infrastructural, modernizing agency that is actually transforming the human itself:  
London was but a foretaste of this nomadic civilization which is altering human 
nature so profoundly, and throws upon personal relations a stress greater than they 
have ever borne before. (HE 222)  
 
To alter human nature is to alter the supreme and stabilizing center of the aesthetics of 
proportion, to corrode the essential heart of Margaret’s liberal humanism. This moment 
quickly passes, but it powerfully (if briefly) displaces the Arnoldian humanism that seems 
to structure the novel’s moral-aesthetic worldview.21 To enframe “human nature” within 
the wider infrastructural dynamism of London is to relativize the human at the heart of 
Arnoldian culture. Is culture, then, the highest expression of a timeless human essence, or 
is human nature contingent, perhaps to some extent even produced by, that very culture? 
Forster, then, figures Margaret’s realist aesthetics of proportion, of the individual-human 
gaze, as precariously poised between two interpretive possibilities: (1.) the key aesthetic 
mode that unlocks Trilling’s perfectly-constructed class allegory of social reconciliation 
and (2.) the residual aesthetic frame of a cultural humanism under threat by the 
encroaching “red rust” of urban infrastructure (HE 290). Do Margaret’s aesthetics of 
proportion solve the contradictions of Arnoldian culture in the twentieth century, or are 
 
21 Despite its clear limitations in the case of Leonard, a stand-in for the systemic relations 
of economic interdependence that link his precarity to her privilege, which she can bear 
to see neither steadily nor whole. 
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they merely a symbolic brake to ward off social transformations that are rendering the 
very humanizing agency of culture obsolete? 
This tension immanent to Howards End gains historical and aesthetic depth when 
read in conjunction with Forster’s short fiction of the same period. His science-fiction 
story “The Machine Stops,” published just one year before Howards End in 1909, gives 
positive form to the changing human nature to which Howards End can only dimly allude 
from the deepest recesses of its overt Arnoldian humanism. In the story, a totalizing but 
invisible apparatus known only as “the Machine” has taken over human social 
organization on a global scale. Politics are equally invisible; nation-states have given way 
to an unseen Central Committee of the Machine that seems to have ceded all meaningful 
political agency to the Machine itself. Individuals live physically isolated from each other 
in small identical chambers outfitted with mediated communication systems that connect 
these atomized beings across the globe.  
Much of the story takes place between a mother and son. Vashti—the mother—
embraces the Machine and spends her time sheltered in her room listening to and giving 
“lectures” via an infrastructural communications technology. Vashti—like most other 
denizens of the Machine—is deeply distrustful and even fearful of first-hand experience. 
She dreads speaking directly and especially touching other people. The total experience 
of mediation—a kind of virtual exchange of already-existing ideas—has taken the place 
of both physical exertion and Arnoldian culture. There are no books in the Machine 
(except for the tech manual-cum-scripture “Book of the Machine”) and no felt need to 
“see it whole” outside the frame of the virtual communications portal. 
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This totalizing mediation reaches a parodic level towards the end of the story 
when a lecturer insists that the regurgitation of tenth-hand ideas must supplant the vulgar 
and distorted experience of the body:  
Those who still wanted to know what the earth was like had after all only to listen 
to some gramophone, or to look into some cinematophone…. “First-hand ideas do 
not really exist. They are but the physical impressions produced by love and fear, 
and on this gross foundation who could erect a philosophy? Let your ideas be 
second-hand, and if possible tenth-hand, for then they will be far removed from 
that disturbing element—direct observation.”22   
 
This fear of nature and of direct experience refracts backs and exerts a degenerating 
influence on the denizens of the Machine. Vashti is described as a kind of semi-human 
pap: “a swaddled lump of flesh—a woman, about five feet high, with a face as white as a 
fungus.”23 Her son Kuno, a clear Forster mouthpiece, rejects the Machine and argues 
throughout the story that the fear of personal connection has withered or diminished some 
essential quality of the human worth saving:  
“It has robbed us of the sense of space and of the sense of touch, it has blurred 
every human relation and narrowed down love to a carnal act, it has paralyzed our 
bodies and our wills…”24  
 
And it is at this point that these two seemingly divergent literary texts—the Edwardian 
social drama of Howards End and the science-fictional thought-experiment of “The 
Machine Stops”—vitally intersect: the imaginative tension between some essential 
quality of the human and that human’s vulnerability to a kind of environmental agency 
that brings it dangerously proximate to “nature” and threatens to corrode that very human 
 
22 E.M. Forster, “The Machine Stops” in Selected Stories, ed. David Leavitt and Mark 
Mitchell (New York: Penguin, 2001), 114. 
23 Ibid., 91. 
24 Ibid., 100. 
 
 
 
19 
essence. A passage from the story’s apocalyptic conclusion expresses the difficulty of 
this idea: 
[B]eautiful naked man was dying, strangled in the garments that he had woven. 
Century after century had he toiled, and here was his reward. Truly the garment 
had seemed heavenly at first, shot with the colors of culture, sewn with the 
threads of self-denial. And heavenly it had been so long as it was a garment and 
no more, so long as man could shed it at will and live by the essence that is his 
soul, and the essence, equally divine, that is his body. The sin against his body—it 
was for that they wept in chief; the centuries of wrong abusing the muscles and 
the nerves, and those five portals by which we can alone apprehend—glozing it 
over with talk of evolution, until the body was white pap, the home of ideas as 
colorless, last sloshy stirrings of a spirit that had grasped the stars.25 
 
This is a fabulously confused and confusing passage: the narrator tells us that “talk of 
evolution” has deteriorated the human body. But is “beautiful naked man” a part of 
nature, or does he belong to some other distinctively or autonomously human realm 
adequate to the “essence that is his soul”? Is the power of infrastructurally-mediated 
intellectual exchange so great that talk of evolution can instigate the material effects of 
degeneration? Forster can’t quite decide whether it is a natural-physical or cultural-
intellectual degenerative agency that the text diagnoses and describes. This conceptual 
contradiction melds into this passage’s description of the Machine as a garment worn by 
humanity, “shot with the colors of culture.” But this pseudo-cultural garment of 
infrastructure has acted on the body, turned it into “white pap;” infrastructure has a 
material, physical agency that transforms the human in an existential manner, but one that 
is uncertainty poised between the “natural” and the “cultural,” between “evolution” and 
“talk of evolution.” Nonetheless, what is clear is that infrastructure acts on the body in a 
 
25 Ibid., 122-23. 
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way that burrows deeper than the mere garment of culture and that this infrastructural 
agency has at first covertly but now fully taken over what was once the domain of 
culture. It is in this way that “The Machine Stops” functions as the posthumanist science-
fictional inverse of the liberal-humanist realism of Howards End and its cultural 
aesthetics of proportion. “The Machine Stops” imaginatively extends that second, latent 
interpretation of Margaret’s cultural humanism—the fear that the humanist value of 
culture may only be a contingent symbolic brake or residual aesthetic frame, increasingly 
inadequate to an infrastructural world-in-flux. “The Machine Stops” is the futuristic 
historical destination of the “nomadic society” haunting the imaginative margins of 
Howards End. What, then, is the place of culture in the twentieth century? Are 
Margaret’s aesthetics of cultural proportion, which scale the world to her individual 
comprehension so that she might “see it whole,” a residual and obsolescent aesthetic 
mode in an infrastructural world that is radically transforming the relationship between 
humans and their environments, or is culture an historically vital and urgent symbolic 
practice that needs protecting and reimagining in the “infrastructure era” of the twentieth 
century? Forster seems clearly to favor the second view, but the representational tension 
between these two texts, written simultaneously, lays bare the wider historical 
contradiction from which these questions arise and that this dissertation traces across a 
series of writers who approach the infrastructure era not as existential threat so much as 
imaginative opportunity.  
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Modernism vs./as Media 
The late-nineteenth-century spread of technical infrastructure—railways, 
standards, arrangements of urban space—enabled new forms of social connection that 
transformed how both artists and sociologists modeled the relationship between self and 
society in a globalizing world. While networked communications and transportation 
technologies certainly spread across much of Europe and the United States prior to the 
turn of the twentieth century, the world-scale proliferation of infrastructural technologies 
intensified to an unprecedented degree in the final decade of the nineteenth century.26 As 
Robert Millward notes of the British context: “The growth of the urban infrastructure was 
the most dynamic element in the British economy from the 1870s to the 1930s. Even if 
one ignores housing, the investment in public health, local transport, policing, water, 
electricity and gas was accounting, by the early 1900s, for one quarter of all capital 
formation in Britain.”27 It can be difficult to recover the kind of social, economic, 
 
26 For a close study of the relationship between Victorian fiction and this nineteenth-
century media environment, see: Richard Menke, Telegraphic Realism: Victorian Fiction 
and Other Information Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).  
27 Robert Millward, “The political economy of urban utilities” in The Cambridge Urban 
History of Britain, Vol. III, ed. Martin Daunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 315. On the late-nineteenth-century proliferation of world-scale technical 
infrastructure, see also: Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2010); Peter J. Hugill, Global Communications since 1844: Geopolitics and 
Technology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Thomas P. Hughes, 
Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society,1880-1930 (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1988); Armand Mattelart, Networking the World, 1794-2000, 
trans. Liz Carey-Libbrecht and James A. Cohen (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2000); Martin Schiefelbusch and Hans-Liudger Dienel, eds., Linking Networks: 
The Formation of Common Standards and Visions for Infrastructure Development 
(London: Routledge, 2016); Dwayne R. Winseck and Robert M. Pike, Communication 
and Empire: Media, Markets, and Globalization, 1860–1930 (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2007). 
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geopolitical, spatio-temporal and cultural-imaginative upheaval that would have attended 
such a rapid and complete transformation of the global technology environment. Michael 
Rubenstein reminds us that the term “infrastructure” only attained its settled, familiar 
conceptual coherence in the New Deal context of the 1930s. In the first decade of the 
twentieth century, this terminological-conceptual lack meant that “the nature, context, 
meaning, and portent of the national electrical grid was unknown and mysterious for 
those who lived through its construction.”28 As Maud Ellmann has shown, new 
networked technologies unsettled basic social distinctions between inside and outside, 
autonomy and relationality, “insinutat[ing] the public in the private sphere, creating 
mysterious and uncontrollable relations of dependency.”29 For literary artists, this 
extraordinary experience of socio-technical transformation raised pressing questions 
about the changing social function of literature in a rapidly transforming media 
environment. 
In the case of “The Machine Stops,” the totalizing social saturation of new 
infrastructural technologies spurred Forster to rethink the boundaries between culture and 
technology, human and nonhuman. Joseph Conrad shared a similar apprehension, 
describing in his correspondence a totalizing “knitting machine” that “knits us in…and 
knits us out. It has knitted time, space, pain, death, corruption, despair and all the 
 
28 Michael Rubenstein, Public Works: Infrastructure, Irish Modernism, and the 
Postcolonial (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 6. 
29 Ellmann, The Nets of Modernism, 2. 
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illusions.”30 Conrad’s knitting machine literalizes Forster’s shared intuition that 
infrastructure was becoming a machinic agency materially holding “us” together, 
becoming the very form of social life. This idea of social form expresses itself in literary 
form. As I will elaborate in chapter 3, the convoluted, experimental narrative form of 
Conrad’s 1907 novel The Secret Agent stages the developmental logic of nineteenth-
century Bildung (“culture”) against the infrastructural chronicity of standardized time 
(“technology”). A novelistic knitting machine, The Secret Agent traces the cohesion of 
London “society” not to interpersonal sympathy or shared culture, but to infrastructure: 
the circulation of standards that coordinate the practices and mentalities of diverse 
individuals. This displacement of cultural Bildung by technical infrastructure instigates 
wider questions about the distinctiveness of the novel in a diversifying media ecology: To 
what extent is the modern novel distinctive from other kinds of communicative media as 
a subject-forming technology? Is personhood the result of individual moral development 
or the byproduct of technical mediation (the process of technological “human-becoming” 
that media theorist Bernard Stiegler calls “hominization”)?31 Does literature serve a 
higher cultural purpose, or is it simply another technology of personhood? 
 
30 Joseph Conrad, Letter to R.B Cunninghame Graham, 20 December 1897, Joseph 
Conrad’s Letters to R.B. Cunninghame Graham, ed. C.T. Watts (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 57. 
31 See Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard 
Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), esp. Pt. 1, 
chap. 2. Stiegler here extends and recasts for media philosophy the evolutionary-cultural 
anthropology of André Leroi-Gourhan’s Gesture and Speech (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1993). 
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Conrad and Forster’s shared apprehension of infrastructure as a newly powerful 
agent of social mediation invites literary scholars to rethink what we mean by media in 
modernist studies. No single theorist has been more influential in orienting literary 
approaches to media studies than Friedrich Kittler. One reason for my own focus on the 
axial year of 1900 stems from that year’s significance in Kittler’s media history and 
theory. In Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, Kittler influentially cast 1900 as the arrival-
date of a new discourse network characterized by media technologies (the titular film, 
gramophone, typewriter) that indexically capture the optical, acoustic and temporal 
effects of the real—for the first time producing new technical-experiential regimes that 
break literature’s monolithic hold on “culture.” Kittler saw human beings as the effect of 
an antiquated discourse network constrained by the uncontested monopoly of writing—a 
pre-1900 historical condition in which meaning was hegemonically filtered through the 
hermeneutics of alphabetic language. If the cultural monopoly of literature allowed “so-
called Man” to “mistake information for spirit,” then the 1900 discourse network 
dissolves this humanist spiritual “essence” into the “apparatuses” that comprise its 
technical-material substrate: “So-called Man is split up into physiology and information 
technology.”32  
Kittler’s media theory has rightly exerted a powerful influence in modernist 
studies, providing an historically-specific account of the ways in which our media 
environments determine the capacities and limits of the human sensorium. Recent studies 
 
32 Friedrich A. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young 
and Michael Wutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 16. 
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by Mark Goble, Sara Danius, David Trotter and Richard Menke all implicitly or 
explicitly reflect Kittler’s structuring influence.33 Each of these studies coordinates the 
distinctive stylistic and formal innovations of modern literature with new media 
technologies. Danius, for example, persuasively argues that “the emergence of modernist 
aesthetics signifies the increasing internalization of technological matrices of 
perception.”34 Some of these studies focus on a clearly delimited subset of “new media 
objects”: “technologies of perception” (Danius), “transmission systems that directly 
incorporate or adapt writing” (Menke); while others offer a more flexible media archive: 
“mediums and materialities of communication” (Goble), both “communication”-based 
and “storage”-based devices (Trotter). Both Goble and Trotter analyze a wider array of 
new media objects in order to highlight a deep concern with “communication” as that 
which unites modernism and its modernizing media environment. What media gives to 
modernism, Trotter tells us, is “an idea about the prosthetic enhancement of our capacity 
to communicate.”35 This heuristic of “communication” allows Goble and Trotter to 
reclaim the human from Kittler’s combative antihumanism and connects their studies to 
the other major vector of research in “modernism and media”: global information 
networks. Recent studies by Mark Wollaeger, James Purdon and Damien Keane have 
 
33 Mark Goble, Beautiful Circuits: Modernism and the Mediated Life (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010); Sara Danius, The Senses of Modernism: Technology, 
Perception, and Aesthetics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); David Trotter, 
Literature in the First Media Age: Britain between the Wars (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2013); Menke, Telegraphic Realism. 
34 Danius, The Senses of Modernism, 2. 
35 Trotter, Literature in the First Media Age, 2. 
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recast modernism as the literary prehistory of the “information age.”36 If the early-
twentieth century was the period in which “information…emerged as both the basis of 
modern political power and one of its primary objects of attention and control,” then 
these scholars have shown how “information” became newly visible and thinkable as an 
object of literary representation.37 Wollaeger, for example, casts British modernism and 
modern propaganda as competing information technologies, interrelated “mechanisms for 
coping with information flows that had begun to outstrip the processing capacity of the 
mind.”38  
Each of these scholars describes a version of Anglophone literary modernism that 
absorbs the qualities of new media objects and technologies: contact with a realm of new 
media complexifies and strengthens the literary. While this mode of analysis has vastly 
enriched our understanding of the relationship between “media” and “modernism,” these 
studies deepen and entrench Kittler’s structuring distinction between media on the one 
hand and literature on the other, even as those domains may increasingly resemble each 
other. The next step for media-theoretical approaches to modernist studies requires 
 
36 Mark Wollaeger, Modernism, Media, and Propaganda: British Narrative from 1900 to 
1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008);  James Purdon, Modernist 
Informatics: Literature, Information, and the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015); Damien Keane, Ireland and the Problem of Information: Irish Writing, Radio, 
Late Modernist Communication (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2014). On the relationship between modern aesthetics and global networks in the latter 
half of the century, see Patrick Jagoda, Network Aesthetics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2016); Alexander R. Galloway, “Are Some Things Unrepresentable?” in 
The Interface Effect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). On the prehistory of modernist 
information networks, see Grant Bollmer, Inhuman Power: Social Media and the 
Archaeology of Connection (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016). 
37 Purdon, Modernist Informatics, 6. 
38 Wollaeger, Modernism, Media, and Propaganda, xiii. 
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scholars to engage not only with Kittler’s history of the mediated human sensorium but 
also with his (and many other media theorists’) view of literature as a kind of residual 
anti-media that dissolved into technical obsolescence in the post-1900 discourse network. 
Kittler’s aggressive anithumanism repudiates the literary as enfeebled other to 
media. Books circa 1900 register primarily “an aesthetics of terror”: the formal 
experimentation of modernism is one last aesthetic gasp, as literature reflexively 
recognizes itself as an “information technology whose monopoly is now coming to an 
end.”39Are the infrastructural fictions of Forster and Conrad, Tarde and Kipling, merely 
the stylistic trace of this decomposing human spirit? Against Kittler’s (in)famous 
assertion that “media determine our situation,” charting a one-directional vector from 
media objects to the capacities of human agency, Forster and Conrad both theorize a 
more dynamic relationship between humans and media, culture and technology.40 Time 
standardization competes with Dickens. Arnoldian sweetness and light competes with the 
encroaching red rust. Rather than dissolve the literary along with the human, pace Kittler, 
Conrad, Wells, Forster, Chesnutt, Du Bois and Gilman all recognize literature as media: 
texts that self-consciously mediate between a human reader and the wider world. The 
convoluted narrative chronology of The Secret Agent, for example, formally dramatizes 
the way that media technologies (Greenwich time, mass-circulated newspapers, the 
novel) structure and condition the social experience of temporality. Conrad’s novel-as-
knitting machine reflexively apprehends its social function as literal middle between 
 
39 Ibid., xl. 
40 Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, xxxix. 
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human readers and a rapidly transforming media environment by travestying the 
standardized socio-temporal logic of infrastructural modernity, projecting an alternate, 
disruptive experience of time. The example of Conrad suggests that infrastructural 
modernism not only represents but also serves as a kind of medial infrastructure of its 
own. 
One important model for this approach to modernism-as-media is Kate Marshall’s 
Corridor, which reads early-twentieth-century US fiction as a reflexive media technology 
alongside infrastructure, transit networks, and domestic architecture, each “encod[ing] 
their own communicative processes.”41 Marshall’s study is exemplary for rethinking the 
“distinction between form (for representing communications) and medium (through 
which communication happens)” in modernism by demonstrating how corridors 
“simultaneously operate as form and medium” in the early-twentieth-century American 
novel.42 Marshall calls on literary scholars to recognize “the adverbial and adjectival 
dimensions of media: how they work, and how fiction observes its own operations 
through them.”43 This entails reading media as process rather than a delimited set of 
static objects. Objects only become media through historically-concrete social practices 
and relationships—by actually mediating—rather than a timeless inner essence or static 
ontology. What was once media may not be tomorrow. As Marshall explains, we need 
“to account for how things like spatial structures, technologies, and systems have the 
 
41 Kate Marshall, Corridor: Media Architectures in American Fiction (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 2. 
42 Ibid., 37. 
43 Ibid., 2. 
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capacity to become media in a local historical constellation.”44 It is this attention to 
mediation as historically-specific social process that differentiates Marshall’s 
understanding of infrastructure from that of Rubenstein in Public Works, who focuses on 
the ideological “imaginative link[s]” between infrastructure and art within Irish literature, 
rather than on the kind of formally reflexive mediality that Marshall describes.45 Marshall 
helps us to rethink how we adjudicate what is and is not “media” in modernist studies. 
But returning to the imaginative proximity of culture and infrastructure in Forster circa 
1909, the question still remains: In the twentieth century, is “culture” subsumable to 
“infrastructure”? To begin to answer this question we need first to ask: How exactly does 
infrastructure shape the experience of modern social life? 
This is an abstract, challenging question that scholars across the humanities have 
begun of late to embrace. Over the past two decades, an interdisciplinary array of 
scholars across the history of technology (Edwards), urban studies (Easterling), cultural 
criticism (Parks), sociology (Bowker/Star), media philosophy (Peters), anthropology 
(Larkin) and social theory (Berlant) have newly theorized the interrelationship of media, 
infrastructure and environment in shaping the experience of modern social life.46 Arguing 
 
44 Ibid. 
45 Rubenstein, Public Works, 2. 
46 Paul N. Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization 
in the History of Sociotechnical Systems” in Modernity and Technology, eds. Thomas J. 
Misa, Philip Brey, and Andrew Feenberg. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); Keller 
Easterling, Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space (London: Verso, 2014); 
Signal Traffic: Critical Studies of Media Infrastructures, ed. Lisa Parks and Nicole 
Starosielski (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015); Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan 
Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2000); John Durham Peters, The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of 
Elemental Media (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Brian Larkin, Signal and 
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for a wider conception of “media” than the objects and institutions through which human 
beings communicate and store data, this newer direction in media studies maintains that 
media comprise a kind of environment that both enables and constrains the capacities of 
human agency. Paul Edwards has argued, for example, that infrastructure functions “as 
environment, as social setting, … as the invisible, unremarked basis of modernity 
itself.”47 Infrastructure gives shape “both conceptually and practically” to the very 
experience of living in “society” such that “to construct infrastructures is simultaneously 
to construct a particular kind of nature, a Nature as Other to society and technology.”48 
More recently, Keller Easterling has drawn attention not to the clandestine agency of 
infrastructure as “hidden substrate” or “binding medium,” but rather to infrastructure as 
“the overt point of contact and access between us all—the rules governing the space of 
everyday life.”49 Infrastructural technologies mediate dynamic constellations of space, 
information and power in ways that exceed older conceptual mediations of political 
agency like the nation-state, generating “de facto forms of polity faster than even quasi-
official forms of governance can legislate them.”50 What both Edwards and Easterling 
suggest is that in the twentieth century to think about media is to think about 
 
Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2008); Lauren Berlant, “The commons: Infrastructures for troubling times,” 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 34.3 (2016): 393-419. See also: Traffic: 
Media as Infrastructures and Cultural Practices, ed. Marion Näser-Lather and Christoph 
Neubert (Leiden: Brill, 2015); Susan Leigh Star, “The Ethnography of Infrastructure,” 
American Behavioral Scientist 43.3 (1999): 377–391. 
47 Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity,” 186. 
48 Ibid., 189. 
49 Easterling, Extrastatecraft, 11. 
50 Ibid., 15. 
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environment—and to think about environment is to think about media, technology, and 
infrastructure. This idea has recently been developed by John Durham Peters, who 
extends “media” beyond its conventional humanist referent, the “distributors of messages 
and meanings designed on a human scale.”51 Instead, he argues, “[t]he old idea that 
media are environments can be flipped: environments are also media.”52 If we widen our 
understanding of media to the “enabling environments that provide habitats for diverse 
forms of life,” then we can recognize media as that which mediates between human 
beings and the natural world, “always in the middle between sea, earth, and sky.”53 Media 
studies, then, is reimagined as “a form of philosophical anthropology, a meditation on the 
human condition, which also means a meditation on the nonhuman condition.”54 Lauren 
Berlant brings this environmental model of mediation back to her infrastructural social 
theory. What distinguishes infrastructure, she argues, from “system or structure” is that it 
allows us to conceptualize “the movement or patterning of social form.”55 Infrastructure 
“is the living mediation of what organizes life: the lifeworld of structure…all the systems 
that link ongoing proximity to being in a world-sustaining relation.”56  
 
51 Peters, The Marvelous Clouds, 5. 
52 Ibid., 3. 
53 Ibid., 3, 12 
54 Ibid., 12. 
55 Berlant, “The commons,” 393. 
56 Ibid. Berlant’s theory of infrastructure as a kind of “living mediation” resonates with 
larger trends in media studies to engage directly with processes of mediation as opposed 
to media objects. For representative texts in this mode, see: Alexander R. Galloway, 
Eugene Thacker, and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries in Media and 
Mediation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); John Guillory, “Origin of the 
Media Concept,” Critical Inquiry 36 (2010): 321-62; Richard Grusin, “Radical 
Mediation,” Critical Inquiry 42.1 (2015): 124-148; Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinksa, 
Life after New Media: Mediation as a Vital Process (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014); 
 
 
 
32 
What Edwards, Easterling, Peters and Berlant all diversely emphasize is the 
unique agency of modern infrastructure to shape human beings’ relationship not only 
with each other but also with the natural world. If infrastructure holds us, as Berlant says, 
in “a world-sustaining relation,” how do we theorize that world? Do we follow Peters and 
recognize the continuity between natural and socio-technical media environments, the 
mediation of human and nonhuman? Or, following Edwards, is our apprehension of 
modern social life fundamentally shaped by a conception of “Nature as Other to society 
and technology”? These are questions that Forster, Kipling, Conrad, Wells and Gilman 
first surveyed at the dawn of the twentieth century. But not only were these ideas 
explored in literary form—at the same time, these same questions regarding the 
relationship between nature and society were adjudicated in the codifying disciplinary 
protocols of academic sociology. As infrastructure shaped and decomposed “society,” 
sociology emerged to conceptualize and to theorize it. Returning to these turn-of-the-
century sociological debates clarifies the intellectual stakes underlying the literary 
experiments of infrastructural modernism—and why those aesthetic forms constitute a 
vital imaginative resource for our own infrastructural present. 
 
Social Facts and Fiction 
Human beings are, of course, distinctive. But how we represent, conceptualize, 
and image that distinctiveness has crucial socio-political consequences. How do our 
conceptual paradigms and aesthetic forms lead us to highlight certain kinds of 
 
W.J.T. Mitchell, Image Science: Iconology, Visual Culture, and Media Aesthetics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
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relationality and to efface or obscure others? And to what extent might these occlusions 
conform to—or even sustain—the structural inequality of the modern world-system?  
The sociological paradigms codified at the turn of the twentieth century continue to 
structure how we understand the distinctiveness of human social relations and the 
autonomy of human culture in the present. But what alternative conceptual or aesthetic 
possibilities might we reclaim by returning to these early sociological debates—
recovering the internal complexity and contested nature of turn-of-the-century efforts to 
conceptualize the distinctiveness of human social life?  
Mary Poovey traces the “gradual consolidation of a distinctively ‘social’ domain” 
to proto-sociological efforts in Britain “to comprehend—to understand, measure, and 
represent—the poverty that seemed increasingly visible in the last three decades of the 
eighteenth century.”57 Into the nineteenth century, a widening tension between 
representation and measurement (as itself a kind of representation) increasingly came to 
structure European social theory. Oscillating between a “scientific orientation” and 
“hermeneutic attitude,” a distinctively sociological discourse began to take shape in 
competition with literary realism: an “inner-disciplinary process of purification” in which 
sociology repudiated its originary proximity to the aesthetic in order to attain 
epistemological capital within a burgeoning social-scientific knowledge-system that 
privileged analysis and systemization above description and classification. 58 As Susan 
 
57 Mary Poovey, Making a Social Body: British Cultural Formation, 1830-1864 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 8. 
58 Wolf Lepenies, Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology, trans. R.J. 
Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1, 7. Lepines describes “a 
complex process in the course of which scientific modes of procedure became 
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Mizruchi has shown, in the late-nineteenth century a semi-undifferentiated “general 
group of disciplines”—including sociology, economics, anthropology, and psychology—
“reached their critical emergent point at the turn of the twentieth century, when they were 
institutionalized…as academic disciplines… and codified in the works of major social 
scientific theorists particular to each field.”59 Into the twentieth century, as the study of 
society became an academic profession subdivided into the distinct disciplines of social 
science, sociologists “inherited the assumption that a singular logic provided the unseen 
dynamic of social life” and sought to conceptualize the particular mechanisms, laws and 
patterns that distinguish human social life from other kinds of relation.60 
The most influential figure in establishing these disciplinary protocols for modern 
sociology was Émile Durkheim. In the preface to his sociological study of suicide, 
Durkheim insists that sociology’s most pressing intellectual task is to delimit its own 
particular object—to locate the ontological domain that is distinctively sociological: 
“Indubitably for sociology to be possible, it must above all have an object all its own. It 
must take cognizance of a reality which is not in the domain of other sciences.”61 This 
special domain is what he seeks to locate inductively through the practical application of 
 
differentiated from literary modes” over the course of the nineteenth century, as 
“literature and sociology contested with one another the claim to offer the key orientation 
for modern civilization and to constitute the guide to living appropriate to industrial 
society” (1). What Lepines does not consider is that these internal debates and processes 
of inner-disciplinary differentiation continued to gain complexity into the twentieth 
century. 
59 Susan L. Mizruchi, The Science of Sacrifice: American Literature and Modern Social 
Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 13. 
60 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 1. 
61 Émile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, trans. John A. Spaulding and George 
Simpson, ed. George Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1951), 38. 
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sociological method—using statistical analysis to uncover the social patterning 
underlying even the most seemingly intimate or personal domains of human behavior. 
Durkheim codifies these methods and the distinctively social ontology that they disclose 
in The Rules of Sociological Method (1895). The first task that Durkheim undertakes in 
The Rules is to distinguish the specificity of sociology from both biology and 
psychology: 
Every individual drinks, sleeps, eats, or employs his reason…. If therefore these 
facts were social ones, sociology would possess no subject matter peculiarly its 
own, and its domain would be confused with that of biology and 
psychology….[I]n reality there is in every society a clearly determined group of 
phenomena separable, because of their distinct characteristics, from those that 
form the subject matter of other sciences of nature.62  
 
Because every individual eats and sleeps, these behaviors are not social, but rather belong 
to the animal domain of biology. The task of the sociologist is to locate those activities 
that exceed or press upon individual interiority (the realm of psychology) without 
bleeding into the wider transspecies domain of nature. Throughout The Rules Durkheim 
epistemologically delimits and describes the privileged object of sociology, the social 
fact: “a category of facts which present very special characteristics: they consist of 
manners of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are invested 
with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him.”63 Two primary 
features characterize the social fact: they are external to the individual, and they exert a 
 
62 Émile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, trans. W.D. Halls, ed. Steven 
Lukes (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 50. 
63 Ibid., 52. 
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coercive force on those individuals who comprise society.64 Thus for Durkheim “society” 
is separate not only from biological nature, but also the individual; the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts.65 The ontological distinction between individual and society lies 
at the heart of Durkheim’s sociological system.66 This separable externality of society 
from the individual allows Durkheim to conclude that the “first and most basic rule is to 
consider social facts as things.”67 More than a tentative mental construct or posited 
concept, the thingliness of the social fact allows Durkheim to assert for sociology the 
objectivity of the positivist natural sciences—and thus to grant sociology an autonomous 
domain of study distinct from biology (with its connection to “nature”). These criteria of 
quasi-scientific objectivity enable Durkheim to distinguish between “normal” social facts 
 
64 Ibid., 56. “A social fact is identifiable through the power of external coercion which it 
exerts or is capable of exerting upon individuals.” 
65 Ibid. “It is in each part because it is in the whole, but far from being in the whole 
because it is in the parts.” 
66 This conceptual impasse between the individual and society is the basis of Adorno’s  
influential critique that Durkheim reifies society. Describing “the peculiar tendency of  
Durkheim’s entire sociology…to posit the thing-like quality of society as something  
positive, to submit to it,” Adorno challenges Durkheim’s “inclination to repeat the  
process of reification and autonomization, to which society is subject through its  
immanent laws, within sociology, instead of critically and dissolving it.” Durkheim’s  
concept of the social fact thus actively “suppresses that fact that the concept of society  
refers to a relationship between people.” (Theodor Adorno, Introduction to Sociology,  
trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Christoph Gödde (Stanford: Stanford University Press,  
1999), 37.) Adorno thus echoes the Tardean critique of Durkheim that I will elaborate in  
the pages to come; the difference between Adorno and Tarde is that Adorno conceives  
the relational mediation of “society” wholly thorough the transactional medium of   
“exchange, which binds together virtually all the people participating in this kind of  
society” (31). As we will see, Tarde insists that we conceptualize, say, financial exchange  
and socio-technical entanglement on the same conceptual plane. 
67 Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, 60. 
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(characterized by their generality) from the “pathological.”68 This is the full theoretical 
ambition of Durkheim’s sociological method: to establish a positivist science of society 
capable of analyzing social phenomena “beyond a purely dialectical or ideological, 
political diagnosis.”69 The Rules is at its heart a critique of the claims of the individual to 
diagnose the structural conditions of social health in any but the most ideological 
manner.70 The epistemological privilege of sociology relies on the conceptual coherence 
of a “society” alienated not only from nature but also the self.  
This total alienation of self and society is the key point of convergence between 
classical sociology and Georg Lukács’ early-twentieth theory of the modern novel, still a 
major conceptual-historical resource for novel theory in the present. In The Theory of the 
Novel, Lukács describes the constitutive alienation between self and society as the key 
interpretive-historical condition underwriting the modern novel. In contrast to the 
immanence of meaning apprehensible in ancient epic, modern social life has hardened 
into a “world of convention” disconnected from the individualized world of the self.71 
Society has become “second nature, the nature of man-made structures”: 
 
68 Ibid., 86. “For societies, as for individuals, health is good and desirable; sickness, on 
the other hand, is bad and must be avoided. If therefore we find an objective criterion, 
inherent in the facts themselves, to allow us to distinguish scientifically health from 
sickness in the various orders of social phenomena, science will be in a position to throw 
light on practical matters while remaining true to its own method.” 
69 Mike Gane, On Durkheim’s Rules of Sociological Method (London: Routledge, 1988), 
19. 
70 Excepting, of course, the professional sociologist. 
71 Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1971), 62. 
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This second nature is not dumb, sensuous and yet senseless like the first: it is a 
complex of senses—meanings—which has become rigid and strange, and which 
no longer awakens interiority; it is a charnel-house of long-dead interiorities.72 
 
Thus the alienation of self and society displaces and formally overtakes the more 
fundamental estrangement of society and nature, producing an experience of scalar 
irresolution between the individual subject and “a multiplicity of forms too complex for 
understanding.”73 The modern novel reflects this alienation of self and society through 
the biographical form, which mediates the fundamental estrangement at the heart of 
modern social life that the novel seeks to overcome: “The contingent world and the 
 
72 Ibid., 63-64. Following his later turn to Marxism, Lukács more strongly historicizes 
this concept of “second nature” as the historical experience of the reification of social life 
in capitalist society— an idea that will become crucial for historical materialist theories 
of the modern novel, in which the commodity functions as the prevailing analytic unit 
coordinating the governing structures of capitalism and culture; chapter 3 will discuss 
limitations of this interpretive model in more detail. “The commodity can only be 
understood in its undistorted essence when it becomes the universal category of society 
as a whole. Only in this context does the reification produced by commodity relations 
assume decisive importance both for the objective evolution of society and for the stance 
adopted by men towards it. Only then does the commodity become crucial for the 
subjugation of men's consciousness to the forms in which this reification finds expression 
and for their attempts to comprehend the process or to rebel against its disastrous effects 
and liberate themselves from servitude to the ‘second nature’ so created.” (Lukács, 
History and Class Consciousness, 86)  
73 Ibid., 62. For an illuminating contrast, see Marshall McLuhan’s reimagining of Lukács’ 
alienated second nature through the lens of media studies, recasting the body as both 
“first nature” and media object, endlessly entangling itself with the wider world through 
the “second nature” of media: “As our second nature consists entirely in our artifacts and 
extensions and the grounds and narcoses they impose, their etymologies are all to be 
found in first nature, the wild body. They have no hierarchy or orderly sequence; they 
subsume, obsolesce, retrieve, extend each other, burrow on each other, hybridize, and 
miscegenate endlessly.” (Marshall McLuhan and Eric McLuhan, Laws of Media: The 
New Science (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 116). To some extent, these 
two formulations contain in miniature the competing conceptualizations of the 
relationship among body-media-world that this dissertation will trace within modernist 
literary form circa 1900. 
 
 
 
39 
problematic individual are realities which mutually determine one another.”74 The literary 
forms that Lukács values—critical realism, the historical novel—are those which strive to 
overcome this alienation through the horizon of collectivity, that mediate the dialectical 
synthesis of individual and social collective in narrative form.75  
Lukacs’ literary-critical project has remained vital into the twenty-first century 
most visibly and influentially through the evolving career of Fredric Jameson. Lukacs’ 
and Jameson’s key shared insight is that the modern novel reflects and seeks to overcome 
a structuring irresolution between individual experience and a wider collective realm or 
horizon of meaning—a formal dialectics that Jameson has more recently glossed “the 
drama of the incorporation of individual characters into a greater totality.”76 But it is 
through this concept of totality that Jameson’s (and Lukács’) connection to Durkheim is 
most evident. The following passage from Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life serves as epigraph to Jameson’s The Political Unconscious: 
Since the world expressed by the total system of concepts is the world as society 
represents it to itself, only society can furnish the generalized notions according 
to which such a world must be represented…Since the universe exists only insofar 
as it is thought, and since it can be thought totally only by society itself, it takes 
its place within society, becomes an element of its inner life, and society may thus 
be seen as that total genus beyond which nothing else exists. The very concept of 
totality is but the abstract form of the concept of society: that whole which 
includes all things, that supreme class under which all other classes must be 
subsumed.77 
 
74 Ibid., 78. 
75 See, for example: Lukács, Studies in European Realism, trans. Edith Bone (New York: 
Grosset & Dunlap, 1964) and Lukács, The Historical Novel, trans. Hannah Mitchell and 
Stanley Mitchell (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983). 
76 Fredric Jameson, The Antinomies of Realism (London: Verso, 2013), 267. 
77 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, qtd. in Jameson, The 
Political Unconscious: Narrative as Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1982), 8. 
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In this Durkheimian model of the social, totality is society, which has achieved autonomy 
over a natural realm that is inaccessible, alien, ontologically other. The world does not 
exist outside of our collective representations of it. Nature, biology, psychology, 
materiality—all are subsumable to society, contained within (or, rather, produced 
through) its “total system of concepts.” The furthest reaches of totality are simultaneous 
with the borders of society; the limit of the social is the boundary beyond which nothing 
else exists. To some extent, Durkheim’s totality is the symmetric inverse of Lukács’ 
“second nature”: nature become social, fully overtaken by human symbolization. 
But why does this totalizing, humanist model of the social matter for our 
interpretations and valuations of modern literary form? In the conclusion to The Political 
Unconscious, Jameson discusses the epigraph, stressing the utopian, collective dimension 
of religion in Durkheim’s theory: the “symbolic affirmation of the unity of a given tribe, 
collectivity, or…social formation.”78 Jameson ascribes to “cultural production” the 
socially symbolic function of Durkheimian religion: both reflect “nostalgia for the 
collective and the Utopian” in a fragmented, class-divided world.79 The novel, then, 
symbolically affirms the promise of utopian collectivity underlying the atomizing agency 
of modern society But we do well to remember Susan Mizruchi’s characterization of 
Durkheimian sociology as itself a substitute for religion—a secular replacement for the 
lost universal: “social science confronted the waning reliability of universal ideals—faith 
 
78 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 292. 
79 Ibid. 
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in God, the valuation of human life—by offering its own methods as a replacement.”80 
Durkheim’s theory in particular transfers “allegiance from the overwhelming Jewish 
orthodoxy of his youth” to “the equally cohesive modern symbolic system called 
‘society.’”81 Sociology—as a kind of secular, socially cohesive universal—in this sense 
produces the alienation that it ostensibly diagnoses: theorizing an ontologically distinct, 
fully humanist domain generated out if its own anthropocentric conceptual apparatus. 
Sociology symbolizes the world via a “total system of concepts” that both analyze and 
generate the fundamental alienation of the individual not only from “society” but also 
from “nature.”  
Jameson connects Durkheim’s secular theology with “one of the most urgent 
tasks of Marxist theory today”: the development of a new conceptual apparatus capable 
of imaging the utopian collective to come, “a whole new logic of collective dynamics, 
with categories that escape the taint of some mere appellation of terms drawn from 
individual experience.”82 Jameson admits the limitation of Durkheim’s sociological 
framework of the collective consciousness (like Lukacs’ class consciousness) is its 
“reliance on categories of the individual subject…. an unrigorous and figurative 
assimilation of the consciousness of the individual subject to the dynamics of groups.”83 
Nonetheless, however: 
Until this task is completed, it seems possible to continue to use a Durkheimian or 
Lukacsean vocabulary of collective consciousness or of the subject of 
history ‘under erasure,’ provided we understand that any such discussion refers, 
 
80 Mizruchi, The Science of Sacrifice, 8. 
81 Ibid., 9. 
82 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 294. 
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not to the concepts designated by such terms, but to the as yet untheorized 
object—the collective—to which they make imperfect allusion.84  
 
Acknowledging the need for new trans-individual concepts, Jameson casts the 
Durkheimian social totality as a conceptual placeholder en route to an as-yet-untheorized 
logic of the collective. Lukacsean and Jamesonian models of interpretive critique remain 
tremendously influential to novel theory in the present. But the wider question that we 
need to pose is whether the constitutive anthropocentrism of Jameson’s dialectical 
history, Lukács’ Marxist humanism, and Durkheim’s social totality have blocked our 
ability to conceptualize the collective from the very start? 
Jameson and Lukács inherit from Durkheim a model of human social relations 
premised on the conceptual polarity—and subsequent dialectical reconciliation—of self 
and society, a model of art that I call the “self-and-society” dialectic. Lukács’ 
biographical form, Jameson’s “drama of incorporation”: for both theorists, these narrative 
forms mediate history in terms of the dialectical ir/reconciliation of the individual to the 
wider social totality. But as we saw with Durkheim, this “self-and-society” dialectic 
entails the constitutive alienation of nature and society, the ontological autonomy of 
human social relations from the biological processes of nature and other forms of 
human/nonhuman entanglement. An urgent question for novel theory in the present is 
whether narrative forms and interpretive models of art premised on the constitutive 
alienation not only of self and society, but also of nature and society, can conceptualize, 
image, or grasp the genuinely utopian collective to which Jameson’s Marxist dialectics 
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aspire. A major claim of this project is that the humanist dialectics of the “self-and-
society” paradigm are incapable of imaging new conceptualizations of humans-in-nature, 
new narrative forms and aesthetic mediations of human/nonhuman entanglement. As 
recent scholarship across the humanities has shown, the ontological split of nature and 
society is not only an epistemic rift experienced within the painfully alienated modernist 
psyche—it is also a social distinction wielded in service of patriarchy, racial domination, 
colonialism, and environmental expropriation.85 The burgeoning critical impulse to 
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Autonomedia, 2004). Political Ecology and environmental studies: Bruno Latour, Politics 
of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University 
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dissolve the nature/society binary compels literary scholars to develop new interpretive 
methods and literary histories that rethink the Durkheimian alienation of nature and 
society. 
I outline this genealogy of sociological humanism not in order to discard the 
concept of “totality” for novel theory, but in order to rethink the conceptual paradigms 
through which we recognize the modern novel’s “aspiration towards totality.”86 Against 
the humanist dialectic of self-and-society, it has become necessary to bring to the 
foreground an alternative conceptualization of the social long suppressed by the 
institutional victory and intellectual centrality of Durkheimian social theory. Two 
animating questions emerge: (1.) Can literary scholars excavate positive alternatives to 
the Durkheimian model of society (i.e., ontologically distinct both from nature and the 
individuals who comprise it)? (2.) How might these new conceptualizations reframe both 
the methods and objects of modern literary study? If we decenter the dialectical 
relationship between the liberal subject and the societies composed of and authorized by 
such subjects, what new forms of association or relationality emerge? And what kinds of 
literary forms come to the fore? Given the intensifying technological entanglement of 
human and nonhuman agency via proliferating world-scale infrastructure, does an 
anthropocentric model of “society” any longer make sense? It is through this lens that 
Durkheimian sociological humanism begins to look like a conservative or reactionary 
intellectual response to the unprecedented socio-technical mediation of the late-
 
86 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 198. 
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nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries—a sort of conceptual-symbolic brake on the 
intensifying hybridization of collective human agency. 
In the chapters that follow, I analyze texts (many marginal, semi-canonical or 
uneasily peripheral to the modernist canon) that disrupt or irritate the classical form of the 
“self-and-society” dialectic. Destabilizing the ontological limits or political coherence of 
“society” unsettles the stable centrality of the self (and vice versa). The Marrow of 
Tradition, for example, parodies the conventions of realist protagonism in order to hide 
its real protagonist in plain sight. Chesnutt distributes the majority of his narrative 
attention to an evident protagonist, Dr. Miller. But this narrative space does not dramatize 
Miller’s heroic agency, moral virtue or distinguished selfhood so much as ironize his lack 
of historical agency by the novel’s conclusion. Instead, Janet, his narratively 
marginalized wife, attains symbolic power by repudiating bourgeois values and refusing 
to step into the position of the liberal subject, opening the novel to a wider symbolic 
horizon than the middle-class social world of the Jim Crow South that had seemed its 
evident referent. Through Janet and other marginalized characters, Chesnutt imagines 
new forms of social recognition rooted in the material body—the marrow of tradition—
and its wider socio-technical environment. Only by reimagining the self, Chesnutt 
suggests, can we reimagine society. At the same time, we can begin to recognize a 
continuity between Chesnutt’s representation of Janet’s social power and the wider 
discourses of Darwinian feminists like Charlotte Perkins Gilman who resisted the 
socially-reproductive, infrastructural function of female domestic labor by recasting the 
socially-delimited and symbolized female body as a potent and evolving natural agency. 
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Both Chesnutt and Gilman imagine a new kind of selfhood that transforms oppressive 
social environments only by repudiating autonomy in favor new kinds of entanglement 
with wider nonhuman agencies. 
Pursuing different motivations and often to very different ends, each of the texts 
that I analyze asks what happens to the form of the modern novel when the totality to 
which it aspires is no longer fully human. These texts exemplify what I call the “self-in-
society” model of modern novelistic form, whose conceptualization of human sociality I 
trace to the turn-of-the-century sociologist Gabriel Tarde, Durkheim’s most significant 
intellectual rival in the first decade of the twentieth century. I am not claiming that all of 
the literary artists that I analyze had read or were even familiar with Tardean sociology. 
Rather, Tarde’s institutional and intellectual confrontations with Durkheim present us 
with an actual, historical alternative to the dominant Durkheimain conceptualization of 
human social life—one that offers a positive conceptualization of human/nonhuman 
entanglement beyond the mere negation of the “human,” “subject” or “society.” Tarde’s 
sociology not only helps us to model alternative ontologies, epistemologies and politics 
that decenter the liberal subject, but also suggests new modes for apprehending how 
modern literary form might mediate the “modernity” of a technologizing world. 
 
A Tardean Counterfactual History of the Novel 
To engage the work of Gabriel Tarde in the present is to imagine a counterfactual 
history of twentieth-century social theory: What if Durkheimian sociology had been 
forced to confront an active intellectual competitor from its earliest days of institutional 
codification? Like Durkheim, Tarde sought to conceptualize the distinctiveness of human 
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social life—to theorize the mechanisms and limits of social cohesion in a globalizing 
world. But Tarde’s social theory undoes almost all of Durkheim’s epistemological 
assumptions: the ontologically-distinct “thingliness” of society; the autonomy of human 
culture; the priority of the macro scale over the micro, of law and structure over process 
and historical contingency. Recognized as Durkheim’s direct rival in the late-nineteenth 
century, Tarde was appointed over Bergson to the chair of philosophy at the Collège de 
France in 1900. And yet Tarde’s distinctive approach to social theory appears to have 
disappeared soon after his death in 1904. Tarde died “without leaving a school or group 
of followers in either France or in the English-speaking world” and has for the most part 
been remembered as Durkheim’s vanquished and unmethodical antagonist.87 The first 
glimmerings of a Tardean revival emerged via the 1968 publication of Deleuze’s 
Difference and Repetition, in which Tarde is presented as an early and important theorist 
of difference, the originator of a micro-sociology that rejects impersonal, totalizing 
explanations of social phenomena in favor of infinitesimal processes of opposition and 
invention. Tarde’s influence is even more overt in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand 
Plateaus.88 This Deleuzian recovery has instigated a slow but quickening vivification of 
 
87 Matei Candea, “Revisiting Tarde’s house,” in The Social after Gabriel Tarde: Debates 
and Assessments, ed. Matei Candea (London: Routledge, 2010), 6. Latour is correct to 
note that Tarde has “maintained a steady constituency in the United States because of his 
work on imitation, influence and media and has been considered a founding father of 
communication studies,” but that this view of Tarde’s media sociology neglects the more 
radical aspects of his social theory. (Bruno Latour, “Gabriel Tarde and the End of the 
Social,” in The Social in Question, ed. Patrick Joyce (London: Routledge, 2014), 131.) 
88 See in particular the “Micropolitics and Segmentarity” chapter, which discusses 
Tardean social theory as the conceptual bedrock of the micropolitics/micropolitics 
distinction. (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
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interest in Tarde’s sociology, and contemporary social theorists have begun to wonder 
whether “we might be witnessing the configuration of a new sociological paradigm (new 
syntax and new concepts), in which Tarde officiates as a major founder.”89 This Tardean 
revival has been more lively in France, a result of the recent republication of Tarde’s 
extensive and diverse corpus. But the recent translation of many of Tarde’s major works 
into English has accelerated Tarde’s belated revival in the anglophone world. 
The contemporary reawakening to Tarde circulates around no figure so much as 
Bruno Latour, who explicitly names Tarde the “venerable ancestor” and “forefather” of 
his Actor-Network Theory.90 What connects the social theory of Latour and Tarde across 
a full century is their shared repudiation of the Durkheimian model of society: estranged 
from nature, alienated from the self.91 Latour questions the existence of a specific realm, 
domain or set of phenomena that could be distinguished as “social” and instead calls 
upon theorists to trace the interlocking varieties, scales and intensities of association 
among heterogeneous elements (ideas, objects, persons and so on) that constitute the 
fundamental relationality of modern social life. Latour’s critique of “the sociology of the 
 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1987), 208-231.) 
89 Sergio Tonkonoff, From Tarde to Deleuze and Foucault: The Infinitesimal Revolution 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 27. Tonkonoff convincingly rewrites the 
intellectual history of twentieth-century social theory from the perspective Tarde, whom 
Tonkonoff casts as inaugurating an “infinitesimal revolution” that lays the intellectual 
foundation connecting Foucault’s microphysics of power, Deleuze’s metaphysics of 
difference and creative repetition, and Latour’s Actor-Network Theory. 
90 See Latour, Reassembling the Social, 13 and Latour, “Gabriel Tarde and the End of the 
Social,” 117. 
91 See the introduction to Reassembling the Social. “It is no longer clear whether there 
exists relations that are specific enough to be called ‘social’ and that could be grouped 
together in making up a special domain that could function as ‘a society’” (2). 
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social” has had a far-reaching impact across the humanistic disciplines. Within literary 
studies, his polemic against critical demystification has been tremendously influential in 
guiding the recent impulse to theorize new forms of postcritical method.92 Latour’s 
growing influence on how scholars conceive the domain, protocols and political efficacy 
of literary method is both a model and a provocation for my own return to Tarde. If Tarde 
has proven a vital conceptual resource for social theorists in the present, what does it 
mean that this alternative to sociological humanism emerged in the turn-of-the-century 
context in competition with Durkheim? Might Tarde represent a wider conceptual 
orientation within early-twentieth-century social theory (and, perhaps, literary fiction) 
that can be traced to other writers? If Durkheim’s social ontology has quietly structured 
many of novel theory’s most enduring and influential interpretive paradigms, is there a 
comparable method immanent to Tardean social theory?  Does Tarde have a privileged 
aesthetic orientation or literary form comparable to Lukács’ bourgeois realism and 
historical novel? 
Like that of Durkheim, Tarde’s social theory addresses the elemental questions of 
human relationality: What is a social group? What is the nature of that group’s cohesion, 
the bond that holds its elements together? What are the conditions or mechanisms of 
 
92 See Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to 
Matters of Concern,” Critical Inquiry 30.2 (2004): 225-248. For the overt influence of 
Latour on recent efforts to model new kinds of postcritical method, see Stephen Best and 
Sharon Marcus, “Surface Reading: An Introduction,” Representations 108.1 (2009): 1-
21; Heather Love, “Close but not Deep: Literary Ethics and the Descriptive Turn,” New 
Literary History 41.2 (2010): 371-391; Marcus, Best and Love, “Building a Better 
Description,” Representations 135.1 (2016): 1-21. See also the prevalent and wide-
ranging influence of Latour throughout Critique and Postcritique, eds. Elizabeth S. 
Anker and Rita Felski (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017).   
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social transformation? Before engaging his theory on a closer textual level, we can 
schematize three major points of contrast between Tarde and Durkheim at the outset. 
(1.) Whereas Durkheim posits society as a pre-existing domain external to the 
individual, Tarde refuses to theorize society as distinct from the elements that compose it. 
(2.) Whereas Durkheim analyzes the coercive agency of social facts on 
individuals, Tarde believes that sociology should analyze forms of interrelationship 
among elements within social groups (in human social relations, these mechanisms of 
relationality are imitation, invention and opposition). 
(3.) Whereas Durkheim explains the micro/lower levels by the macro/higher 
levels (i.e., social behavior like suicide is explained by the coercive social fact of society; 
society explains behavior), Tarde explains the macro/higher levels by the micro/lower 
levels (i.e., the historical reality of social cohesion is explained by studying the 
mechanisms and processes of social relationality that produce it; behavior explains 
society).  
 
What unifies Tardean sociology is, pace Durkheim, the constitutive primacy of difference 
and change, the “affirmation that social life consists of the changing interrelation of an 
infinite number of agents which are irreducibly different, endlessly varied, and constantly 
variable.”93 Over the course of the 1890s, Tarde and Durkheim exchanged a series of 
increasingly pointed disputes regarding the proper methods, objects and purpose of 
sociology. By the turn of the century, these disputes had coalesced into two competing, 
 
93 Tonkonoff, From Tarde to Deleuze and Foucault, 10. 
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recognizable models of social theory, and in 1903 their rivalry culminated in a public 
debate hosted at the École des hautes études sociales.94 Tarde passed away not soon after, 
and Durkheim quickly codified his institutional victory, establishing himself as the 
architect of modern academic sociology. This victory had the far-reaching consequence 
of delimiting sociology’s disciplinary field of knowledge: delimiting the autonomy of 
human social relations from philosophy, psychology, biology, and art. Durkheim 
normalized a “macrophysical” perspective of the social world: institutions over 
individuals; the macro scale over the micro; and laws, structures and regularities over 
diversity and change. From this perspective, human social relations were “hypostasized 
in different pairs whose poles would then be studied separately: society/individual, social 
representations/individual representations, state/civil society, structure/agency.”95 But 
now that social theorists are increasingly skeptical of the sharp separation of human 
social life from other kinds of relationality, Tarde has emerged as a compelling 
alternative theorist of human being-in-the-world—and intertext for modernist fiction. 
The most concise, fully-developed articulation of Tarde’s distinctive sociological 
method is outlined in Monadology and Sociology (1893), a short tract central to the 
contemporary Tardean revival. More than anything, Monadology and Sociology 
 
94 No transcript or record of this debate exists except for a brief overview published in On 
Communication and Social Influence, ed. Terry Clark (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1969). A script of the debate composed from quotations from Tarde’s and 
Durkheim’s published works was written and performed by a group of prominent social 
theorists including Latour at Cambridge University in 2008 and published in The Social 
after Gabriel Tarde: Debates and Assessments, ed. Matei Candea (London: Routledge, 
2010), 27-43. A short snippet of the performance can be found here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C1TGYXXWUe0 
95 Tonkonoff, From Tarde to Deleuze and Foucault, 39. 
 
 
 
52 
challenges what Tarde perceives as the constitutive anthropocentrism of sociological 
method, “the prejudice of always considering ourselves superior to everything,” which 
leads social theorists to simplify and homogenize the complexity of the outside world.96 
If we recognize the deep entanglement of human agency with other kinds of being, Tarde 
argues, sociologists will have to rethink what we mean by “society” from the ground up. 
The central, animating insight of Monadology and Sociology is that all of nature—
organic and inorganic—consists of societies. “[E]verything is a society…every 
phenomenon is a social fact.”97 To disarticulate “society” from the specifically human 
entails reimagining society not as an entity or domain, but as a kind of relationship, as 
“each individual’s reciprocal possession, in many highly varied forms, of every other.”98 
This conceptual gear-shift from essence to relation is addressed both to sociology and 
philosophy.99 He calls upon both to replace the obsession with being, essence, and 
substance to a new focus on relationship, entanglement and transformation: 
All philosophy hitherto has been based on the verb Be, the definition of which 
was the philosopher’s stone, which all sought to discover. We may affirm that, if 
it had been based on the verb Have, many sterile debates and fruitless intellectual 
exertions would have been avoided. From this principle, I am, all the subtlety in 
the world has not made it possible to deduce any existence other than my own: 
hence the negation of external reality. If, however, the postulate I have is posited 
as the fundamental fact, both that which has and that which is had are given 
inseparably at once…. The concrete and substantial concept which one discovers 
 
96 Gabriel Tarde, Monadology and Sociology, trans. Theo Lorenc (Melbourne: re.press, 
2012), 22. 
97 Ibid., 28 (italics in original). 
98 Ibid., 51. 
99 For Tarde, sociology is continuous with philosophy: both theorize the distinctiveness 
of human experience within a wider, radically entangled world. This is of course a 
primary source of his appeal to thinkers like Latour and especially Deleuze. For a more 
technical discussion of the relationship between Tardean sociology and philosophy, see 
Theo Lorenc’s afterword to his recent translation of Monadology and Sociology (2012). 
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in oneself is, therefore, that of having. Instead of the famous cogito ergo sum, I 
would prefer to say: I desire, I believe, therefore I have.100 
 
Tarde envisions a model of sociology not premised on the synchronic classification of 
social groups within a static typological grid—but that instead examines the ever-shifting 
vectors of relationship that both pre-exist and constitute the self. Tarde asks us “to 
decompose the reifying notions of our habitual vocabulary”—self, society, nation, 
institution—by “reconstructing the specific processes of configuration and dissemination 
that those notions only capture in their results.”101 If relationship is prior to being, then 
neither individuals nor societies (the starting points of Durkheimian sociology) pre-exist 
this relation but are in fact constituted by and within it.102 Both individual and society are 
outcomes which must be explained, not self-evident entities from which explanations 
proceed. The ontological condition of the world is animate and interconnected, not 
bifurcated or alienated.103 Tarde thus asks to rethink the standpoint of sociology: from the 
secure humanist frame of the Cartesian cogito to new forms of relationality that unsettle 
our notions of scale, being, and perspective. 
So what, then, are the aesthetics of Tarde’s social theory? Given its quick 
obsolescence in the early-twentieth century, Tardean theory does not have a Lukács or 
Jameson: a major literary-interpretive extension and expansion of its social model. While 
 
100 Gabriel Tarde, Monadology and Sociology, 52. 
101 Tonkonoff, From Tarde to Deleuze and Foucault, 34. 
102 For more on this idea, see Lorenc, afterword to Monadology and Sociology, 76. 
103 Candea offers a helpful clarification of this somewhat difficult point: “Tarde’s radical 
move is to expand the discussion beyond the chicken-and-egg alternation of human 
individuals and the relations between them, by inscribing this contrast within a much 
broader multi-scalar, indeed cosmic, perspective” (“Revisiting Tarde’s house” 8). 
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this introduction can only begin to approach this larger critical task, we can look to 
Latour as a representative model for both why and how to extend Tarde’s insights into 
the present. Latour’s critique in Reassembling the Social is that the structuring concepts 
and frameworks of what he calls “the sociology of the social” (the dominant orientation 
of academic sociology traceable to Durkheim) “limit[s] in advance the shape, size, 
heterogeneity, and combination of associations” that social theorists are able to 
describe.104 Actor-Network-Theory is a set of tools that enable sociologists to abandon 
“the fixed frame of reference” that has delimited their understanding of the diverse actors, 
scales, intimacies and modes of association that constitute modern social worlds.105 Tarde 
figures prominently in Latour’s thought as the originary theorist of this kind of 
conceptual upheaval and perspectival flexibility.106 Latour extends Tarde’s idea that 
“every phenomenon is a social fact” by arguing that nonhuman agency does not designate 
a domain of reality separate from society. Human and nonhuman actors should be 
approached on the same conceptual plane. Latour wants us to remember that “nature” and 
“society” are not timeless ontological distinctions, but concepts entrenched within and 
circulated by modern thought (and, we might add, “operationalized” by modern 
 
104 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 11. 
105 Ibid., 24. 
106 For more on this conceptual relationship between Latour and Tarde, see Bruno Latour 
and Vincent Antonin Lépinay, The Science of Passionate Interests: An Introduction to 
Gabriel Tarde's Economic Anthropology (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2009). 
“What makes Tarde so difficult for us to understand, after more than a century of 
sociologism, is that he never places society and the individual in opposition, but, rather, 
he sees the two as nothing but temporary aggregates, partial stabilizations, nodes in 
networks that are completely free of the concepts contained in ordinary sociology” (9). 
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capitalism).107 “There exists no relation whatsoever between ‘the material’ and ‘the social 
world,’ because it is this very division which is a complete artifact.”108 This is not to 
repudiate the human subject position, but to imagine new ways of conceptualizing 
humans’ relationship to the wider world from within that subject position.109 But most 
suggestive for modern literary studies is Latour’s bid to replace Durkheim’s humanist 
“society” with a new definition of “the social”: “not a place, a thing, a domain, or a kind 
of stuff but a provisional movement of new associations.”110 Prioritizing Tardean 
relationship over Durkheimian essence, Latour calls for a “shift in perspective” that 
dissolves the thingliness of the social fact in favor of things themselves: “Things, quasi-
 
107 See, for example, Moore, “The Capitalocene, part I”: “Capitalism ‘operationalizes’ 
through this ontological rift of Nature/Society….Capitalism’s governing conceit is that it 
may do with Nature as it pleases, that Nature is external and may be fragmented, 
quantified and rationalized to serve economic growth, social development or some other 
higher good” (601).   
108 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 75-76. 
109 That said, I do believe that this is a weak point in Latour’s framework—drawing a line 
that some will be unwilling to cross. Latour’s evident confidence that the sufficiently 
thoughtful, careful and ingenious sociologist can theorize away the constitutive 
separation of subject and object is, as nearly all of post-Kantian critical philosophy tells 
us, naïve. Many admirers of Latour recognize this and read him anyway. (For an 
especially insightful example, see John Durham Peters’ discussion of Latour in the 
introduction to The Marvelous Clouds.) Despite these limitations, Latour's thinking 
remains important to so many branches of contemporary humanistic scholarship because 
of the challenge it poses to conceptual thought-structures (say, the nature/society 
dualism) that clearly bolster the status quo of a late-capitalist modernity in environmental 
crisis. What makes the modern novel such an interesting and complex vehicle for 
Tardean-Latourian thought is that the subject/object distinction is baked into its very 
form. The modern novel—for so long rightly understood as an important (perhaps, the 
important) tool for the production of the liberal subject—cannot presume to dissolve fully 
the subject’s tragic estrangement from the wider world. This is not a limitation, but rather 
what makes the modernist novel such a complex mediation of history and powerful 
conceptual tool. As I will discuss at length in the following chapter, it should be anything 
but surprising that Tarde himself would choose to write a novel at the end of his career. 
110 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 238. 
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objects, and attachments are the real center of the social world, not the agent, person, 
member, or participant—nor is it society or its avatars.”111 Latour helps us to visualize 
the aesthetic possibilities embedded in Tardean social theory—what it looks like to 
disarticulate self and society and to dissolve the Durkheimian “firebreaks” that allocate 
historical agency to subjects and societies. To what extent can we locate this Tardean 
model of social life in literary fiction circa 1900, and how might this allow us to newly 
approach the literary history of the early twentieth century? 
 
 
Modernism and the Character-Environment Complex 
Modernism has been long understood as a radically subjectivist form of art. The 
“modernist novel” connotes writerly techniques—Faulkner’s stream of consciousness, 
Ford’s impressionism, James’ point of view—that variously express the same 
fundamental insight: the intractability of the monadic subject position, the fundamental 
estrangement of the subject from “objectivity.” If the human has become alienated from 
her environment, then Woolf’s “flickerings of that innermost flame” expresses not 
solipsism but a more authentic reality, the objectivity of subjectivity. This view of 
modernism centers the subject, ever-disconnected from an atomizing society and a 
subaltern nature. What the Tarde/Durkheim debate—and the wider codification of 
sociology circa 1900— signals, however, is that this modernist retreat into the subject is 
simultaneous with the experience of that subject’s socio-technical entanglement—the 
burgeoning awareness that to be a subject in the twentieth century is to experience the 
 
111 Ibid., 238. 
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distribution of agency across the human/nonhuman divide at unprecedented intimacies 
and scales. Durkheim responds to this phenomenon by epistemologically delimiting “the 
social” from other kinds of relationships and domains. But Tarde’s response is to 
embrace this intensifying entanglement, to identify relationship itself as the primary 
object of sociology. Once we appreciate this historical tension—this active intellectual 
debate—between what we might anachronistically designate humanist and. posthumanist 
models of the social, we can begin to recognize its traces in modernist form, and 
especially in the texts of infrastructural modernism. These texts develop strategies to 
represent the distribution of agency across the nature/society divide rather than allocating 
autonomy to the liberal subject. To highlight relationship over substance is to perceive a 
social world composed of “quasi-subjects” and “quasi-objects”: human agency is 
technical and mediated, subjects and objects share agency in ambiguous and uncertain 
ways, and the “outside” world of the nonhuman begins to resemble the human agency 
that has altered it. 
It is this uncertain distribution of agency between the human and nonhuman that 
Wells’ Tono-Bungay (1909) captures in Uncle Teddy’s insistence that “Anglo-Saxon 
energy” (mediated by “threads, wires, stretching out and out…from that little office of 
ours, out to West Africa”) is “running the world practically.”112 Just a few pages later, his 
nephew George embarks on an undisguised journey of colonial resource extraction and 
begins to experience his self simultaneously as subject and object, person and 
infrastructural agency. But this is not the liberating self-realization of the Lukácsean 
 
112 H.G. Wells, Tono-Bungay (New York: Penguin, 2005), 262. 
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proletariat-as-historical metasubject, but rather a stripping away of individual autonomy 
that George tries to recover by writing an autobiographical novel, symbolically 
converting infrastructure back into culture. As I elaborate in chapter 2, what Wells 
captures in Tono-Bungay is not the historical dialectics of self and society, but rather the 
way that technology and financial capital literally overtake George’s sense of personal 
agency.  
Wells’ effort to write a novel in which nonhuman, infrastructural agencies 
threaten to overtake the subject defies and problematizes the humanist dialectics of self-
and-society and invites us to rethink the terms in which we evaluate, periodize and 
describe modern literary form. Lukács valorizes realism for its aesthetic mediation of 
totality, for “display[ing] the contradictions within society and within the individual in 
the context of a dialectical unity.”113 To “totalize” for Lukács is to mediate connections 
and contradictions within the symbolic horizon of social life. Totality does not refer to an 
actual, describable object so much as the aesthetic aspiration to connect disparate 
phenomena within a coherent social-symbolic horizon, “a living whole inseparable from 
man himself.”114 Jed Esty has shown that for the nineteenth-century novel the nation 
could function as this symbolic horizon—a progressive historical force against the more 
chaotic agencies of modernization, capitalization and empire. But this “soul-nation 
allegory” loses symbolic viability in the global-capitalist extension of the twentieth-
century age of empire, as the nineteenth-century Bildungsroman transforms into 
 
113 Lukács, “The Ideology of Modernism,” 31. 
114 Ibid., 39. 
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modernist and colonial fictions of youth.115 Esty helps us to chart the transition from 
realism to modernism in terms of the waning symbolic horizon of social totality in 
modern Anglophone fiction: if realism maps totality to the symbolic form of the nation, 
then modernism aesthetically indexes its failure to map a totality whose symbolic horizon 
is dispersed into an ungraspable world-system. Tarde invites us to approach this historical 
framework from another vantage—to query whether the dialectic between individual and 
social life can mediate history in “the infrastructure era” of sociotechnical mediation. If 
the infrastructural entanglement of human and nonhuman agency has destabilized the 
ontological coherence of both self and society, then the question is no longer: Why can’t 
art totalize society? But rather: What happens to the novel when totality is no longer 
human? Or, alternatively: What happens to the dialectic when the coherence of both self 
and society is shaped by nonhuman agencies that defy human symbolization? In Tono-
Bungay, “quap,” the energy resource that George plunders, gives representational form to 
this inhuman, material agency. Over the course of George’s journey, the brute, decaying 
materiality of quap seems slowly to adopt a life of its own and finally dissolves the hull 
of his ship, ruining his resource extraction scheme. Quap representationally exceeds its 
social designation as “natural resource,” becoming a major agent in George’s life story. 
Finally, George himself takes on the rank, decadent, rotten quality that had one belonged 
to quap: “I am, in a sense, decay.”116 This agential transformation of seemingly passive 
matter metonymizes Wells’ wider representational project: a narrative model of history 
 
115 Jed Esty, Unseasonable Youth: Modernism, Colonialism, and the Fiction of 
Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 40. 
116 Wells, Tono-Bungay, 382. 
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shaped not by the dialectical reconciliation of self and society, but rather the shifting 
distribution of agency between character and environment. 
Against a model of history organized by the dialectical relationship of self and 
society, both the sociology of Tarde and the literary example of Wells suggest an 
alternative model that we might schematically call “self-in-society.”117 I use this 
appellation to designate a number of late-realist and proto-modernist texts that displace or 
unsettle the conceptual centrality and ontological coherence of both self and society. 
These texts seek forms to describe the mutual constitution of character and 
environment—that present human agency as technical and the natural world as 
humanized. The “self-in-society” model displaces the autonomy of literary character into 
what we might call “the character-environment complex:” the figural domain of 
distributed agency. Character emerges through a kind of semiotic labor, a figural 
personification of diverse agencies. Selfhood emerges through relationship—the 
entanglement of the human body with technology, nature and other humans. These 
distributed forms of human and nonhuman agency resemble the “quasi-subjects” and 
“quasi-objects” that Latour extracts from Tarde. It is this quality of modern selfhood that 
Forster captures when he says that modern science has “split and shattered the idea of a 
‘Person,’” revealing that “there is something incalculable in each of us.” This 
displacement of the self threatens the very foundation of politics, for “[h]ow, then, can 
we put any trust in personal relationships, or cling to them in the gathering political 
 
117 This appellation does of course risk displacing or concealing its primary Tardean-
conceptual insight: that the “self” or liberal subject does not pre-exist the various social 
relationships that in fact constitute the individual subject as such. 
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storm?” Human beings require a kind of semiotic labor of selfhood in order to survive in 
the modern world: “For the purpose of living one has to assume that the personality is 
solid, and the ‘self’ is an entity, and to ignore all contrary evidence.”118 For the liberal-
humanist Forster, the social function of the modern novel is to produce and circulate the 
social fiction of the unsplit, autonomous self. But for many of the writers that I discuss in 
the chapters to come, the special value of the modern novel is that it can encode the self 
as social fiction by revealing the co-constitution of character and environment in 
infrastructural modernity. 
Dialectical models of history that import a self-and-society heuristic to the 
modernist novel misrecognize these novels’ efforts to sustain and semiotically project a 
“self” whose coherence was increasingly dispersed into biological processes and 
technological mediation. We need to understand modernism not only in terms of the 
ir/reconcialtion of alienated selves and societies but also in terms of the mutual 
constitution of character and environment, society and nature, within both the form and 
content of the modernist novel. Sometimes, as in the case of Wells, this aesthetic 
ambition is explicit and overt. Describing his feud with Henry James in Experiment in 
Autobiography, Wells describes the crux of their aesthetic rivalry by distinguishing the 
Jamesian obsession with “completely consistent characterization arranged beautifully in a 
story and painted deep and round and solid” to his own efforts to depict “adjustment-
interest….a new instability” that “splinter[s] [the] frame” of social and aesthetic fixity. 
 
118 E.M. Forster, “What I Believe” in Two Cheers for Democracy, ed. Oliver Stallybrass 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1972), 65-66. 
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Wells relinquishes both psychological depth and realist consistency in service of “the 
discussion of relationships,” subordinating “character-interest” to the dynamic co-
production of selves and modernizing social worlds.119 For other writers, these aesthetic 
techniques are more subtle and often involve ironizing the narrative protocols of the 
realist novel. Tarde, in his sociological-utopian novel Underground Man mocks and 
empties the historical agency of the protagonist, who serves a crucial function before 
exiting the novel and ceding historical agency to an ever-changing collective in dynamic 
relation to its nonhuman environment. Conrad is even more explicit: as I argue in chapter 
3, the aesthetic centerpiece of his 1907 novel The Secret Agent features an elaborate 
parody of Dickensian urban realism, viciously ironizing the intersubjective class politics 
of liberal humanism and the dialectical relationship of self-and-society that would 
presume to mediate modern history. Conrad parodies the culturally-ameliorative agency 
of humanist Bildung through the damaged artist-figure of Stevie whose faux-Dickensian 
social insight “Bad world for poor people” is both hilariously and tragically inadequate to 
the complex of material/symbolic, human/nonhuman, social forces that exceed the figural 
simplification of his realist-aesthetic gaze. 
 All three of these critiques share a conviction that the realist novel is shaped by a 
liberal humanism that scales a complex and socially-entangled world to the desires and 
experiences of the individual subject. Within the fiction of Conrad, Tarde and Wells, the 
realist novel is figured as one (or some combination) of two things: (1.) A weak and 
ineffectual consolation for the alienation of modern life (Tono-Bungay) (2.) A technology 
 
119 H.G. Wells, Experiment in Autobiography (New York:  Macmillan, 1934), 414-16. 
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for the production of liberal subjects (Underground Man, The Secret Agent). These texts’ 
literary-historical reflexivity helps us to locate and describe the specificity of 
infrastructural modernism within literary history while also coordinating its characteristic 
features with other theorizations of the modern novel 
 
(1.) This first point, that the realist novel (understood as some version of Wells’ 
“completely consistent characterization arranged beautifully in a story and painted deep 
and round and solid”) might merely offer a sort of weak, belated consolation for a deeply 
damaging world is to some extent continuous with Leo Bersani’s critique of “the culture 
of redemption,” a model of art that “repairs inherently damaged or valueless 
experience.”120 For Bersani, challenging the culture of redemption entails displacing “the 
question of authoritative selfhood” through an “aesthetics of narcissism…a self-
jouissance” that dissolves the person and “erases the sacrosanct value of selfhood.”121 
This anti-redemptive aesthetic exposes the self as a kind of harmful social fiction, “a 
practical convenience…promoted to the status of an ethical idea…a sanction for 
violence.”122 Like Bersani’s narcissist aesthetics, infrastructural modernism contests a 
model of art that belatedly compensates for alienation by filtering the jagged and 
dispersed experience of socio-technical mediation through the conceptual prism of the 
self. But unlike Bersani, I am less interested in decentering the self through 
psychodynamics that ultimately refer aesthetic form to the horizon of individual 
 
120 Leo Bersani, The Culture of Redemption (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1990), 1. 
121 Ibid., 3-4. 
122 Ibid., 4. 
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experience; rather, I am interested in texts that mediate socio-technical entanglement in 
ways that reimagine the relationship of nature and society. 
If Bersani is right that the culture of redemption entails “a certain type of 
repetition of experience in art,” then sociological novels like Tono-Bungay resist the kind 
of belated or secondary temporal relationship of art to history that such a model 
suggests.123 Wells does not console or “repair inherently damaged or valueless 
experience” so much as investigate how literary form actively structures and shapes how 
we conceptualize the relationship between human and nonhuman agency in the present 
and into the future. What I am suggesting is that infrastructural modernism invites us to 
rethink the division of labor between the “formalist” and the “sociologist” that Franco 
Moretti describes in Modern Epic.124 What distinguishes literature from sociology, 
Moretti suggests, is that “literature follows great social changes…it always ‘comes 
after.’” Moretti presents a Levi-Straussian model of literature-as-myth, casting literature 
with a “problem-solving vocation” to reconcile the “ethical impediments, perceptual 
confusions, ideological contradictions” of modern social life.125 But the sociological 
literature of Wells, Du Bois, Gilman, and even Forster suggest alternate models for 
understanding the relationship between literary form and history. It is not clear, for 
example, that Wells’ posthuman entanglement of protagonist, infrastructure, and nature 
 
123 Ibid., 1. 
124 Franco Moretti, Modern Epic: The World System from Goethe to Garcia Marquez, 
trans. Quintin Hoare (London: Verso, 1996), 6. 
125 Ibid. Thus, for example, in Moretti’s reading of modernism, stream of consciousness 
is an aesthetic tool to make comprehensible and livable “the countless stimuli swirling 
through the streets of the modern city…. It provides the metropolis with a form, and its 
inhabitants with a perspective” (124). 
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in Tono-Bungay symbolically resolves a pressing ideological or historical contradiction, 
or that it seeks “to make existence more comprehensible.”126 I am not suggesting that 
Wells predicts or images a futuristic form of posthuman being before it actually exists, 
but rather that Wells’ fiction actively seeks to irritate, unsettle and reimagine the 
prevailing literary forms and conceptual structures of modern thought with the hope that 
they may be otherwise in the future. In the science-fictional utopia of Tarde, this kind of 
conceptual play can seem frivolous, but for writers deeply concerned with the lived 
experience of race and gender like Du Bois and Gilman, their work as sociologists 
opened their eyes not only to the conceptual flexibility, but also the historical agency of 
literary form. It is this understanding of literary form as conceptual tool and technique 
that explains Du Bois’ transition away from the academic sociology of his magisterial 
The Philadelphia Negro (1899) and towards the trans-medial and literary-experimental 
form of The Souls of Black Folk (1903).  In chapter 4, I argue that we can understand Du 
Bois’ vacillation between sociology and literature as expressive of competing impulses 
both to understand the social and to change it, which he often experienced in conflict. 
This tension is most fully expressed in his apocalyptic short story “The Comet” (1920), 
which casts racial domination as an as intractable historical obstacle that sociology 
cannot redress without wider the conceptual upheaval that only literature can imagine. 
Du Bois’ vacillation between literary and sociological form mirrors the tension I 
have already traced in Forster circa 1909, in which the apocalyptic infrastructural 
posthumanism of “The Machine Stops” competes with and threatens the cultural 
 
126 Ibid., 6. 
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humanism and symbolic reconciliation of Howards End. If Howards End supplies the 
kind of belated, imaginary solution to a real-life contradiction that Moretti ascribes to 
literary art, then the “The Machine Stops” dramatizes the declining purchase of “culture” 
to reflect or mediate the material conditions of social life that such an aesthetic solution 
requires. It is not a coincidence that Wells (electric grid), Conrad (time standardization), 
Forster (the Machine), Chesnutt (mass media), Du Bois (underground urban space), 
Gilman (social systems of reproduction), and other turn-of-the-century writers overtly 
highlight the socio-technical agency of infrastructure in their sociological-literary texts. 
These are all reflexive texts that apprehend their own status not only as humanist cultural 
objects but also as media: texts that self-consciously mediate between a human reader 
and the wider world—that irritate, displace and reimagine the conceptual structures 
through which their human readers apprehend and understand themselves in relation to 
their material world. 
 
 (2.) This second point, that the realist novel functions as a kind of technology for the 
production of liberal subjects, is not exactly an original insight for contemporary novel 
theory. But the representation of distributed agency within infrastructural modernism 
displaces the centrality of the liberal subject in many of our most influential literary-
theoretical paradigms for apprehending the relationship between literary character and 
social totality in the modern novel: Foucauldian (Miller), Political formalist (Woloch), 
New formalist (Levine). 
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In The Novel and the Police, D.A. Miller describes the disciplinary function of the 
Victorian novel to “confirm the novel-reader in his identity as ‘liberal subject.’”127 
Because the novel embeds a critical relation to society that exceeds its disciplinary 
function, Miller shows how the novel—in its failure to form a stable subject in a stable 
world—does in fact habituate the reader to “a social order whose totalizing power 
circulates all the more easily for being pulverized.”128 The Victorian novel entrenches the 
self within the disciplinary social order of Western liberalism. In The One vs the Many, 
Alex Woloch redefines literary characterization in terms of a “distributional matrix” that 
organizes “how the discrete representation of any specific individual is intertwined with 
the narrative’s continual apportioning of attention to different characters.”129 Woloch thus 
presents a humanist model of the social, in which the individual character can emerge 
only via its differential relationship to other characters: “the space of a particular 
character emerges only vis-à-vis the other characters who crowd him out or potentially 
revolve around him.”130 In Forms, Caroline Levine argues that literary theory can 
disclose the continuity between aesthetic and social form, the “patterns of sociopolitical 
experience.”131 Levine defines “form” as “an arrangement of elements—an ordering, 
patterning, or shaping” that constitutes “the stuff of politics” by “imposing and enforcing 
 
127 D.A. Miller, The Novel and the Police (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), x. 
128 Ibid., xiii. 
129 Alex Woloch, The One vs. the Many: Minor Characters and the Space of the 
Protagonist in the Novel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 13.   
130 Ibid., 18. 
131 Caroline Levine, Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2015), 2. 
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boundaries, temporal patterns, and hierarchies on experience.”132 Levine presents a model 
of aesthetic mediation consistent with a self-and-society model in which selves are 
imaginatively separable from the forms that organize or contain them. 
It is important to note that all three of these studies deploy archives largely 
comprised of Victorian novels (despite the fact that Woloch and Levine both aspire to 
operationalize literary-interpretive approaches that are not historically specific). How and 
why does modernism—and especially the infrastructural modernism that this project 
assembles—displace the conceptual centrality of the liberal subject and transform the 
humanist model of character that these models share? Woloch begins to indicate an 
answer when he argues that “the realist novel is structurally destabilized not by too many 
details or colors or corners, but by too many people.”133 Realism begins to distend into 
something else with the inclusion of “too many people.” This same dilemma—how to 
represent and conceptually organize too many people—is at the heart of early twentieth-
century sociology. People become “too many” not out of sheer voluminousness, (see, for 
example, the Homeric epic catalogue), but when the realist social categories of nation 
and/or class cease to organize collective social life in an infrastructural modernity that 
irritates the coherent symbolizations through which art mediates social cohesion. With 
the dissolution of these realist categories, novelists like Conrad begin to shift their 
reflection to the social itself, questioning and investigating the basic sources of social 
cohesion. Hence Conrad’s fascination with time standardization, which symbolically and 
 
132 Ibid., 3. 
133 Woloch, The One vs. the Many, 19. 
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materially competes with the seemingly obsolescent social function of Victorian 
“culture” to bind the teeming streets of London to a wider geopolitics of terror. For 
sociologists and modernists circa 1900, reflection on “the social” inevitably leads both to 
reflect on the relationship between “society” and its material-technological conditions of 
emergence. These material, natural and technological conditions—Conrad’s time 
standards, Forster’s Machine, and even the “flow” of Joyce’s “subterranean aqueduct”—
dissolve the autonomy not only of the liberal subject, but also of “society” as a realm 
ontologically separable from the inhuman bedrock of its social power.134 
 
Literary Studies in the Infrastructure Era 
The texts of infrastructural modernism query the limits of “the social” in a 
moment of unprecedented socio-technical transformation. To pose the question of “the 
social”—to coordinate modernism with the referent of “society”—may seem willfully 
archaic, naively effacing the political agency of the nation-state in wielding the 
infrastructural biopolitical power described above. Emblematic of this critique is David 
Lloyd and Paul Thomas’ appraisal of Raymond Williams’ Culture and Society, whose 
“somewhat nebulous” concept of “society” prevents Williams from “adequately 
addressing…the gradual subordination of the institutions of culture to the work of the 
state.”135 Lloyd and Thomas’ challenge is well-taken, and chapter 4 of this dissertation 
 
134 James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Vintage, 1986), 548. 
135 David Lloyd and Paul Thomas, Culture and the State (New York: Routledge, 1998), 
9. According to Lloyd and Thomas, “society” is best understood as a kind of apolitical, 
transitional domain that “demands its actualization in pedagogical institutions whose 
function is to transform the individual of civil society into the citizen of the modern state” 
(145). “Society” exists only insofar as it produces citizen-subjects of the state. 
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engages in greater detail with the sociological and imaginative consequences of what 
Michel Foucault describes as the nineteenth-century disarticulation of “society” 
(constituted via “a tight grid of disciplinary coercions that actually guarantees the 
cohesion of the social body”) from the sovereign political body of the state.136 But this 
dissertation argues that close attention to turn-of-the-century infrastructure requires 
cultural scholars to reclaim the wider socio-political referent of Williams’ “society,” if 
wholly reconceived—reprocessed through the insights of media theory and the history of 
technology.  
Alan Liu has recently argued that in “late modernity” infrastructure as “social-
cum-technological milieu” has “the same kind of general purchase on social complexity 
that Stuart Hall, Raymond Williams, and others sought when they reached for their all-
purpose word, ‘culture.’”137 Now that scholars across both the humanities and sciences 
have come to appreciate the transformative technological entanglement of human and 
nonhuman agency in the twentieth century, humanists are called to rethink how we 
theorize the infrastructural mediation of—if not Williams’s “society,” then perhaps 
Latour’s “the social.” Modern culture is “no longer fully describable in older schemes of 
 
136 Michel Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1975-1976, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 37. According to Foucault, 
“modern” social life is characterized by this disarticulation of society and state, in which 
“power is exercised through, on the basis of, and in the very play of the heterogeneity 
between a public right of sovereignty and a polymorphous mechanics of discipline” (38). 
See also Latour, Reassembling the Social, 161-164, which reframes the relationship 
between politics and sociology building out of this Foucauldian social-historical insight.  
137 Alan Liu, “Toward Critical Infrastructure Studies,” Critical Infrastructure Studies 
(blog), April 21, 2018, http://cistudies.org/wp-content/uploads/Toward-Critical-
Infrastructure-Studies.pdf, 2-3. 
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ideology-critique according to which infrastructure underlies an alternate, rather than 
thoroughly intermeshed, reality of superstructure.”138 Liu expresses a growing conviction 
among both social and media theorists that the technological recombination of human and 
nonhuman agency has transformed the very logic of critical hermeneutics: future forms of 
critique must confront the distinctive mechanisms of socio-technical mediation if they are 
to have any hope in explicating the conditions of modern subjectivity and identity, power 
and oppression. 
While Liu discusses the infrastructural conditions of contemporary digital 
networks, I locate the prehistory to this present in the short span of years bridging the 
turn of the twentieth century: in the historical co-emergence of literary modernism, the 
professionalizing social sciences, and the world-scale proliferation of technical 
infrastructure—the aesthetic, social, and technological mediations of the infrastructure 
era. A number of studies across media history, social theory and the history of science 
and technology have addressed the relationship between new forms of world-scale socio-
technical transformation and the social sciences.139 But the relation of literature to these 
interdisciplinary conversations is less certain. While literary scholars have increasingly 
turned their attention to the “infrastructuralism” of modern literature, “infrastructure” 
often figures in these studies as a kind of privileged represented object bearing 
 
138 Ibid., 4. 
139 For important studies that engage with elements in all of these fields to varying 
extents, see: Latour, Reassembling the Social; Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, 
Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Jason W. 
Moore, “The Capitalocene, Part I: on the nature and origins of our ecological crisis,” The 
Journal of Peasant Studies 44:3 (2017): 594-630. 
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heightened ideological content or symbolic weight.140 Less attention has been directed to 
the kind of hermeneutic-conceptual upheaval that Liu describes: the way in which socio-
technical mediation may actually transform the very conditions of meaning in the modern 
world—the conditions through which “culture” mediates “nature” and “society” in a 
world in which ever-intensifying technological entanglement destabilizes the coherence 
of those very concepts.  
The texts of what I call “infrastructural modernism” constitute a vital counter-
aesthetic to the anthropocentrism of turn-of-the-century social science. In a chapter 
analyzing the “new scale of twentieth-century engineering” focused on the construction 
of the Aswan Dam in Egypt from 1898-1902, Timothy Mitchell asks why “some of the 
most profound transformations of the modern era, … the techno-scientific 
transformations of the twentieth century” pose such a deep-seated “problem for social 
science.” Mitchell describes the epistemological canalization of the social sciences, “still 
largely trapped in the methods and divisions of labor of the nineteenth century,” codified 
in the sociology of Durkheim.141 These narrow disciplinary epistemologies are incapable 
of describing the interaction of the technical and biological, the cultural and material: 
“Each of these processes and forces has its own science, which identifies the agents, time 
lines, geo-spatial scales, and modes of interaction appropriate to its analysis. This tends to 
 
140 See, for example, the introduction to the special issue of Modern Fiction Studies on 
“Infrastructuralism.” (Michael Rubenstein, Bruce Robbins, and Sophia Beal, 
“Infrastructuralism: An Introduction.” MFS 61.4 (2015): 575-586.) An important 
exception to this approach is Kate Marshall’s Corridor. 
141 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 35, 28. 
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leave each of them isolated in their separate sciences.”142 Mitchell’s contention is that the 
turn-of-the-century epistemological codification of the human sciences left them without 
a theoretical language or framework to describe the multiscalar and transdisciplinary 
nature of world-scale socio-technical transformation.  
What Mitchell seeks in the social sciences is the domain of literary form. Over the 
following four chapters, this dissertation will trace how for many turn-of-the-century 
artists and social theorists, literature became a privileged medium for capturing the 
conceptual upheaval attendant on new forms of socio-technical mediation that was 
increasingly inaccessible to the codifying social sciences. We can thus look to 
infrastructural modernism as not only a vital historical archive of aesthetic efforts to 
capture a technologizing world-in-flux, but also an imaginative resource for 
contemporary social theorists and historians like Mitchell seeking new methods and 
conceptual vocabularies to describe the mutual constitution of human and nonhuman 
agencies in the wake of the Anthropocene. 
Recovering the contested nature of “society” circa 1900 invites us to rethink and 
extend what we mean by the “sociology of literature” in and for the present. In the 
introductory essay to a special issue on “New Sociologies of Literature,” James English 
asks: “As currently configured, and facing the particular disciplinary circumstances that 
we do, are literary scholars capable of producing a new sociology of literature?”143 
English describes the generalized perception that sociological orientations to literary 
 
142 Ibid., 28. 
143 James F. English, “Everywhere and Nowhere: The Sociology of Literature After ‘the 
Sociology of Literature,’” New Literary History 41.2 (2010): v. 
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studies have exhausted themselves or (even worse) watered themselves down to 
effectively become active participants in the institutional obsolescence of the critical 
humanities, “in step with ominous trends that are driving humanistic inquiry toward some 
small, sad corner of the increasingly social-science-dominated academy to endure an 
‘interdisciplinary’ afterlife of collaborative media research.”144 Whereas English suggests 
that literary scholars learn to cultivate a more flexible relationship to empirical 
quantification and adopt new forms of mixed-methods research, I believe that to rethink 
the sociology of literature entails rethinking what we mean by “the social,” “society” and 
how those concepts structure the conceptual horizon of literary method. And to rethink 
these terms means, finally, that we return to the sites, texts and debates of sociological 
disciplinary emergence when the referent of these terms was more actively contested than 
the sociologies of our literary-critical present. 
For many literary scholars, this disciplinary constructedness is a source of 
difficulty or embarrassment: classical sociology has not been a particularly fertile ground 
for Anglophone literary criticism.145 Mark McGurl has noted the “anxiety” that sociology 
provokes in literary scholars regarding its “nature and boundaries.”146 Because sociology 
“only comes into being under that name in the late nineteenth century, with the successful 
efforts of Émile Durkheim to lodge it in the newly modernizing French university 
 
144 Ibid. 
145 One notable exception is Mizruchi, The Science of Sacrifice: American Literature and 
Modern Social Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); for a literary-formal 
analysis of classical sociology itself, see also Fredric Jameson, “The Vanishing Mediator: 
Narrative Structure in Max Weber,” New German Critique 1.1 (1973): 52-89.  
146 Mark McGurl, “Ordinary Doom: Literary Studies in the Waste Land of the Present,” 
New Literary History 41.2 (2010): 331.  
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system,” for literary scholars, “its official products carry the heavy baggage of 
disciplinary specificity.”147 The “always-already institutional identity” of sociology 
contrasts with history and philosophy, which are not only “disciplines,” but also 
“fundamental intellectual modalities, expansions, and narrativizations of the cognitive 
claims of memory and reason.”148 What McGurl (rightly, I think) characterizes as a 
source of anxiety, I want to reframe as both a virtue and opportunity—for turn-of-the-
century literary artists and for modern literary studies. Despite its latent 
anthropocentrism, sociology nonetheless afforded artist-theorists like Wells, Tarde, and 
Du Bois a conceptual standpoint from which to reimagine the mutual constitution of 
human and nonhuman agency outside of the humanist “cognitive claims of memory and 
reason.” From what perspective or through what aesthetic form, these writers ask, can 
literature conceptualize the distinctiveness of human experience without structurally 
occluding the force or complexity of the nonhuman agencies that shape that experience? 
“Inhuman Power” reclaims for literary studies what Alberto Toscano calls the 
“aesthetics of social theory”: “the regimes of visibility and sensibility that pervade 
different ways of doing sociology.”149 But this reclamation also entails a reversal—how 
might modernism project its own “social theory of aesthetics”? Toscano calls on social 
theorists to “interrogate the limits of the institutions, methods and self-understandings 
that currently define their own practice.”150 “Inhuman Power” seeks to do the same—not 
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in service of instrumental interdisciplinarity but to “renew the cognitive, ethical and 
political vocation to ‘see it whole.’”151 A major claim of this dissertation is that 
recovering the contested sociological imaginary immanent to literature circa 1900 offers 
a new way of approaching the “aspiration towards totality” of modernist literary form. 152 
Once we displace the humanist dialectics through which novel theory generally mediates 
“totality,” then we can reframe modernism away from its ungraspable symbolic horizon 
and towards the character-environment complex. Ultimately, then, “Inhuman Power” is 
an argument about the intimacy of aesthetics and social theory. If we follow Toscano in 
recognizing “the ‘aesthetic’ dimension of social research not as a supplement or an 
ornament, but as a matter of our modes of representing, figuring or imaging the social,” 
then to project that insight back onto infrastructural modernism is to recognize literary art 
as itself an immanent sociology.153 
But while English, McGurl and Toscano each invite us to consider the 
epistemological and representational resonances between literature and sociology as 
disciplines in general, my argument concerns the historical specificity of Anglophone 
writing in the short span of years bridging the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Why 
1900? “Inhuman Power” reframes the historical co-emergence of literary modernism, the 
professionalizing social sciences, and the world-scale proliferation of technical 
infrastructure in order to rethink how scholars theoretically stabilize and narrate the 
relationship between “modernism” and “modernity” that has largely shaped scholarship 
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in modernist studies for several decades.154 To focus on the transatlantic micro-history of 
literary and sociological production in the short span of years circa 1900 is to go against 
the geographic-temporal grain of most scholarship in modernist studies. This kind of 
historical lens—geographically wide and temporally narrow—is not meant to signal a 
naïvely cavalier disregard for historical specificity or literary-historical periodization, but 
is rather motivated by a desire to irritate the interpretive protocols through which we 
coordinate modern literature and capitalism (the often-unspoken horizon of or stand-in 
for “modernity” in the new modernist studies). To write this kind of transatlantic micro-
history is to attempt to bring literary studies nearer to the “modernity” that its cultural 
objects mediate—to take seriously Sven Beckert’s injunction that “no state of capitalism 
is ever permanent or stable. Each new moment in capitalism’s history produces new 
instabilities, and even contradictions, prompting vast spatial, social, and political 
rearrangements.”155 Capitalism is neither organized via the political agency of the nation-
state, nor does it possess the inner rationality or consistency that our periodizing 
 
154 Paul K. Saint-Amour describes modernist scholars’ recent slackening of gatekeeping, 
canon-building definitions of modernism (“capitalized singular noun with a bounded 
referent”) in favor of a weakening of the field’s immanent theory of modernism 
(“pluralized, adjectivalized, decoupled from high culture, and rethought as a transnational 
and transhistorical phenomenon”) in Tense Future: Modernism, Total War, Encyclopedic 
Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 41. While the weakening of “modernism” 
has surely vivified the field of modernist studies (and opened the door for this very 
project!), it has also entrenched the centrality of “modernity” as the bolstering historical 
context that grants coherence to the field’s newly diffuse temporal-geographic borders 
and proliferating cultural objects. A major claim of this project is that as “modernism” 
has weakened, the conceptual-historical hold of “modernity” has hardened, and that this 
hardening has quietly delimited the criteria of aesthetic value by which we measure 
“modernism.” I discuss this aspect of modernist studies field formation in more detail in 
chapter 2, framed through the ambivalent canonicity of H.G. Wells. 
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protocols sometimes suggest. This insight suggests a literary-critical method not wholly 
organized by the historical referent or political unit of the nation-state while recognizing 
an ever-shifting, structurally unequal world-system as representational horizon. Finally, 
then, “Inhuman Power” tells the story not of a total “modernism” that does not exist, but 
of an unprecedented moment of conceptual upheaval in the entwined histories of 
capitalism and culture. 
 
Project Outline  
Chapter One, “‘Alien and Intimate’: The Aesthetic Form of Sociology in Gabriel 
Tarde and H.G. Wells” traces the historical encounter of H.G. Wells and Gabriel Tarde in 
order to excavate shared aesthetic strategies between novelist and sociologist at the turn 
of the century. In 1905 H.G. Wells wrote the preface to the French sociologist Gabriel 
Tarde’s lone work of fiction, the technological utopia Underground Man (1896). Wells’ 
preface offers a complex meditation on the incommensurability of the realist novel and 
the transformative potential of human collective agency. Wells’ preface informs my own 
reading of Underground Man. Against critics who read Tarde’s novel as transparent 
social-scientific tract, I argue that Tarde subtly ironizes the individualizing subjectivity of 
his protagonist in order to invest utopian energy not in the purification of nature from 
society, but rather in the transformative mediation of human and nonhuman agency. 
While writing Tarde’s preface, Wells composed “The So-Called Science of Sociology,” a 
scathing critique of the latent anthropocentrism of modern sociology. Wells insists that a 
genuinely scientific sociology must both include and exceed human experience—must be 
a new kind of literature. This chapter takes seriously Wells’ provocation, approaching 
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Wells’ essay as a statement of modernist criticism and Tarde’s Underground Man as a 
modernist novel. 
Chapter Two, “‘Running the Country Practically’: H.G. Wells and the Enabling 
Fictions of Inhuman Power,” examines how the aesthetic questions posed in the first 
chapter intersect with and transform prevalent models of literary modernism. 
Coordinating Wells’ exclusion from many accounts of modernism with the influence of 
Lukács on twentieth-century histories of the novel, I argue that Wells’ fiction apprehends 
capitalism outside of the human-centric logic of the commodity form. Less interested in 
the historical destiny of the bourgeoisie or the psychic degradations of reification, Wells’ 
fiction models what he calls “adjustment-interest”: the dynamic and co-productive 
relationship between character and environment. I trace Wells’ aesthetics of 
entanglement in his semi-fictional A Modern Utopia (1905) and semi-autobiographical 
Tono-Bungay (1909). Both texts stage elaborate interactions between protagonist and 
infrastructure—utopian energy grids and imperial communications networks—that 
destabilize the narrative centrality and interpretive coherence of both characters. Wells’ 
“adjustment-interest” gives form to the uncertain limit between human and technological 
agency in modernity in order to rethink the conditions of individual political agency 
outside the static binaries of freedom and determinism, human and nonhuman. 
Chapter Three, “The Secret Agency of Standardization: Narrative Standard Time 
and Other Modernist Infrastructures in Joseph Conrad,” begins by reading Conrad’s 
personal correspondence alongside the essays of Sandford Fleming, an influential 
engineer of global communications technology and international standard time. 
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Fleming’s language dematerializes state-owned cables into “bonds of sentiment” that 
quicken “the ties of sympathy” among the nations of the Empire. Conrad explores this 
tension between the material and immaterial conditions of infrastructural social cohesion 
in The Secret Agent (1907). The character of the Professor, a parody of the intellectual 
sterility of modern social science, can only combat the coercive power of social violence 
through material destruction—the bombs that he distributes indiscriminately to London 
anarchists who plan to explode Greenwich Meridian. The Professor seeks to exert agency 
over the socio-technical environment of infrastructural modernity, but his actions are 
largely ineffectual outside of the personal tragedy of the novel’s domestic plot. The 
Professor’s fate is inversely mirrored in the character of Stevie, who seeks to exert artistic 
agency over his material environment but is ultimately destroyed by social forces that 
defy his humanist aesthetic gaze, his charred remains finally merging with the 
environment that he sought to grasp. Conrad contrasts both the Professor’s material 
destruction and Stevie’s symbolic humanism with the formal experimentation of his 
narrative style. The intricate temporal-formal architecture of The Secret Agent contests 
the machinic chronicity of standardized time, staging a complex meditation on the social 
function of the novel in a world in which infrastructure overwhelms culture. 
Chapter Four, “Scales of Justice: Overdetermined Embodiment and the Semiotics 
of State Racism in Charles Chesnutt and W.E.B. Du Bois,” explores continuities between 
the sociology of Du Bois and the fiction of Chesnutt regarding new infrastructural forms 
of racial violence. Du Bois’ turn-of-the-century sociology investigates the infrastructural 
conditions of social relationality that enable complex techniques of racialization in the 
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modern city. Du Bois describes a turn-of-the-century urban environment which 
powerfully shapes the very conditions of modern personhood. Building on Simone 
Browne’s theorization of “racializing surveillance” technologies that reify racialized 
boundaries in the modern state, I show how Du Bois gives aesthetic form to his urban 
sociology in The Souls of Black Folk (1903) in order to dramatize the new scales of social 
control enabled by world-scale infrastructure. Du Bois’ account of the scalar mobility of 
the color line in the twentieth century helps us to understand the infrastructural aesthetic 
of Chesnutt’s The Marrow of Tradition (1901), in which the communications, legal, and 
urban infrastructures of the Jim Crow South ostentatiously produce and reify racial 
hierarchies. The Marrow of Tradition breaks the conventions of realist characterization in 
order to imagine new forms of social recognition rooted in the material body—the 
marrow of tradition— that do not rely on a bourgeois intersubjective sympathy 
inadequate to transform the inhuman environment of the biopolitical state. 
The saturation of infrastructure into the core experiences and functions of 
contemporary social life—and the corresponding entanglement of human and nonhuman 
agencies—has only intensified since the turn of the twentieth century. Today’s cultural 
critique requires new methods and vocabularies to describe the evolving mediation of 
human beings with their media environments. Responsive to literary scholars’ growing 
interest in methods that decenter the human as historical agent and interpretive horizon in 
the wake of the Anthropocene, “Inhuman Power” offers a new genealogy of modernism 
that situates the originary exchanges between modernist art and social theory as the 
prehistory of our critical and cultural present. 
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CHAPTER ONE: “Alien and Intimate”: Aesthetic Forms of Sociology in Gabriel Tarde 
and H.G. Wells 
 
What is the place of the nonhuman in the modern novel? To attempt an 
answer is to confront another of the uncanny effects of the Anthropocene: 
it was in exactly the period in which human activity was changing the 
earth’s atmosphere that the literary imagination became radically centered 
on the human. 
—Amitav Ghosh, The Great Derangement: Climate 
Change and the Unthinkable 
 
The framework of the work of art is individual lived experience, and it is 
in terms of these limits that the outside world remains stubbornly 
alienated. When we pass from individual experience to that collective 
dimension, that sociological or historical focus in which human 
institutions slowly become transparent for us once again, we have entered 
the realm of disembodied abstract thought and have left the work of art 
behind us. 
— Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form  
 
 
…there can be no guarantee that the future will have a place for the 
literary.  
—Derek Attridge, The Singularity of Literature  
 
 
What is the imaginative form of nonhuman agency in modern fiction? How can 
literature—made by humans, for humans—hope to transcend a humanism baked into its 
very form? Surely modern art—the art of “individual lived experience” and “individual 
moral adventures”—has little to contribute to the apprehension of nonhuman agency in 
the modern world.156 And yet this apprehension has become one of literary theory’s most 
 
156 Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 168. Amitav Ghosh, The Great 
Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2016), 129. 
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pressing critical tasks. As we increasingly recognize the capacity of human beings to 
devastate our planet, theorists of the novel have sought to counteract philosophical 
anthropocentrism—to take measure of the mechanisms through which novels center (and 
decenter) the human subject as historical agent and interpretive horizon. Seeking the 
place of the nonhuman in the modern novel, Amitav Ghosh has found it absent; modern 
literature radically centers the human. But what, or where, is the place of the nonhuman 
in modern literature? The provocation of this chapter is that some of the most sustained, 
searching depictions of nonhuman agency in modern literature can be found where 
perhaps least expected: in modernist sociological texts investigating the science of human 
sociality at the turn of the twentieth century. 
 This chapter traces the historical encounter of the British novelist H.G. Wells and 
the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde in order to excavate shared aesthetic strategies 
developed between novelist and sociologist circa 1900. Fredric Jameson has described a 
fundamental incompatibility between the sociological and the literary. The modern novel, 
beholden to the experiences and desires of the individual, relies on the alienation of self 
and nature as the very condition of its narrative structure. But if this is the case—if 
modern art depends on the stubborn alienation of the outside world—then where in the 
novel could we ever hope to find the place of the nonhuman? The crucial insight shared 
by Tarde and Wells is that to narrate the place of the nonhuman is not (as Ghosh seems to 
suggest) to decenter the human, but rather to relinquish the structuring premise of 
alienation—to risk writing a novel that may no longer be “art.” Seeking to give literary 
form to the unwieldy shapes of human sociality, both Tarde and Wells recast the 
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framework of the work of art away from “individual lived experience,” and toward  trans-
individual collective life. Rather than represent or respond to an alienated world, their 
fiction contests and reframes the conceptual structures that divide the world into “nature” 
and “society.” Where is the place of the nonhuman if “nature,” no longer distant and 
alienated, includes an historically-evolving “us”?157 
 
Gabriel Tarde: Literary Sociology   
In 1905 H.G. Wells was asked to write the introduction to the English translation 
of Underground Man, the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde’s lone work of narrative 
fiction, first published in France as Fragment d’histoire future in 1896. Abandoning the 
language of bald social-scientific theory, Tarde’s science-fiction novel fantasizes 
humanity’s migration underground in the wake of ecological catastrophe. The novel 
opens onto a world-society of the near future—a global state united by a shared language 
(Greek) and powered by massive public works projects. But this world-scale 
technological colonization of nature is quickly undone, as the sun rapidly begins to cool. 
A deathly chill spreads over the surface of the earth, transforming the landscape and 
annihilating civilization. Millions are killed, as humanity flees to ever-shrinking pockets 
 
157 I place “nature” in quotation marks to signal the Durkheimian conception of nature as 
a realm ontologically separate from human social relations. Bruno Latour discusses and 
critiques this “idea of nature” at length in Politics of Nature. Latour insists that we 
replace “the dual arena of nature and politics” (i.e., of nature and society) with “the  
single arena of the collective,” a new conceptualization of social life that “blur[s] the 
distinction between nature and society durably” so that “the properties of human beings  
and nonhumans with which it has come to terms are in no way assured” (30, 36, 38). 
Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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of habitable climate. The last human survivors, guided by the anachronistic heroic 
individuality of their leader Militades, finally seek refuge inside the bowels of the earth. 
Bringing with them only masterpieces of art and philosophy, the remnants of humanity 
transform into a unified world society mediated by culture. Eventually these few 
survivors construct for themselves an underground paradise—a temperate shelter filled 
with philosophy and art. Over time, these settlers’ intricate tunnels spread under the 
surface of the earth, and this new sect of humanity develops its own laws, customs, and 
values that reflect its separation from the organic life-forms of the planet’s surface. 
 Underground Man has not been a particularly contested object of scholarly 
debate. Perhaps encouraged by the novel’s evident lack of aesthetic merit or literary 
subtlety, critics seem willing to interpret Underground Man in the same critical register 
as Tarde’s straightforwardly sociological texts, despite the inconsistency of many of the 
novel’s stated ideas with Tarde’s wider thought. Grant Bollmer, for example, argues that 
we need to read Underground Man as an earnest utopian tract, “a speculative vision for a 
utopian society.”158 Rosalind Williams reads the novel as a “thought experiment” in 
which “the natural environment has been replaced not by a technological environment but 
by a social one.”159 Describing Tarde as a “social aesthete” for whom “society was the 
highest art form,” Williams locates more artistry in Tarde’s sociological program than in 
his literary text.160 Alberto Toscano similarly reads Underground Man as a “sociological 
 
158 Grant Bollmer, Inhuman Networks: Social Media and the Archaeology of Connection 
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 95. 
159 Rosalind Williams, Notes on the Underground: An Essay on Technology, Society, and 
the Imagination (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 136. 
160 Ibid. 
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thought experiment” that provides “clues regarding the manner in which Tarde envisages 
the specificity of politics.”161 According to Toscano, the novel’s premise “allows Tarde to 
speculate on the being of a society that has been thoroughly purified of its mediation by 
nature.”162 But it is, I argue, precisely this purified conception of society that 
Underground Man contests, despite the text’s overt assertions to the contrary. What all of 
these readers of Tarde’s novel fail to address is the specificity of its literary form—the 
manner in which the text ironically undermines several of its most explicit and baldly-
stated sociological claims. But what would it mean for literary critics to take seriously 
Tarde’s decision to write a novel—to ask not only what Underground Man reveals about 
Tardean sociology, but also what it reveals about the novel at the turn of the century? 
 Reading Underground Man as an earnestly straightforward utopian tract, as do 
Bollmer, Toscano, and Williams, invites an initial interpretive question: What is the 
relationship between the first, surface-level world-society and the second, underground 
one (ostensibly the site of genuine utopia)? Toscano addressees this question most 
explicitly, contending that the first social world—what Tarde describes as “the great 
Asiatic-American-European confederacy”163—dramatizes “the limits of ‘extensive 
culture’… which seems to presage an eternity of pacified intercourse, and a somewhat 
emasculating ennui.”164 As Wells notes in his introduction, Tarde’s irony is at its most 
 
161 Alberto Toscano, “Powers of Pacification: State and Empire in Gabriel Tarde,” 
Economy and Society 36.4 (2007): 603. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Gabriel Tarde, Underground Man, trans. Cloudesley Brereton (Westport: Hyperion 
Press, 1974), 23. Further references to this text hereafter cited parenthetically by page 
number and abbreviated UM. 
164 Toscano, “Powers of Pacification,” 603-604. 
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trivializing and biting in this first section, and it is tempting to read this first social world 
as the dystopian negative object that the underground utopia will proceed to correct. But 
this ignores the consistency of this initial world with Tarde’s sociological theories and 
ideals. Despite the continuity of this futuristic society with Tarde’s own late-nineteenth 
century present, Underground Man emphasizes the radical social transformation that has 
attended the world-scale unification of language—the world bears witness “to the 
rapidity, the depth, and the universality of the change which took place in the customs, 
ideas, and needs, and in all the forms of social life” (UM 29). The motor of this radical 
remaking of the social is none other than the Tardean mechanisms of invention, imitation, 
and adaptation: “henceforth there was no barrier to stop in its star-like radiation the 
expansion of any idea, no matter where it originated” (UM 30).165 This infrastructural   
intensification of communication and interpersonal exchange does not simply result in 
larger or more inclusive versions of older social units like the nation-state, but makes 
those more archaic mediations of collective life meaningless. The ultimate index of this 
transformation is literature itself, in which exemplars of the great European national 
literary traditions—“Shakespeare, Goethe, and Hugo”—have become literally 
unintelligible, as the dually archaic social referents of the nation-state and the middle-
class individual dissolve into obsolescence, the provincial “pretended literatures of our 
rude ancestors” (UM 31, 30).   
 
165 I discuss the basic conceptual structure of Tardean sociology in the introduction, in 
which I frame Tarde’s long-standing rivalry and 1903 debate with Durkheim as a model 
for the competing orientations of social theory at the turn of the twentieth century, 
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 The unprecedented exchange of ideas and influence profoundly transforms both 
society and art. But this exchange is facilitated not only by linguistic unification—an 
intensified world-scale linguistic infrastructure—but also by the “transmission of force at 
a distance by electricity and its enlistment under a thousand forms”—the amplification of 
material energy infrastructures. This future world on the surface is characterized by the 
tenfold multiplication of “the productivity of human energy,” in which waterfalls, winds 
and tides have become “the slaves of man” (UM 34). In Tarde’s vision, these linguistic, 
cultural, and energy infrastructures combine to transform the future under the sign and 
agency of the human—transmuting the natural world into an infrastructural fantasy of 
unlimited energy. Thus we find even in this first, surface-level social world many of the 
characteristics that critics like Williams and Toscano attribute to Tarde’s underground 
utopia: a world-state mediated by culture and the free exchange of influence, structured 
around the radical separability of the natural and the social. What does it mean that 
already this seemingly pre-utopian world-state has thoroughly domesticated nature to 
meet its needs? Just how degraded is this surface world of the future? What is the basis of 
its comparison with the underground? 
This first social world on the surface is doomed not by its political structures, 
values, or mechanisms of exchange so much as its ultimate vulnerability to the ravaging 
agency of the natural environment. The sun begins to cool, and the humanized landscape 
is annihilated by alien natural forces: “from time to time a country or continent broke off 
suddenly its communication with the central agency, the reason  being that an entire 
telegraphic section was buried under the snow” (UM 55-56). The infrastructures that had 
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so thoroughly framed the world are suddenly themselves framed by the wider agencies of 
the planet: “Of this immense network of electricity, which enveloped in its close meshes 
the entire globe, as of that prodigious coat of mail with which the complicated system of 
railways clothed the earth, there was only left some scattered fragments” (UM 56). But 
what are we to make of this sudden ecological crisis—the radically-compressed cooling 
of the earth? At first glance, this certainly seems to be the most fantastic of science-
fictional premises. But in fact Tarde dramatizes one of the most basic phenomenological 
illusions of infrastructural modernity—what Paul Edwards describes as the 
misapprehension that nature is “orderly, dependable, and separable from society and 
technology—an understanding that is in fact a chief characteristic of modern life-within-
infrastructures.”166 No matter how thoroughly human infrastructure domesticates the 
natural world and instrumentalizes its alien agency, nature will always exceed the frame. 
What both Edwards describes and Tarde dramatizes is the perspectival delusion inherent 
to an infrastructural modernity in which human entanglement with the nonhuman is ever-
intensifying yet ever more structurally foreclosed by technologies that disguise the 
“permanent imbrication of infrastructure in nature.”167  
 The first half of Underground Man temporally compresses global ecological 
catastrophe in order to render narratable precisely what tends to recede from view in 
infrastructural modernity—the inseparability of nature and human social form. Tarde 
 
166 Paul N. Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social 
Organization in the History of Sociotechnical Systems” in Modernity and Technology, 
ed. Thomas J. Misa et al. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 195. 
167 Ibid. 
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abbreviates ecological catastrophe to the timescale of a human life, suddenly summoning 
into being the semi-protagonist Militades whose individual agency is required to raise the 
new underground society. Tarde dramatizes the extent to which infrastructural 
technologies—language, communications networks, energy infrastructures, and, finally, 
literary fiction—all produce the illusion of a natural world scaled to human mastery. 
Tarde’s world-state on the surface is not a dystopia—a negative example to contrast with 
a subsequent utopia—but the representation of a contradiction immanent to his literary 
project: how to describe the mutual constitution of nature and society through a novelistic 
form whose very mechanisms of plot and protagonism tend to obscure that fact. How can 
literary narrative be genuinely sociological when its narrative protocols scale the world to 
the desires, experiences, and agencies of the individual life? This is the question that the 
opening half of Underground Man poses, and to which its subsequent underground half 
responds. How, then, does our understanding of the novel’s second half—the 
underground utopia—transform if we read the novel not as a binaristic comparison of 
dystopia and utopia, but as a natural disaster novel speaking the interpenetration of nature 
and society? 
 Despite the extent to which the novel’s opening half dramatizes the constitutive 
imbrication of nature and human infrastructure, the first underground inhabitants are 
convinced that their new habitat is radically insulated from the vagaries of nature. Upon 
their first subterranean descent, these pioneers are surprised to find “enchanted palaces, in 
which all extremes of climate, rain, and wind, cold and torrid heat were unknown” (UM 
96). They live under the glow of “innumerable lamps” in an eternal “daylight that knew 
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no night” (UM 96-97) and soon come to recognize the capriciousness of the sun as 
a “mode of lighting that bristled with so many inconveniences” (UM 99). Growing 
increasingly conscious of the extent to which their lives on the surface were responsive to 
the organizing agency of the sun—“every night the sun commanded social life to desist 
and social life desisted”—this underground humanity comes to see its former self as “the 
slave of nature” despite its evident technological mastery (UM 99). 
 Developing its own customs and social structures, this underground society adapts 
to the lack of organic plant and animal life. Dwellers soon come to recognize this 
“complete elimination of living nature, whether animal or vegetable” as a “purification of 
society” in which “the social milieu was for the first time able to reveal and display its 
true virtues” (UM 111). In perhaps the most frequently-cited passage of Underground 
Man, the narrator (using language that critics have tended to attribute to the voice of 
Tarde himself168) speculates that “destiny had desired to make in our case an extended 
sociological experiment”: 
The problem, in a way, was to learn, what would social man become if committed 
to his own keeping, yet left to himself—furnished with all the intellectual 
acquisitions accumulated through a remote past by human geniuses, but deprived 
of the assistance of all other living beings, nay, even of those beings half endowed 
with life, that we call rivers and seas and stars, and thrown back on the conquered, 
yet passive forces of chemical, inorganic and lifeless Nature, which is separated 
from man by too deep a chasm to exercise on him any action from the social point 
of view. (UM 111-113) 
 
 
168 As we have already seen, both Toscano and Williams adopt the language of the 
“sociological thought experiment” to describe Underground Man itself—equating the 
narrator’s own self-understanding of his social position with the un-ironic sociological 
theorization of Tarde himself. 
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Just as the surface dwellers imagine that they have transformed the waterfalls, winds, and 
tide into “the slaves of man,” this underground society asserts its mastery over the 
passive chemical Nature of its subterranean environment. But what should we make of 
the fact that the passage to which critics have turned for the most explicit statement of 
Tarde’s utopian ideals in actuality draws a parallel between surface and underground 
societies that both seek to domesticate their environmental surround?169 
 Tarde almost immediately undermines the premise of this so-called “extended 
sociological experiment,” ironizing the pretension and perspectival limitation of his 
narrator’s own self-understanding. The narrator believes that the elimination of organic 
life radically liberates the underground dwellers; humanity formerly relied on vegetation 
for sustenance, making “man a slave to the tyrannical whims of a plant” (UM 124). But 
of course, no human society can fully eliminate organic life, and the underground 
dwellers are themselves beholden to the creaturely needs of their own organic bodies. 
Their survival depends upon meat frozen in ice during the solar cool-down, an 
exhaustible resource whose future scarcity the dwellers can only manage through 
population control. Just like their predecessors on the surface, these underground 
denizens shelter themselves from their reliance on and vulnerability to nature. Literally 
“shelter”: in underground society, architects are replaced by “sappers” whose vocation is 
“to work out the plans for excavating and repairing all our crypts and to direct the 
 
169 For an illustration of this kind of reading, see for example Williams, Notes on the 
Underground: “Moral, intellectual, and aesthetic life all flower once humanity is freed 
from the degrading need to deal with nature’s caprices and hardships….The 
imperfections of nature are replaced by the perfections of culture” (136). 
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carrying out of the work by our machines” (UM 127). Domesticity merges with 
machinery, architecture merges with infrastructure, and the inorganic rocky surround is 
dually transformed into the substrate both of human shelter and of human productive 
energy. This infrastructural architecture of underground tunnels is aestheticized by the 
dwellers into “artificial and veritably artistic scenery,” and its burrowed dimensions are 
transmuted into “horizon,” “sky,” and “vegetation”— the natural objects of post-
Romantic aesthetic contemplation: “Here is nature winnowed and perfected, which has 
become human in order to delight humanity, and which humanity has deified in order to 
shelter love beneath its shade” (UM 129). 
 In the passage block-quoted above, “Nature” signifies the fully alien—its 
inorganic, stony materiality intensifying the dwellers’ sense of a radical separability 
between nature and society. The narrator claims that the brute materiality of the 
underground habitat is too detached from man “to exercise on him any action from the 
social point of view.” But just a few pages later, these same rocks become the very 
substrate of underground social form—the humanized basis of shelter, energy, and 
culture. What the novel’s narrator cannot seem to decide is whether these rocks are fully 
alien or fully humanized—whether they are nature or technology. And it is this 
struggle—this contradiction—within the narrative voice that is the most telling 
representational feature in Tarde’s novel. If the opening half of Underground Man gives 
representational purchase to the doomed pretensions of human technological mastery that 
the wider agencies of nature will penetrate and humiliate, the second “utopian” half 
would seem to depict technology reclaiming human mastery over nature. But that is not 
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the case. Instead, the contradictions within the novel’s narrative voice dramatize the 
powerfully structuring conceptual force of “nature” and “technology” in shaping human 
beings’ relation to their environment and to “society.” That this inner confusion is subtle 
and unmarked by the narrator indexes the difficulty of reconciling that contradiction 
within the individual mind and through the dominant conceptual paradigms of modern 
thought. Rocks can either function as passively irrelevant or foundationally constitutive 
to human social development, so long as they do not transform the essential “human” 
who is the subject of that development. Rocks are either nature or technology—
technology masters nature, which eventually reclaims technology. But can we find in 
Tarde’s novel an alternative to this endless dialectic between the separable domains of 
nature and society?  
 The genuinely utopian promise motivating Underground Man inheres not in the 
social structures and customs of underground life, but in the possibility that the limiting 
and alienating conceptual paradigms of modern thought might be changing. Near the 
conclusion of Underground Man, the narrator gives an account of the current state of 
scientific research in underground society. Intellectual energy is primarily directed into 
two sciences—chemistry and psychology—which are felt to be converging into the same 
field of inquiry, “on the high road to becoming identical by dint of pushing their joint 
researches ever deeper and crushing to atoms the last problems left” (UM 168). 
Chemistry pursues “the psychology of the atom”—chemists “force their way into the 
inner life of the molecules and reveal to us their desires, their ideas, and under a 
fallacious air of conformity, their individual physiognomy” (UM 169). At the same time, 
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psychology pursues “the atomic theory of self,” alternatively understood as “the 
sociology of the self” —psychologists “enable us to perceive, even in its most minute 
detail, the most admirable of all societies, this hierarchy of consciousness” (UM 169). 
Chemistry reveals the personality of rocks, and consciousness is shown to comprise its 
own society. Taken together, this underground science reveals wider relational energies 
that are beginning to transform humanity’s conception of its position in the wider world: 
We are no longer alone in a frozen world. We are conscious that these rocks are 
alive and animated, we are conscious that these hard metals which protect and 
warm us are likewise a prolific brotherhood. Through their mediation these living 
stones have some message for our heart, something at once alien and intimate, 
which neither the stars nor the flowers of the field ever told to our forefathers. 
(UM 169-170) 
 
Modern science reveals humanity’s brotherhood with rocks, its entanglement with the 
alien. How do we square this passage with the narrator’s earlier assertion that 
underground life is constitutively premised on the “purification of society,” the radical 
separation of the social and natural? Are these “living stones” those same passive, 
lifeless, inorganic rocks, “separated from man by too deep a chasm to exercise on him 
any action from the social point of view”? Surely not. Here Underground Man most 
nearly approaches Tarde’s wider sociological thought. The novel imagines future forms 
of science with the resources, curiosity and technical tools to reveal the intimate 
entanglement of human and nonhuman being. The underground scientists empirically 
confirm the genuinely relational ontology theorized more explicitly in Tarde’s 
Monadology and Sociology. The narrator can only aestheticize these rocks as having 
“some message for our heart.” But this passage introduces a humanization of nature far 
different than the domestication and instrumentalization dramatized earlier in the novel—
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the fantasies of a technologized humanity projecting its mastery over an inert, passive 
nature. Instead, this late passage prompts the reader to ask what it means to find 
brotherhood and companionship in the alien agencies that are the very substance of one’s 
habitat—the literal substrate of society’s architectural, infrastructural and cultural 
capacities. The novel’s most radical—and most overtly Tardean—utopian gambit is not 
the fantastic isolation of a pristine human society invulnerable to the vagaries of nature, 
but instead the possibility that a transformed environment might itself transform human 
forms of knowing and apprehending the world and thus, perhaps, humanity itself.170 
Locating the utopian energies of Tarde’s novel in the narrator’s contradictory self- and 
social-understanding—in glimmers of a radically transformative relationship between self 
and world that exceeds the narrator’s own cognitive capacities—forces us to reject 
readings of the novel that frame the text as a transparent, unartful utopian tract or wholly 
earnest vision of a finalized, ideal society. Underground Man has been of interest 
 
170 Tarde gestures toward the slow and ongoing transformation of “human nature” in the 
gradual diminution of the dwellers’ fear of death: “psychologists have acquired still 
further claims on our gratitude in freeing us from the fear of death. Permeated by their 
doctrines we have followed their consequences to their final conclusion with the 
deductive vigor that is second nature with us. Death appears to us as a dethronement that 
leads to freedom. It restores to itself the fallen or abdicated self that retires anew into its 
inner consciousness, where it finds in depths more than the equivalent of the outward 
empire it has lost” (UM 170-171). In this way, Tarde imaginatively anticipates the 
Freudian death drive, in which the body’s organic materiality is subject to the force of a 
Thanatos that exceeds human social agencies. Both Tarde and the later Freud place the 
human within wider force-fields of relational energy that exceed the psychodynamics of 
human social interaction. This constitutive interest in the relational mediation of human 
and nonhuman agencies is what unites Tarde and Freud and what differentiates not only 
Tarde from Durkheim, but also Freud from his later reworking in Lacan, who contains 
the cosmic conflict between Eros and Thanatos within the ambivalent aggressivity 
inherent to the specular narcissism of the mirror stage. 
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primarily to sociologists and intellectual historians. But what can close attention to the 
text’s unrecognized literary complexity teach us about history of the modern novel at the 
turn of the twentieth century? 
 Underground Man is voiced by a narrator who fully identifies with underground 
society, who earnestly extols the virtues of its social structure and its “purification” from 
the degradations of nature—who believes he inhabits “an extended sociological 
experiment.” Because of the subterranean boundedness of his underground social world 
(a sort of knowable community of sociological wish-fulfilment), the narrator is confident 
that he understands the customs, values and structure of underground society.171  But 
throughout the latter half of the novel, Tarde indicates this underground society’s 
constitutive imbrication with nature and thus undermines the most confident claims of his 
utopian cicerone. Tarde ironizes his narrator as a sort of “bad sociologist” presenting his 
own contingent social position as a transparent and unmediated sociological experiment, 
unable to bring his own historical position, his own situatedness, into the analytic frame. 
Critics mirror this reductiveness when they read the narrator as an unironized Tarde 
proxy. But it is not an accident that most readers confuse Tarde and his narrator—Tarde 
himself invites it! The first-person drifts in and out of the novel’s narrative texture, 
 
171 On the literary representation of “knowable communities,” see Raymond Williams, 
The Country and the City (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). According to 
Williams, most novels are knowable communities in which “the novelist offers to show 
people and their relationships in essentially knowable and communicable ways” (165). 
This knowability becomes increasingly difficult to represent in the infrastructural 
extensivity of the twentieth-century world-system. Thus for a novelist like Tarde the 
knowability that Williams describes as characteristic of the nineteenth-century novel 
becomes an object of science-fictional fantasy or wish-fulfillment at the dawn of the 
twentieth century. 
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figurally objectifying the narrator into a distinct character, only to fade back into an 
impersonal and bitingly ironic indicative that is difficult to distinguish from Tarde’s own 
sociological voice. 
 This pivoting between characterological objectification and narrative 
identification is the representational alternative that Underground Man poses to the “bad 
sociology” of the novel’s narrator. Underground Man seemingly narrates the historical 
emergence of a bounded, knowable social world, presenting the reader with both the 
historical protagonist (Militades) and sociological cicerone (narrator) of that world. But 
both of these figures shift in and out of narrative focus—sometimes the object of 
narration, sometimes fading into a narrative background that is indistinguishable from the 
author himself. Tarde’s narrator often invokes the first-person plural at moments in which 
he seems most fully to identify with the consolidated, bounded social identity conferred 
by “underground society,” the comprehensible subterranean social world that literally 
encloses him. These invocations of the first-person plural frequently equate “humanity” 
with underground society and emphatically assert the separation of the social from the 
natural: “we have realized at the same time what an unsuspected drag the terrestrial fauna 
and flora had hitherto been on the progress of humanity” (UM 113). Who or what is the 
referent of this “we”? The narrator names “humanity,” but Tarde clearly intends the 
denizens of this particular underground society. This quotation is one of many in 
Underground Man that slips between the “we” of underground society and the “we” of 
the human species. This is the linguistic trick of Underground Man: the subtly shifting 
referent of “we,” ambiguously poised between species and society. This referential 
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ambiguity mirrors the wider instability of the novel’s narrative voice, itself uncertainly 
poised between historically-situated character and transparent Tarde proxy. Tarde pivots 
between these two referents of the first-person plural in order to unsettle both—just as the 
narrator, “we” slips in and out of view, functioning as both subject and object. 
 The animating question that Underground Man addresses through its literary form 
is the wider sociological problem confronted by artists and social theorists at the turn of 
the century:  What “we” is adequate to a technologically-saturated world, a globe 
symbolically and materially mediated by infrastructures that intensify forms of exchange 
to an unprecedented degree? What is the appropriate representational language to 
describe the limits and mechanisms of cohesion in a social world that exceeds the 
individual’s cognitive grip? More to the point, what is “the social” in modernity? How do 
we draw conceptual limits in a world in which we are felt to be mediating with rocks? 
These questions allow us to approach with fresh perspective the quotation singled out by 
Wells in his introduction as the heart of Tarde’s thought—the passage in the novel in 
which Tarde’s own voice seems most discernable.172 The passage critiques the influence 
of bourgeois economics on surface-life prior to the solar cool-down (and also, of course, 
on Tarde’s own turn-of-the-century present): 
Was the relation of the worker to his employer, of the artisan class to the other 
classes of the population, of these classes between themselves a really social 
relation? Not the least in the world! Certain sophists, who were called economists, 
and who were to our sociologists of to-day what the alchemists formerly were to 
the chemists or the astrologers to the astronomers, had given credit, it is true, to 
this error—that society essentially consists in an exchange of services. From this 
 
172 In his introduction, Wells writes that the ideas expressed in this passage “constitute 
the body, the serious reality to which all the rest of this little book is so much dress, 
adornment and concealment” (UM 16-17). 
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point of view, which, moreover, is quite out of date, the social bond could never 
be closer than that between the ass and the ass driver, the ox and drover, the sheep 
and the shepherd. Society, we now know, consists in the exchange of reflections. 
Mutually to ape one another, and by dint of accumulated apings diversely 
combined to create an originality is the important thing. Reciprocal service is only 
an accessory. (UM 116-117) 
 
It seems that Trade critiques an economic hermeneutic—the interpretive point of view in 
which the economic is understood as first cause of the social and cultural. But that is not 
quite right. Tarde critiques bourgeois economists as alchemists—occult shamans 
unscientifically confusing cause and effect, imagining that economic relations reveal the 
true mechanisms and scope of social relations, when in fact they constitute the limit to a 
more genuinely social relation. Bourgeois economic theories bolster the degraded 
relations that a more genuinely social future might ameliorate. What Tarde probes in this 
passage is the extent to which concepts and material practices sustain each other—such 
that economic theories with as much essential truth-value as alchemy can achieve a 
material foothold in social relations. Bourgeois economics and capitalist social relations 
dually format the world into subjects and objects—“the ass and the ass driver, the ox and 
drover, the sheep and the shepherd”—actors that exert their agency and things that are 
acted upon. This passage opens the window to another conceptual possibility for 
apprehending the mutual exchange of agencies in infrastructural modernity: the exchange 
of reflections, imitation, entanglement. What the narrator is here unable to process 
cognitively, but that the “brotherhood of rocks” passage later suggests, is that this 
exchange of reflections is in fact a posthumanist one. 
 Grant Bollmer reads Underground Man as emblematic of a problematic Tardean 
ideology, “a general principle in which connection and flow can be equated to nearly 
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anything that exists.”173 In Bollmer’s reading, Tarde “reduc[es] everything to 
transmission and repetition” and “assumes most humans to be mere information 
relays.”174 Bollmer finds in Tarde a generalized imaginary of networked flows that posits 
connective networks as the ontological basis of the economic, social, political, 
technological, and biological. This flattening conjunction of the economic and the social 
can only advance “a bourgeois politics that assumes the masses are ultimately 
somnambulistic and in need of control.”175 Bollmer’s account of a Tardean politics of the 
networked human node relies on a conception of humanity as essentially static—nodal 
vessels unchanged by the exchanges that they facilitate. But as we have seen, 
Underground Man invests its strongest utopian energies in processes of transformative 
entanglement that meaningfully alter human beings’ relationship not only with each other 
but also the material world. Tarde critiques the structuring agency of dominant 
conceptual paradigms that format the world into subjects and objects, distorting and 
obscuring human beings’ capacity to apprehend their imbrication with and reliance on the 
natural world. These conceptual paradigms are inextricable from the material practices—
the economic exchanges, public works projects, and cultural forms—on which they rely. 
Both sociology and literary form are implicated in this critique. Underground Man is 
Tarde’s effort to coordinate the conceptual limitations of social thought with the 
representational limitations of the novel in the late-nineteenth century.  
 
173 Bollmer, Inhuman Networks, 95. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid., 91. 
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Central to this coordinated critique is the novel’s break with the conventions of 
nineteenth-century realist characterization. Tarde dissolves any sort of structuring or 
stable representational relationship between the narrator and his underground society.176 
Just like the unsettled “we,” the allegorical link between character and society that the 
novel would dialectically reconcile in its narrative form is disintegrated. Not a coherent 
character so much as a dynamic narrative function, the narrator in Underground Man is a 
device dramatizing the limits of human cognition, the inability of the modern mind to 
process the contradictions immanent to the misapprehension of “purified society” or the 
stable “we” of an essential humanity. And this is the essential role of Underground Man 
within the wider oeuvre of Tarde. The referential instability of the novel’s narrative voice 
offers a representational device that articulates something Tarde’s social-scientific texts 
cannot: the relational exchanges mediating human and nonhuman agencies that transform 
the human while escaping its cognitive grasp. Novelistic characterization offers Tarde a 
representational strategy—the grammatical flexibility and referential instability of the 
first-person, the shifting objectification of and identification with the narrator—that 
renders these forces of entanglement thinkable. Rather than allegorize humanity or 
underground society, the narrator dramatizes the filtering distortion of human-scaled 
 
176 In this way, Tardean characterization defies the animating tension between allegory 
and reference that Alex Woloch describes as the immanent tension structuring realist 
literary characterization. Alex Woloch, The One vs. the Many: Minor Characters and the 
Space of the Protagonist in the Novel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 12-
42. 
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perception, his own immanent contradictions rendering these forces intelligible and thus 
narratable. 
 This dispersal of both the omniscient third-person narrator and the representative 
protagonist deforms—without wholly abandoning—the historical logic underwriting the 
nineteenth-century realist novel. The first half of Underground Man narrates the socially 
and ecologically catastrophic consequences of anthropocentric conceptual paradigms that 
conceal the constitutive imbrication of nature and society. The novel’s second half does 
not solve that problem but invests utopian energy in the possibility of new ways of 
apprehending the world that are more open to alien agencies. The history of that 
conceptual mutation—from the alienation of the present to unimaginable future forms of 
entanglement—requires a far longer timescale than the human lifespan. Thus for Tarde 
the individual life is not the proper unit through which to narrate history—is not the unit 
of historical transformation. But recognizing that readers can only apprehend the world 
through the dimensions of their own cognitive perception, Tarde confronts the challenge 
that utopia is only thinkable and narratable via the human-scaled perceptions and 
concepts that he would imagine otherwise. This is the contradiction immanent to the 
novel form that the sociological novelist confronts circa 1900: the novel’s reliance on and 
reference to structures of individuation that its sociological energies seek to transcend and 
its utopian desire aspires to transform. 
This articulation of the historical-formal contradiction immanent to Tarde’s novel 
allows us finally to answer the question with which this reading began: What is the 
relationship between the first, surface-level world-society and the second, underground 
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social world? As we have seen, the first half of Underground Man condenses world-scale 
solar cool-down to the timescale of a human life in order to render narratable and 
representable the constitutive entanglement of nature and society. The novel’s second 
half subtly narrates the narrator’s own inner contradictions in order to depict the 
inadequacy of modern social-scientific paradigms to apprehend this imbrication—
dramatizing the limits of modern thought-structures that define the human by negating 
nature and asserting the pristine autonomy of human social relations. Read in this way, 
we can see the inadequacy of the redemptive historical plot-structure of “dystopia to 
utopia” that critics generally apply to Underground Man. Instead, the thematic 
architecture of Tarde’s novel recursively folds back onto itself, twice dramatizing the 
manner in which modern concepts and technologies obscure human entanglement with 
other forms of life. Utopia is not available as a final historical destination or a narratable 
movement of historical forces, but rather as a transformative potential glimpsed in the 
possibility that new concepts and social practices might restructure human beings’ 
relationship with the world. This literary-formal effort to represent agencies outside of 
the individual stalls the motor of narrative plot and stretches the bourgeois novel out of 
recognition. 
Finally, then, we can grasp Tarde’s science-fiction novel not as a quirky 
divertissement, but rather an essential component of a wider sociological project. The 
stalled, recursive form of Underground Man gives representational shape to the 
contradiction inherent in trying to apprehend human/nonhuman entanglement through the 
technology of the nineteenth-century novel, whose formal logic reconciles the world to 
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the desires and experiences of the alienated individual. Tarde presents a fantastic science-
fictional premise through not only the constrained agency of a semi-protagonist but also 
the delimited perceptions of a semi-narrator, both of whom slip in and out of narrative 
focus. Underground Man thus concatenates the literature of bourgeois individuality with 
a science-fictional plasticity and futurity that can imagine that individual transformed. 
Underground Man gives imaginative form to the utopian energy implicit in Tarde’s wider 
thought—the idea that the radical expansion of imitative energies and transspecies 
relationality could transform the very composition of “society.” Underground Man 
dissolves the allegorical logic of the representative protagonist and instead glimpses a 
new grammar through which we might restructure our relation to the world—tracing the 
contours of an unstable “we” whose future referent is the novel’s unknowable utopian 
form. 
 
H.G. Wells: Sociological Literature 
Writing the introduction to the English translation of Underground Man in 1905, 
H.G. Wells identifies most strongly with the explicit sociological speculation of the 
novel’s second half. Tarde’s novel “gives out clearly what so many of us are beginning 
dimly perhaps to apprehend, that ‘society consists in the exchange of reflections.’”177 
Wells finds in Tarde a shared desire for genuinely transformative social theory; both he 
and Tarde “[dream] of the possibility of human groupings based on interest and a 
 
177 H.G. Wells, introduction to Underground Man, by Gabriel Tarde (Westport: Hyperion 
Press, 1974), 16. 
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common creative impulse rather than on justice and a trade in help and services.” 178 
Their sympathy consists in a common impulse to imagine new mechanisms of social 
cohesion and new forms of social relation. Wells explains that the primary purpose of his 
introduction is to direct the reader past the “lightness and cheerful superficiality of the 
opening portions of this book”—the  “rather disappointing” depiction of the solar cool-
down—and toward “these obscure but curiously stimulating and interesting caves, and 
tunnels, and galleries in which the elusive real thought of M. Tarde lurks.”179 Wells 
emphasizes the constitutive relationship between the subterranean environment and the 
novel’s most profound sociological insights, suggesting that the stony surround is not 
mere science-fictional backdrop, but rather implicated in and necessary to the novel’s 
socially-transformative imagination. 
What does it mean for Wells to draw such a strong connection between Tarde’s 
sociological insights and the rocky environment of the novel’s underground social world? 
As we will come to see more clearly in the following chapter, Wells’ conception of the 
“modern” condition is defined primarily in terms of the intensifying interpenetration of 
nature and society in the wake of technological advancement. Wells’ thought—like that 
of Tarde—draws together three discrete epistemological domains—natural science, 
literature, and social theory—and mutually implicates them in either opening or 
foreclosing the possibility of social transformation in modernity. Wells’ concern is that 
all three domains combine to stabilize “nature” to the detriment of transformative social 
 
178 Ibid., 17. 
179 Ibid., 19. 
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change. In his quasi-sociological study Mankind in the Making (1903), Wells critiques 
the artificiality of the “nature” concept, implicating both literature and infrastructural 
engineering in the production of a delimited nature ideology: 
One would think that no human being would ever discover there was any such 
thing as “nature” were it not for the schoolmaster—and a quotation from 
Wordsworth. And this nature, as they present it, is really not nature at all, but a 
factitious admiration for certain isolated aspects of the universe conventionally 
regarded as “natural.” .… Trees, rivers, flowers, birds, stars—are, and have been 
for many centuries Nature—so are ploughed fields—really the most artificial of 
all things …. A grassy old embankment to protect low-lying fields is Nature, and 
so is all the mass of apparatus about a water-mill; a new embankment to store an 
urban water supply, though it may be one mass of splendid weeds, is artificial, 
and ugly. A wooden windmill is Nature and beautiful, a sky-sign atrocious 
.…Vesuvius, for example, is grand and beautiful, its smell of underground 
railway most impressive, its night effect stupendous, but the glowing cinder heaps 
of Burslem, the wonders of the Black Country sunset, the wonderful fire-shot 
nightfall of the Five Towns, these things are horrid and offensive and vulgar 
beyond the powers of scholastic language.180 
 
Wells critiques the epistemological limitations of the post-Romantic “nature” ideal, 
diagnosing the capacity of both infrastructure (“the mass of apparatus about a water-
mill”) and literature (“a quotation from Wordsworth”) to format our experience of the 
nature/society divide: to frame “nature” as a series of distinct, separable objects of 
aesthetic contemplation. Wells understands literature as a kind of technology coplanar 
with water mills and the underground railway—one of several modern infrastructural 
technologies that artificially structure our experience of our surrounding environment. 
Wells worries that post-Romantic literature—modern literature, the literature of 
individual experience and the individual life—disrupts our capacity to recognize ecology. 
 
180 H.G. Wells, Mankind in the Making (1903), quoted in Simon J. James, Maps of 
Utopia: H. G. Wells, Modernity and the End of Culture (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 14-15. 
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Modern literature, like infrastructure, artificially domesticates the world to the agency of 
human subjects, enframing the world into objects of aesthetic reflection or technological 
use-value. This apprehension of the infrastructural agency of literature in producing and 
sustaining anthropocentric conceptual structures is the point of intersection between 
Wells and Tarde.  
 Wells’ preface to Underground Man reflects on the complicity of nineteenth-
century literary realism in imaginatively bolstering the anthropocentrism that animates 
his critique of “nature.” But Wells is ambivalent regarding the proper representational 
strategies through which to address this problem. Like many readers of Underground 
Man, Wells is concerned with the novel’s evident lack of psychological depth and human 
drama, and he actually re-writes Tarde’s solar cool-down passage, dramatizing the 
manner in which the solar extinction could have been written had Tarde chosen to depict 
it in realist fashion: 
…a world-wide wind, and then first little flakes and then the drift and driving of 
the multiplying snow into the dim illumination of lamps, of windows, of street 
lights lit untimely. Then again, the shiver of the cold, the clutching of hands at 
coats and wraps, the blind hurrying to shelter and the comfort of a fire—the blaze 
of fires. One sees the red-lit faces about the fires, sees the furtive glances at the 
wind-tormented windows, hears the furious knocking of those other strangers 
barred out, for, ‘we cannot have everyone in here.’ The darkness deepens, the 
cries without die away, and nothing is left but the shift and falling of the incessant 
snow from roof to ground. Every now and then the disjointed talk would cease 
altogether, and in the stillness one would hear the faint yet insistent creeping 
sound of the snowfall. ‘There is a little food down-stairs,’ one would say. ‘The 
servants must not eat it. We had better lock it upstairs. We may be here—for 
days.’181 
 
 
181 Wells, introduction to Underground Man, 11-12. 
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Wells lavishly rewrites the solar extinction in what he calls “realistic fashion”—the more 
familiar register of novelistic realism scaled to human experience and bourgeois class 
politics (“‘There is a little food down-stairs,’ one would say. ‘The servants must not eat 
it’”). The elaborate detail and length of Wells’ rewrite (here only quoted in part) suggests 
the strong appeal this representational register of human suffering and class politics holds 
over Wells’ own imagination. But he ultimately concludes that “M. Tarde was well 
advised to let his hand pass lightly over this episode, to give us a simply pyrotechnic 
effect of red, yellow, green and pale blue, to let his people flee and die like marionettes 
beneath the paper snows of a shop window dressed for Christmas.”182 Wells emphasizes 
that neither the suffering nor the desires of the human beings that populate Tarde’s novel 
are accessible to readers. These characters are not persons, but marionettes staged behind 
a shop window. Tarde commodifies them, turns them into objects rather than subjects of 
historical narration. If these beings change over the course of the novel, that 
transformation is not motivated by their own dissatisfaction or agency, in their desire for 
a new class position or romantic fulfillment. Instead, Wells suggests, these beings only 
change when newly posed behind a different window, when placed in a different social 
and material environment. Withholding the social desire and inner lives of his characters 
displaces individual experience as the locus of socio-historical transformation within the 
novel. Tarde thus troubles the division of conceptual labor between the subject and object 
of novelistic representation—he objectifies and makes passive the novel’s evident 
 
182 Ibid., 12-13. 
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historical subject, without fully withholding the realist conventions of protagonist and 
narrator.  
The moment of social transformation in Underground Man is designated by Wells 
as a “pyrotechnic effect”—a construction whose agency is intentionally obscure. This 
destabilizing of human agency—figuring human beings as uncertainly poised between 
subjects and objects of historical narration—disrupts the narrative logic of naturalist 
determinism that might otherwise attend the premise of social extinction. Wells concedes 
that any “realistic” treatment of solar extinction would necessarily fall into the darkest 
naturalism: “Directly one thinks at all seriously of such a thing as this solar extinction, 
one perceives how preposterously hopeless it is to imagine that mankind would make any 
head against so swift and absolute a fate.”183 But what alternative is there to this naturalist 
stalemate between freedom and determinism? Wells locates a possibility in the various 
forms of irony pervading the narrative texture of Underground Man. Tarde mocks human 
presumptuousness, “our conceit in our race’s capacity” to do “all sorts of organized and 
wholesale things quite beyond [our] capabilities.”184 But at the same time, Tarde narrates 
the transformation of those human “capabilities” that realism would otherwise 
essentialize or render static. If realism representationally aggrandizes human agency, 
sustaining the centrality of the individual subject, then irony corrodes that agency, 
undermining the human as subject of social transformation.  
 
183 Ibid., 13. 
184 Ibid., 14. 
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At the outset of his introduction, Wells identifies two linguistic registers that tend 
to dominate discussions of “the material future of mankind”: pseudo-scientific discourse 
and the trivializing levity of Tardean irony. The conceptual paradigms through which 
individuals’ “workaday thinking goes on” are not up to the burdensome imaginative 
task.185 Radical social transformation is “out of proportion” with the individual life, and 
the formal calculus of realist aesthetics and the nineteenth-century novel are unable to 
reconcile that scalar impasse. “We are interested,” recognizing that social transformation 
constitutively entails human involvement, but at the same time “we feel it is outside us 
and beyond us.”186 Wells captures the contradiction that Tarde’s sociological fiction 
addresses: that the social is simultaneously human and inhuman—that it is constitutively 
comprised of individual lives, but has grown and is growing in excess of the capacity of 
those individuals to transform, represent or narrate it. This social growth, out of 
proportion with the individual life, signals the incompatibility of realist aesthetics and 
Tardean sociology. Tarde relies on irony to capture both the representational burden of 
the infrastructural social aggregate and the theoretical recalcitrance of its mechanisms of 
transformation. Irony—a kind of middle ground between representational tool and 
cognitive defense mechanism—is the aesthetic solution to both a literary-representational 
and social-theoretical impasse. 
 
185 Ibid., 4. 
186 Ibid., 4-5. 
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But Wells harbors a deeper-seated worry: is this kind of writing enjoyable to 
read? Wells takes Underground Man as conceptual tool more than socially-significant 
literature:  
It does not give any measure of our real sense of the proportion of things that the 
Future should appear in our literature as a sort of comic rally and harlequinade 
after the serious drama of the Present—in which the heroes and heroines of the 
latter turn up again in novel and undignified positions; but it seems to be the only 
method at present available by which we may talk about our race’s material 
Destiny at all.187   
 
This is the representational challenge of a sociological literature that ironically corrodes 
the individuating logic of realist aesthetics: How to imagine “our race’s material 
Destiny,” a transformed social future, and still produce narrative—still write stories that 
readers care about? Can the narration of collective social transformation ever simulate or 
recreate the “serious drama of the Present,” or are those dramatic forms constitutively 
beholden to the psychological realism that Wells’ preface recreates, critiques, and finally 
discards? Can readers desire the social? If the limit of the novel is the limit of the 
individual subject or the human species, how can the novel narrate or instigate social 
transformation, especially in a world increasingly shaped by new forms of socio-technical 
mediation? These literary-interpretive questions define the problem space of the 
infrastructural modernism that Tarde and Wells share. Taken together, these questions 
concatenate into a central, animating question that Wells explores more fully in a series 
of essays and literary texts written in the latter half of the decade: By what aesthetic 
 
187 Ibid., 6. 
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concept or literary feature can texts represent the transformative exchanges between 
character and environment, subject and object, human and nonhuman?  
 
*** 
 
 Wells’ interest in Tarde’s sociological antirealism coincides with the early 
institutional development of sociology in Britain, in which Wells himself played a minor 
role. While completing the preface to Underground Man, Wells had become briefly but  
intensely involved with both the Fabian Socialists and the Sociological Society at the 
London School of Economics.188 Disciplinary sociology had been slower to develop in 
Britain than in Germany and France, and the Sociological Society only held its first 
meeting in 1904.189 Wells participated in the Society’s early meetings, and is listed as a 
member for both 1904 and 1905 in the Society’s Sociological Papers. But Wells soon 
grew disillusioned with the scientific pretensions of mainstream British academic 
 
188 For more on Wells’ involvement with the Fabians and London Sociological Society, 
see Krishnan Kumar, “Wells and ‘The So-Called Science of Sociology,’” in H.G. Wells 
Under Revision, eds. Patrick Parrinder and Christopher Rolfe (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna 
University Press, 1990), 192–217; Ruth Levitas, “Back to the Future: Wells, Sociology, 
Utopia and Method.” The Sociological Review 58.4 (2010): 530–47. See especially 
Levitas 533-34 for a detailed account of Wells’ pursuit of an academic appointment as 
chair of sociology at the London School of Economics circa 1905. 
189 On the institutional development of sociology in Britain in the late-nineteenth century, 
see Lawrence Goldman, “A Peculiarity of the English? The Social Science Association 
and the Absence of Sociology in Nineteenth-Century Britain.” Past & Present 114 
(1987): 133–71; Goldman, “Foundations of British Sociology 1880–1930: Contexts and 
Biographies.” The Sociological Review 55.3 (2007): 431-40. Goldman gives a close 
historical response to the argument that Britain’s particular failure to develop a vital 
tradition of academic sociology is evidence of the anti-theoretical provincialism of 
British intellectual culture. See also Philip Abrams, The Origins of British Sociology, 
1834-1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Perry Anderson, “Components 
of the National Culture.” New Left Review 50 (1968): 3-57. 
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sociology, which was increasingly modeling its methods on the natural and physical 
sciences: empirical observation, classification and the formulation of testable laws. It was 
in this intellectual context that Wells delivered “The So-Called Science of Sociology” to 
the London Sociological Society in 1906—his most fully-articulated metadisciplinary 
reflection on sociological method and the relationship between art and sociology.190 
Despite the essay’s close analysis of the relationship between literature and sociological 
method, Wells’ essay has been largely ignored by literary critics. For the most part, “The 
So-Called Science” has been of interest mainly to historians of sociology who suggest 
that social theorists might recover Wells’ more speculative methodological approach as a 
sort of lost origin for a more theoretical British sociology or a model for contemporary 
social theory.191 Read in conjunction with his preface to Tarde and his early-twentieth 
century literary texts, “The So-Called Science of Sociology” should also be read as a 
significant, if unrecognized, statement of proto-modernist criticism—a methodological 
explication of the constitutively sociological dimension of Wells’ “modern” literary form 
at the turn of the century. 
 
190 An early version of the essay first appeared in 1905, the same year that Wells wrote 
both Tarde’s preface and A Modern Utopia. 
191 Both Kumar and Levitas make a version of this argument. Levitas: “[I]f Wells had 
been appointed, the history of sociology would have been very different: both utopia and 
gender relations would have been central to the discipline from the outset. If ‘The So-
called Science of Sociology’ is now treated as a mere footnote, if that, both in histories of 
sociology and in histories of Wells’ own life and work, this may not have been inevitable. 
It should more properly be read as a serious prospectus for a quite different and then 
potentially possible development of sociology…which is less repressive of normative and 
utopian aspects of social understanding” (534-35). 
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 Wells’ essay makes the central, polemical argument that academic sociology “is 
not a science at all.”192 Tracing the burgeoning field’s disciplinary history, Wells 
contends that sociology has achieved coherence only by way of an “arbitrary assumption 
that the whole universe of being was reducible to measurable and commensurable and 
exact and consistent expressions” (SS 3). But that measurability is “not innate”—the 
assumed commensurability on which sociology relies is historical rather than essential. 
Wells argues that contemporary science has confused sociology and reification—that the 
social transactability immanent to capitalist social relations has been mistaken for the 
essential nature of society. This confusion of capitalism for sociology is just the most 
telling example of a wider anthropocentrism underwriting the epistemology of modern 
science: “In the general usage of to-day, ‘science’ implies a quality of knowledge that 
enables its possessor to foretell consequences within his purview; and within that 
restricted sense, the great mass even of natural history still does not come” (SS 8). 
Modern science frames the world to the purview of the human scientist, to the timescale 
of the human lifespan, to the ratios and rationalizations of use-value. The sociologist can 
only identify analytic units, discover social laws or create knowledge about entities that 
fall within this delimited purview. Sociology, then, is always already limited by the 
imagination and values of its human scientists, and produces, in effect, a sort of self-
colonization of human social life by bourgeois concepts. Wells invites his readers to 
consider: What is the “purview” of the professional sociologist, and how might shifting 
 
192 H.G. Wells, “The So-Called Science of Sociology.” The Living Age, vol. CCXLVI 
(1905): 3. Further references to this text hereafter cited parenthetically by page number 
and abbreviated SS. 
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the field’s basic conceptual orientation transform both the predictive value and social 
utility of sociology? How can sociology be made both more truthful and socially useful? 
 Wells’ first scientific axiom is that “there are no identically similar objective 
experiences” (SS 5). Not only human beings, but even atoms have individuality, and 
“only in the subjective world, and in theory and the imagination, do we deal with 
identically similar units” (SS 5). Scientific units are only practically commensurable, and 
modern science confuses “a sort of labor-saving bias in the common man’s mind, in the 
normal human mind” with genuine scientific truth. Reliant on conceptual infrastructures 
scaled to the perspectival limits of human cognition, modern science both confines itself 
to and formats the world in the anthropocentric image of “the normal human mind.”193 
Wells’ demand is not that we should fantastically break free of our embodiment or 
impossibly transcend the perspectival limitations of human cognition, but that we should 
not mistake our anthropoid limits for knowledge of the world: “great practical 
convenience is no proof whatever of…final truth” (SS 7). Rather than repress the scalar 
distortions of human cognition, Wells insists that scientists bring them into the analytic 
frame. If modern science relies on concepts that abstract individuality, then scientists 
must “admit that we become less ‘scientific’ as we ascend the scale of the sciences” (8). 
Human individuality is harder to ignore than that of atoms. And yet, Wells insists, social 
 
193 Hence the appeal of evolutionary thought for Wells throughout his intellectual life, 
from his earliest coursework with T.H. Huxley to his later macrohistories of the planet. In 
transcending the reliance on classificatory schemes and rigid conceptual structures, 
Darwin is for Wells the first and best scientific theorist of individuality: “it was only with 
the establishment of Darwin’s great generalizations, that the hard and fast classificatory 
scheme broke down, and individuality came to its own” (6). 
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scientists from Spencer to Durkheim have sought to divide human society into discrete 
social types and quasi-distinct social entities. But not only is this task intellectually 
dishonest, it is futile to “isolate complete communities of men” in a world of intensifying 
socio-technical mediation: “These alleged units have as much individuality as pieces of 
cloud; they come, they go, they fuse and separate” (SS 9). The ground of the social is 
shifting under sociologists’ feet, and the static conceptual paradigms of academic 
sociology are the belated, ineffectual effort to stabilize a world radically in flux. Like “the 
material future of mankind” in Underground Man, the question of the social is simply too 
big for the conceptual structures of positivist science. What Wells demands is not that we 
find better classificatory concepts, but that we pay closer attention to the very techniques 
through which we render “society” representable—that we become more attentive to the 
processes through which the effect of scale is produced and “the social” becomes 
apprehensible as a series of commensurable units or social types. This is for Wells a 
question of representation that requires a fundamental conceptual reorganization. Rather 
than a series of measurable units, sociologists must recognize that “there is only one 
unit”: not so much a static and unchanging “humanity,” but a conception of human life 
radically open to change:  
We cannot put Humanity into a museum, or dry it for examination; our one single, 
still living specimen is all history, all anthropology, and the fluctuating world of 
men. There is no satisfactory means of dividing it and nothing else is the real 
world with which to compare it. (SS 9)  
 
Wells challenges sociology to orient itself to a radically unwieldy and ever-shifting single 
unit of analysis: the human historical process itself, so open to evolutionary 
transformation that it also in a sense contains the nonhuman historical process. Such a 
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radical shifting of analytic perspective requires commensurably new methods; 
sociologists must “be prepared to admit devices of presentment and methods of approach 
that will shock any other sort of scientific men” (SS 8). 
Because the social is constantly evolving, transforming and mediating, “no 
sociology of universal compulsion, of anything approaching the general validity of the 
physical sciences, is ever to be hoped for” (SS 9). The social is not accessible to the 
human cognitive apparatus, and the sociologist is limited by “the personal angle of 
vision” (SS 9). But this scalar impasse is not a limitation for Wells—rather, it constitutes 
the very object of sociology itself. Revoking at the outset the possibility of a final 
sociology or fully comprehensive social typology, Wells understands the vocation of 
sociological method to be the ongoing mediation of individual mind and evolving, 
complexifying social totality: “Sociology, it is evident, is, upon any hypothesis, no less 
than the attempt to bring that vast complex unique Being, its subject, into clear true 
relations with the individual intelligence” (SS 9). Sociology aspires not only to explicate 
social relations, but also to perfect and transform them—to bring individual elements into 
new forms of relation. Any account of the social must incorporate the individual point of 
view as much as the general—any presentation of the social “must involve an element of 
self-expression, must partake quite as much of the nature of art as of science” (SS 9). 
Sociological method, then, must facilitate exchange across seemingly opposed modes: the 
individual and the social, art and science, subjectivity and objectivity. A sociology more 
perfectly adapted to its object is, finally, a kind of literature: “neither art simply, nor 
science in the narrow meaning of the word at all, but knowledge rendered through 
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personality, that is to say, in the highest sense of the term, literature” (SS 10). Wells 
identifies two primary literary forms that “subserve sociological purposes”: social forms 
of “History” and, especially, “Utopias”—asserting, finally, that “the creation of 
Utopias—and their exhaustive criticism—is the proper and distinctive method of 
sociology” (SS 11).   
A sociology properly attuned to the evolving nature of its object is, then, 
constitutively literary, reconciling the ever-transforming social to individual experience. 
Wells advocates for a sociology combining the best aspects of literature and science. But 
what would it mean to take his provocation further and excavate a sociological dimension 
immanent to modern literary form? Can we recognize literature itself as a kind of 
sociological method? At the conclusion of the essay, Wells opens the window to just this 
manner of reading, contrasting positivist sociology and art as competing methods of 
social science. Wells asserts that “the existing classification of the departments of mental 
activity is one, not only of field and range, but of method and nature,” challenging the 
dominant view “that artistic and literary expression are inferior and unsubstantial human 
activities, methods of decoration as it were, applied to the ‘scientific’ gold” (SS 12). In 
the essay’s conclusion, Wells doubly emphasizes “method.” Art, for Wells, is neither the 
aesthetic consolation of a reified world nor an autonomous realm separable from science. 
Art—and literature in particular—is a counter-method to positivist sociology, an 
epistemological activity seeking not only to explicate but also to intervene in a 
transforming social field. 
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What are the features of a literature that aspires to sociological method? For 
Wells, to imagine the social is to desire utopia: 
There is no such thing in sociology as dispassionately considering what is, 
without considering what is intended to be.…The history of civilization is really 
the history of the appearance and reappearance, the tentatives and hesitations and 
alterations, the manifestations and reflections in the mind and that, of a very 
complex, imperfect, elusive idea, the Social Idea. It is that idea struggling to exist 
and realize itself in a world of egotisms, animalisms, and brute matter. (SS 10-11) 
 
The utopian aspect of Wellsian literary form consists in representing the potential 
reanimation of the world-as-it-is by the Social Idea—in glimpsing civilization’s potential 
transformability through aesthetic forms that break through the intractability of the 
present, displacing the inertia of the individual with the dynamic transspecies relationality 
of the social. In this way, Wells’ utopian sociology of the “intended-to-be” returns us to 
and anticipates Amitav Ghosh’s recent critique of literary realism in The Great 
Derangement—of “conceiving…fiction and politics in terms of individual moral 
adventures”:  
What fiction…makes possible is to approach the world in a subjunctive mode, to 
conceive of it as if it were other than it is: in short, the great, irreplaceable 
potentiality of fiction is that it makes possible the imagining of possibilities. And 
to imagine other forms of human existence is exactly the challenge that is posed 
by the climate crisis.194  
 
Ghosh closely echoes Wells in calling for a future-oriented fiction of social 
transformation and immanent potentiality. Ghosh and Wells both highlight the 
imaginative limitations of a realism scaled to the individual life. But for Wells, the 
literary method of sociology does not confine itself to the explicit imagination of “future 
 
194 Ibid., 129, 128. 
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forms of human existence”—its method is to apprehend the shifting contours and 
broadening domain of the Social Idea as it struggles to realize itself “in a world of 
egotisms, animalisms, and brute matter.”  
Wells’ Social Idea—like Tarde’s infrastructural utopia—mediates across the 
human/nonhuman divide. Sociology is not the science of pristinely separate, 
ontologically distinct human social forms, but rather describes the co-constitution of 
human and nonhuman agency in dynamic socio-technical environments. Wells’ literary-
sociological method demands that we reconsider the concepts that render human society 
and nonhuman world both thinkable and ontologically separable. It is only by remaking 
these conceptual structures (and the aesthetic forms that bolster them) that we can begin 
to imagine new mediations of the Social Idea—begin to imagine a political body 
adequate to the transformations of infrastructural modernity. Wells insists that to remake 
our political institutions we first have to reimagine our social concepts and that this is 
equally the task of the humanities and of science. Sociology is the object of Wells’ most 
scathing critique because it has failed to grasp its privileged place as “the science of the 
social” at the intersection of art and science, giving itself over to the methodological 
limitations of positivism. The utopian gambit of Wells’ essay, then, is not for literature to 
overtake science, but to work with science—remaking the conceptual structures of the 
“human” sciences into something more flexible, grasping the ever-intensifying mediation 
of human and nonhuman agencies in the composition of modern social worlds. 
Returning to Ghosh’s critique of a realism trapped in contemplation of the 
existent, Wells’ essay invites critics to attend more closely to the representational 
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strategies through which literary form responds to world-scale systematic transformation 
outside of its overt thematization. Wells calls us to attend closely to the literary features 
through which the shifting contours of the Social Idea and its entanglement across 
egotisms, animalisms and matter is given representational form. As we will soon observe 
in Wells’ turn-of-the-century literary texts, this utopian literary-sociological method need 
not confine itself to the genre forms of utopian tract and science fiction. Despite the 
perspectival limitations inherent to literary realism that Wells theorizes and that Ghosh 
critiques, the formal logic of the nineteenth-century novel is implicated in and 
transformed by Wells’ infrastructural modernism. In the following chapter, I will trace 
the literary-formal convergences between Wells’ most overt sociological utopia, A 
Modern Utopia (1905), and his most conventionally realist novel, Tono-Bungay (1909). 
Both texts not only thematize the infrastructural basis of modern social relations, but also 
fissure narrative agency across spilt protagonists and dissolving narrators—giving 
complementary formal shape to processes of socio-technical mediation that 
systematically transform the composition of modern social worlds.  
The literary-sociological method modeled and theorized between Tarde and Wells 
requires that we trace a new genealogy of modernism in terms of its historical co-
emergence with modern sociology. Tarde and Wells’ shared critique of realism—what I 
call their infrastructural modernism—recasts modern literature’s prevailing orientation 
away from alienation and towards entanglement, away from the individual and towards 
the social, away from the autonomy of literary character and towards the character-
environment complex. Recognizing these aesthetic continuities developed across 
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literature and sociology in the first decade of the twentieth century demands a literary-
critical practice attentive to the relationship between literary form and changing material 
conditions in a time of systemic, world-scale transformation. Once we recognize the 
collective, rather than individual, framework of their social science fiction, we can see 
that both Tarde and Wells embody a modernism responsive to the representational project 
envisioned by Ghosh, a complex aesthetic response to an infrastructural modernity that 
continues to demand our most exacting artistic ingenuity. 
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CHAPTER TWO: “Running the Country Practically”: H.G. Wells and the Enabling 
Fictions of Inhuman Power 
 
 
Ambivalent Modernism 
The case of H.G. Wells has long presented a classificatory challenge to critics of 
modern literature. Despite the wide-ranging diversity of his written output—from his 
early scientific romances of the 1890s to the posthumanist speculation of 1945’s The 
Mind at the End of its Tether—most sustained discussions of Wells tend ultimately to 
address themselves to the same recurring question: is Wells a modernist? It is a simple 
but forcefully structuring question—one that Wells himself seems to have anticipated. 
Writing in 1930, long after his reputation as a novelist had been eclipsed by that of 
historian, educator and activist, Wells declared himself “a haphazard and pampered 
prophet” who found it “amusing and profitable to write stories.” Distinguishing his own 
writerly goals from self-conscious literary artistry, Wells affirms: “I have never taken any 
very great pains about writing. I am outside the hierarchy of conscious and deliberate 
writers altogether. I am the absolute antithesis of Mr James Joyce.”195  
 Many critics beg to differ. Over the past few decades, numerous readers of Wells 
have taken pains to reclaim him under the sign of modernism—to construct a modernism 
that can shelter Wells and Joyce under the same roof. J.R. Hammond insists that it is a 
mistake to take Wells’ self-assessment at face value, that “he has been taken too readily 
 
195 H.G. Wells, introduction to H. G. Wells: A Sketch for a Portrait, by Geoffrey West 
(London: Gerald Howe, 1930), 13. 
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on his own estimation.”196 Hammond asserts that despite an evident stylistic 
conservatism, Wells “has far more affinity with the modernists than the realists—that is 
to say, he was much more consciously experimental in his work than is generally 
acknowledged.”197 Hammond locates Wells’ modernism in a vaguely defined yet willful 
stylistic experimentation. Robert Caserio develops this argument for Wells as a major 
experimental author of the early-twentieth century, offering a more precise account of 
“the Wellsian New Essay,” a generic hybrid combining Menippean satire and the essay 
form meant to replace the novel of “experiential access” with a new emphasis on overt 
ideological statement prior to its containment within the personality of the protagonist.198 
Caserio contends that critics have failed to apprehend the radically experimental force of 
Wells’ literary output due to an uncritical repetition of the high modernists’ own self-
canonizing efforts. Whereas Wells recognizes “that ‘art’ is a bourgeois invention that 
masks political and economic realities we cannot afford to leave covered up,” literary 
scholars have been too quick to accept the class-bound and ideological account “of what 
modernism and the novel are or ought to be” underwriting the distinction James, Ford, 
Lawrence, and Woolf all draw between their own literary output and that of Wells.199  
 
196 J.R. Hammond, H.G Wells and the Modern Novel (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1988), 8. 
197 Ibid., 5. 
198 Robert Caserio, “The Novel as a Novel Experiment in Statement: The Anticanonical 
Example of H.G. Wells” in Decolonizing Tradition: New Views of Twentieth-Century 
“British” Literary Canons, ed. Karen R. Lawrence (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1992), 91. 
199 Ibid., 89. 
 
 
 
126 
 Both Hammond and Caserio insist that we admit Wells among the modernists due 
to the formally experimental quality of his literary texts. In both accounts, “modernism” 
seems to consist in the formal or ideological subversion of more naive realist 
representational practices and epistemologies. But critics have also insisted on the 
modernism of Wells on precisely the opposite grounds. In her discussion of Wells’ Tono-
Bungay, Benita Parry contends that Wells fails to meet the requirements of modernism 
defined via “ideological subversion, whether effected by radical technical 
experimentation and conspicuous virtuosity of style or by defamiliarizing the process of 
fictional representation.”200 Despite Wells’ lack of formal experimentation, however, 
Parry notes the centrality of processes of “modernization” to the thematic and stylistic 
texture of Tono-Bungay.201 For Parry, the particular generic quality of Tono-Bungay is 
constituted in this contradiction between its residual style and modern content—its 
representation of “what happens at the base, but without evoking that sense of 
experimental fermentation which persisted into the era that is the book’s moment.”202 
Wells’ novel is thus for Parry “transitional”—stylistically and ideologically beholden to 
earlier, non-modernist representation, while “signs of a literary modernism do circulate in 
its chronicle of an England reordered and unsettled by capitalism-as-imperialism.”203  
 
200 Benita Parry, Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique (London: Routledge, 2004), 
148. 
201 Parry, like most critics, takes Tono-Bungay (1909) as representative as Wells’ mid-
career literary output, the period following the heyday of Wells’ late-nineteenth-century 
scientific romances (The Time Machine (1895), The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896), The 
Invisible Man (1897), The War of the Worlds (1898)). 
202 Parry, Postcolonial Studies, 149-50. 
203 Ibid., 150. 
 
 
 
127 
 And thus we approach the crux of the interpretive impasse—why Wells’ 
modernism or non-modernism has remained such an animating and essential question for 
contemporary readers. It does seem clear that an author so invested in emerging forms of 
genre fiction, popular education, and journalism—so invested in being widely read—
should uneasily coexist with the values of many high modernists, as Caserio shows.204 
But where does Wells’ modernism reside, if even those critics who claim him as 
modernist cannot agree as to where to find it or in what it consists? Wells brings to the 
forefront definitional contradictions immanent to the field of modernist studies itself. As 
modernist studies has enriched itself in opening up to more objects and authors than older 
ideologists of modernism were willing to admit, the field has necessarily grown more 
historical and materialist in order to maintain its conceptual and epistemological 
coherence.205 The stylistic experimentation of modernism is seen as responsive to 
transformed historical conditions—to the emergence of modernity. Despite the diversity 
and globally expansive array of texts and media comprising this newer modernism, 
however, the account of what constitutes “modernity” has remained more stable. For 
Parry, the essential “modernity” of Tono-Bungay—Wells’ relation to “the modern” that 
 
204 On this idea regarding the incompatibility of modernism and wide readership, see also 
Simon J. James: “Earlier Wells texts such as Tono-Bungay and Boon may share 
characteristics with modernist fiction, but Wells could never choose to be a modernist 
writer, since he wanted his books and the ideas they contain to be read by as large an 
audience as possible—no doubt in part out of artistic vanity, but above all so that 
humanity’s prospects for survival and well-being might be improved” (190). Maps of 
Utopia: H.G. Wells, Modernity, and the Ends of Culture (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
205 For the classic account of this wider transformation in the field of modernist studies, 
see Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz, “The New Modernist Studies.” PMLA 
123.3 (2008): 737-48. 
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marks him as transitional or semi-modernist—is to be found in “a narrative where the 
positivistic, technocratic and rationalistic remaking of Europe is structurally linked to the 
exploitation of the colonial world.”206 This is the modernity story of global capitalism, in 
which commodification, reification and rationalization serve as the governing structures 
coordinating modernist culture and capitalist modernity.  
 This modernity story is shaped by the methods and disciplinary protocols of late-
nineteenth century social theory and sociology. Returning to the animating questions of 
the Tarde/Durkheim debate, we can begin to appreciate the persistent influence of 
Durkheimian social theory on many of our most durable paradigms for conceptualizing 
twentieth-century social transformation: the understanding of the social as autonomous, 
sui generis, composed of social facts and collective representations ontologically distinct 
from the natural world.207 For Durkheim, social facts have a reality-status and 
explanatory value that exceed the total sum or aggregate of the individuals who comprise 
its composite units: the whole is alienated from and coercively acts upon the sum of its 
parts. Combining Bruno Latour’s critique of Durkheimian sociology with a the 
postcolonial critique of modernity, Timothy Mitchell has discussed the limitations of this 
social-scientific paradigm for apprehending the techno-scientific transformations of the 
early twentieth century. Mitchell contends that two legacies of late-nineteenth-century 
 
206 Parry, Postcolonial Studies, 150. 
207 I discuss the 1903 Tarde/Durkheim debate in the introduction to the dissertation, 
which I frame as a model for the competing orientations of sociology at the turn of the 
century. 
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social theory continue to structure and distort our perception of techno-scientific 
modernity: 
First: developmental narratives of the nation-state continue to be embedded within 
a universal framework—“the story of rationalization, technological and social progress, 
the growth and transformation of production, and the universalization of the culture and 
power of the West”—whose assumed universality is the condition of possibility for 
Durkheimian social science, the smooth canvas on which its social typologies can 
unfold.208 But this so-called universal framework only emerges in simultaneity with the 
radical expansion of Western wealth, technical knowledge, and infrastructure that provide 
the material conditions that authorize its linear-progressivist philosophy of history.  
Secondly, and following from the first: Durkheimian social science continues to 
authorize the structuring assumption that all social actors are human: “The protagonists of 
the history of the nation, of modernity, of capitalism, are people. Human beings are the 
agents around whose actions and intentions the story is written.” Human intention—“the 
spread of this human reason, technical knowledge, or collective consciousness”—confers 
the rationality on which social theory relies, and the assumed universality of sociology is 
the belated intellectual echo of Western colonial practices. 209   
 
208 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 28. This critique of modernity’s assumed universality as the 
ground and apology of persistent colonial domination has been richly developed in 
postcolonial studies. See for example Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: 
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2007); Gayatri Charkavorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a 
History of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); David 
Lloyd, Irish Times: Temporalities of Modernity (Dublin: Field Day, 2008). 
209 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 29. 
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Combined, these two legacies of nineteenth-century sociology produce a social 
science such that “in the explanation of events one always knows in advance who the 
protagonists are.”210 This framework, as we have already seen in the Tarde/Durkheim 
debate, posits an epistemological impasse between human and nonhuman agency. In fact, 
Mitchell cites Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method as exemplary of this 
structural divide, and the quotation he cites bears repeating:  
While the scientist who studies physical nature is very keenly aware of the 
resistance it offers him, and which he has so much difficulty in overcoming, the 
sociologist seems to move in a sphere perfectly transparent to his view, so great is 
the ease with which the most obscure questions are resolved.211 
 
Contrasting the purely alien and material resistance of the object world to the wholly-
available transparency of the social, Durkheim founds modern sociology on the absolute 
distinction between an autonomous realm of human intention and agency and an object 
world upon which that intention acts, or to which it responds. What this model cannot 
apprehend are the ways in which the seeming ideality of universal human agency is 
shaped, transformed and grounded in combination with other forms of agency: “No 
explanation grounded in the universalizing force of human projects and intentions can 
explore whether the very possibility of the human, of intentionality, of abstraction 
depends on, at the same time as it overlooks, nonhuman elements. These appear merely 
physical, secondary, and external.”212  
 
210 Ibid. 
211 Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, quoted in Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 29. 
212 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 29. 
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 This chapter argues that the special value of H.G. Wells to contemporary readers 
resides in his apprehension of modernity and global capitalism in a different conceptual 
and representational register than the modernity story that Mitchell describes. My earlier 
discussion of the Tarde/Durkheim debate excavated a counter-aesthetic to the dominant 
paradigm of nineteenth-century social science—Tarde’s framework of monadological 
relationality undoes almost all of Durkheim’s epistemological assumptions: the 
ontologically-distinct “thingliness” of society, the autonomy of human culture, the 
priority of law and structure over process and historical contingency. In this chapter, I 
analyze how Wells’ mid-career literary output extends the aesthetic logic of Tarde’s 
relational metaphysics into a new literary mode for imaging socio-technical modernity.  
Tracing a competing “modernity story” from Tarde to Wells enables us to 
consider with fresh eyes the essential question of Wells’ modernism. On the whole, I 
think we have to agree with Parry and Simon James that by the conventional 
requirements of ideological subversion, radical technical experimentation, and resistance 
to the massifying tendencies of the commoditized literary marketplace, Wells is not a 
modernist.213 Neither our discomfort with gatekeeping definitions of modernism nor with 
Wells’ consequent exclusion changes the fact that Wells is an ill fit. The argument of this 
chapter is not that we sneak Wells in the back door of a no-longer-quite-so-pretentious 
modernism, but rather that we take Wells’ ill fit seriously as provocation to rethink the 
 
213 James: “The aesthetics of Joyce or Eliot require a strenuous level of knowledge of the 
culture that is anathema to Wells’ iconoclastic dismissal of the residuum. The solipsism 
of much of modernism’s representation of the self is similarly antithetical to Wells’ 
increasingly collectivizing aims” (Maps of Utopia 190). 
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limitations inherent in our conceptual understanding of what “modernity” and 
“modernism” entail. Despite the conceptual loosening that has attended the new 
modernist studies, the field has relied on a relatively stable modernity to which 
modernism is understood as the aesthetic response. Reading through the structuring prism 
of nineteenth-century social theory has led critics to understand modernism as a form of 
human aesthetic agency that redeems or responds to the alienating alterity of machines, 
masses, and matter—casting modernism within a protracted philosophical stalemate 
between the human and nonhuman that obscures the mixing of natural and social 
agencies. The enduring interest of Wells resides in the fact that he forces us to rethink 
this division of conceptual labor. Models of modernism defined as the stylized aesthetic 
response to the global pressures of reification, rationalization and commodification do not 
offer a fully convincing explication of Wells’ literary production in relation to its wider 
historical context. Hence the continued confusion as to the terms and extent of his 
“modernism.” 
This is not to deny Fredric Jameson’s assertion that “the only satisfactory 
semantic meaning of modernity lies in its association with capitalism”—that the notion of 
“modernity” encodes the social upheavals attendant on the intensification of capitalist 
modes of production and the world-scale colonization of market logic.214 To trace an 
alternative modernity story via Wells is not to repudiate the world-shaping force of 
capitalism, but rather to rethink the concepts and literary forms through which we 
apprehend and intervene in that world-shaping force. For Jameson is also right to assert 
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that the concept of modernity “traces its lineage back to the founding fathers of 
sociology—and with which indeed sociology itself is coterminous as a field of study.”215 
This chapter takes us back to that coterminous moment—when the terms of “modernity” 
were far more contested than the prevailing paradigms of today’s modernist studies—to 
recover alternative concepts with which to coordinate capitalism and culture not beholden 
to those limitations that Mitchell describes. 
 
Forms of Modernity: A Modern Utopia 
Wells most closely approximates the overtly “sociological utopia” described in 
“The So-Called Science of Sociology” in A Modern Utopia, first serialized in the 
Fortnightly Review between October 1904 and April 1905 with the subtitle, “A 
Sociological Holiday.” Like Tarde’s Underground Man, the text is uncertainly poised 
between literary text and sociological tract, outlining elaborately detailed accounts of 
futuristic-utopian social formations, customs, and laws—all mediated by a series of 
narrative frames and split narratorial figures. Given the self-consciously “literary” quality 
of A Modern Utopia, critics have struggled to pin down precisely how earnestly readers 
are meant to take the utopian ideas theorized within. In the preface written for the text’s 
1925 republication, Wells retrospectively describes A Modern Utopia as an “experiment 
in form.”216 Wells recounts an arduous process of trial and error, systematically testing 
and discarding a series of generic forms: argumentative essay, discussion novel, ancient 
 
215 Ibid., 7. 
216 H.G. Wells, A Modern Utopia (New York: Penguin, 2005), 5. Further references to 
this text hereafter cited parenthetically by page number and MU. 
 
 
 
134 
dialogue, hard narrative. Seeking a middle ground between the binary structures of 
propositional argumentation—“hard, heavy lines, black and white, yes and no”—and “the 
vulgar appetite for stark stories,” Wells finally arrives at the composite form of A Modern 
Utopia: “a sort of shot-silk texture between philosophical discussion on the one hand and 
imaginative narrative on the other” (MU 6). If, as Krishnan Kumar suggests, the complex 
genre composition and literary devices of A Modern Utopia leave readers “unsure of the 
author’s intent and even of his fundamental faith in his utopian vision,” how does this 
bizarre, knotted text—more narrative apparatus than literary form—subtend the 
specifically sociological method Wells theorizes for utopian art?217  
 A Modern Utopia opens with “The Owner of Voice,” a self-declaring “portrait of 
the author” typographically set off from the main body of the text with italics (MU 7). 
Ostensibly, the author of this utopia—the owner of the voice—is Wells himself. But our 
assumptions are soon undone, and the text carefully explains their analytic distinction: 
“Throughout these papers sounds a note, a distinctive and personal note, a note that 
tends at times towards stridency….Now, this Voice, and this is the peculiarity of the 
matter, is not to be taken as the Voice of the ostensible author who fathers these pages” 
(MU 7). The author distinguishes the writerly personality of his authorial “voice" from 
the “distinctive and personal note” of its vocal performance. The voice is more an 
instrument, less an idiosyncratic personal style—more an object, less a subject. But 
almost immediately the author gives concrete form to this non-authorial voice:  
The Owner of the Voice you must figure to yourself as a whitish plump man, a 
little under the middle size and age, with such blue eyes as many Irishmen have, 
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and agile in his movements and with a slight tonsorial baldness—a penny might 
cover it—of the crown. His front is convex. He droops at times like most of us, but 
for the greater part he bears himself as valiantly as a sparrow. Occasionally his 
hand flies out with a fluttering gesture of illustration. And his Voice (which is our 
medium henceforth) is an unattractive tenor that becomes at times aggressive. 
Him you must imagine as sitting at a table reading a manuscript about Utopias, a 
manuscript he holds in two hands that are just a little fat at the wrist. (MU 7) 
 
As many critics have noted, the owner of the voice is recognizable as a parodic self-
portrait of Wells himself.218 Despite the asserted non-equivalence of author and owner of 
the voice, both seemingly refer to Wells. The disembodied author gives concrete satirical 
form to a degraded version of himself—prying the “unattractive tenor” of his vocal 
instrument free from the ideal personality of his authorial voice. Wells then duplicates 
this figural trick on just the next page—parodying himself into the even less inspiring 
form of the botanist, the sentimental companion and pedantic dialectical counterpart of 
the Owner of the Voice in utopia.219 Like Tarde in Underground Man, Wells frustrates 
 
218 See Patrick Parrinder: “[T]he narrator himself, a plump blue-eyed sparrow of a man 
whose voice is an ‘unattractive tenor that becomes at times aggressive,’ is an easily 
recognizable caricature of H.G. Wells: he is both Wells and not-Wells” (102). Shadows of 
the Future: H. G. Wells, Science Fiction, and Prophecy (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1995). See also Francis Wheen, introduction to A Modern Utopia (New York: 
Penguin, 2005), xxii. 
219 Critics have been less willing to read the botanist as a form of Wellsian self-parody, 
but the character is clearly interpretable as a satire of Wells’ well-documented romantic 
sentimentality and natural-scientific training: “But over against this writer here 
presented, there is also another earthly person in the book, who gathers himself together 
into a distinct personality only after a preliminary complication with the reader. This 
person is spoken of as the botanist, and he is a leaner, rather taller, graver and much less 
garrulous man. His face is weakly handsome and done in tones of grey, he is fairish and 
grey-eyed, and you would suspect him of dyspepsia. It is a justifiable suspicion. Men of 
this type, the chairman remarks with a sudden intrusion of exposition, are romantic with 
a shadow of meanness, they seek at once to conceal and shape their sensuous cravings 
beneath egregious sentimentalities, they get into mighty tangles and troubles with 
women, and he has had his troubles” (MU 8). 
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the relationship between transparent authorial proxy and distinctly objectified character. 
All three of these figures are both Wells and not-Wells, subjects and objects of narration. 
Wells triply allegorizes himself into his utopian semi-narrative, begging the question as 
to whether the text is more concerned with intimate self-examination or futurological 
speculation.220 Wells himself seems trapped in this question, unable to motivate A 
Modern Utopia without recursively re-inserting himself into the text, each satirical 
degradation parodying and thus flagging in advance his own sense of personal 
limitation—the structures of individual personality or desire that might foreclose 
authentic sociological investigation. 
 In the diegetic narrative of A Modern Utopia, the Owner of the Voice and his 
botanist companion are transported to an alternate version of earth—an exact copy of the 
physical constitution and population of the planet in 1905, reimagined through the 
structures and customs of Wells’ modern utopia. Throughout the text, Wells emphasizes 
the specifically modern quality of this futuristic social form, and the narrative proper 
begins by contrasting “modern utopia” to all preceding forms of utopian thought. Earlier 
utopias were “perfect and static States, a balance of happiness won for ever against the 
forces of unrest and disorder that inhere in things” (MU 11). Wells rejects the notion that 
any society could achieve static and perfected organizational finality, reproducing its 
 
220 This impasse between utopian speculation and narcissistic self-knowledge is staged 
within the utopian text proper via the Owner of the Voice’s increasing obsession with 
meeting his utopian double: “That I have come to Utopia is the lesser thing now; the 
greater is that I have come to meet myself” (MU 156); “My Utopian self is, of course, my 
better self—according to my best endeavours—and I must confess myself fully alive to 
the difficulties of the situation. When I came to this Utopia I had no thought of any such 
intimate self-examination” (MU 167). 
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unchanging perfection into generational futurity. A modern utopia is constitutively 
dynamic:  
The Modern Utopia must be not static but kinetic, must shape not as a permanent 
state but as a hopeful stage, leading to a long ascent of stages. Nowadays we do 
not resist and overcome the great stream of things, but rather float upon it. We 
build now not citadels, but ships of state. (MU 11) 
 
Kinetic utopia does not finally conquer nature but enters into flexible compromise with it. 
The “whole trend of modern thought” is against the permanence of “enclosure” —the 
modern social process is constitutively one of social extension, inclusion and growth, 
rather than the twinned partitioning of the natural world and human social organization.  
The kinetic modernity to which A Modern Utopia refers is that of endless incorporation 
and transformation—a social world that “floats upon” rather than “resist[s] and 
overcome[s]” or insulates itself from “the great stream of things.” For Wells, earlier 
utopias like William Morris’ News From Nowhere rely on a kind of magical thinking in 
which utopian social structure unproblematically transforms human behavior, 
ameliorating “the nature of man and the nature of things together” (MU 12). Morris’ 
utopia is facile wish-fulfillment, not sociology. It fails its most urgent narrative function: 
“to bring that vast complex unique Being”—the wider world of egotisms, animalisms, 
and brute matter—“into clear true relations with the individual intelligence.”221 Wells 
seeks a narrative apparatus that can actively mediate the relationship between the 
individual and that wider world—that can reconcile a reader to her social world so that 
she can better transform it. Rather than lay out the static structures of the timeless 
 
221 Wells, “The So-Called Science of Sociology,” 9. 
 
 
 
138 
perfected state, Wells addresses the mechanisms through which the “limitations of human 
possibility” adapt themselves to “the inhumanity…the insubordination of nature” (MU 
12). 
 Wells most comprehensively describes the socio-political structure of the utopian 
state in the chapter discussing utopian economics. This chapter is also the text’s most 
explicitly utopian: the economic system it describes does not yet exist even in the modern 
utopia itself but is elaborately outlined as the aspirational destination of an even-more-
perfected social world.222 Utopian economics seeks not to abolish money, but to “amplify 
the scope of this most precious invention” by converting commercial exchange into an 
elaborate world-scale energy infrastructure—currency replaced by “force,” value 
“measured in units of energy” (MU 55, 56). Wells transmutes the transactional mediation 
of commercial exchange into the material transspecies relationality of socio-technical 
mediation. This infrastructural economy dissolves the coherence of older mediations of 
collective social life: if the “old order” comprised a “system of institutions and classes,” 
utopia fosters a more dynamic system “of enterprises and interests” (MU 56). Wells gives 
imaginative form to the “movement” that for Lauren Berlant distinguishes infrastructures 
from institutions that congeal power into the illusory appearance of social permanence.223 
 
222 In Wells’ modern utopia, the world-scale energy economy outlined in “Utopian 
Economics” is thinkable, but not actualized in socio-political practice: “Heaven knows 
where progress may not end, but at any rate this developing State, into which we two men 
have fallen, this Twentieth Century Utopia, has still not passed beyond money and the 
use of coins” (MU 55). 
223 Berlant: “Movement is what distinguishes infrastructures from institutions, although 
the relation between these concepts and materialities is often a matter of perspective. 
Institutions enclose and congeal power and interest and represent their legitimacy in the 
way they represent something reliable in the social, a predictability on which the social 
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Only this fully consolidated energy infrastructure can replace money as the most 
dynamic, totalizing agency of social transformation that Wells can imagine. Unlike the 
“bad psychology” of the money economy, beholden to exchange values derived from 
“individual preferences which are incalculable and unique,” a genuinely modern 
infrastructure-economy attends to the dynamic needs of the collective, mediated by “units 
of physical energy” (MU 60, 58). Utopian economics are thus a “physics applied to 
problems in the theory of sociology” (MU 59, 60). Infrastructure makes possible the 
ameliorative physics of sociology and renders social transformation thinkable, revealing 
the constitutive continuity of economic exchange, interpersonal psychology, and socio-
technical mediation. Economics is ultimately subsumable to the psychological, and 
psychology becomes relational psychology: “a science of human aggregations… of the 
methods of intercourse and collective decision that hold human groups together, and 
finally of government and the State” (MU 61). Finally, then, economics is “subordinate 
and subsequent to this general science of Sociology” (MU 61). A Modern Utopia 
literalizes infrastructural mediation—the socio-technical entanglement of human beings 
and a once-insubordinate nature—as the motor of social transformation in modernity. An 
amplification of Wells’ own infrastructural modernity into its most extreme futuristic 
form, Wells allegorizes the emergent infrastructural systems of the early-twentieth 
century into a fantastic world-scale energy economy that can powerfully bring the social 
and natural into mutually transforming relation.  
 
relies. Institutions norm reciprocity. What constitutes infrastructure in contrast are the 
patterns, habits, norms, and scenes of assemblage and use” (“The commons” 403). 
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 The utopian heart of A Modern Utopia gives sociological shape to a world 
radically in flux, in which “there is no being, but a universal becoming of individualities” 
and ontological stability gives way to transformative processes of entanglement (MU 21). 
Wells’ investment in giving representational shape to a world of constant socio-technical 
transformation helps to clarify the text’s bizarrely convoluted form, which aspires to what 
Wells describes in the 1925 Preface as a “sort of lucid vagueness” (MU 5). More than 
simple “ambiguity” or “fuzziness,” “vagueness” is a charged word for Wells, drawing on 
his early training in the post-Darwinist natural sciences. We can refer, most tellingly, to 
his usage in “Scepticism of the Instrument,” a 1903 paper that was published as the 
appendix to A Modern Utopia: “A mind nourished upon anatomical study is of course 
permeated with the suggestion of the vagueness and instability of biological species.”224 
In the essay Wells contends that the evolutionary transience of all existing life forms 
requires that we recognize the inherently provisional nature of all systems of logic, 
classification, and social signification. The essay describes the formative effect of Wells’ 
early education in comparative anatomy under T.H. Huxley, which powerfully confirmed 
the constitutive impermanence of the human animal: “I knew him incurably for what he 
was, finite and not final, a being of compromises and adaptations” (SI 252).225 
 
224 H.G. Wells, “Scepticism of the Instrument” in A Modern Utopia (New York: Penguin, 
2005), 254. Further references to this text hereafter cited parenthetically by page number 
and abbreviated SI. 
225 For a detailed account of the influence of Huxley’s “ethical evolution” on Wells’ 
wider political thought and social outlook, see John S. Partington, Building Cosmopolis: 
The Political Thought of H.G. Wells (London: Routledge, 2016), 1-48. On Huxley’s 
divergence from Herbert Spencer on the implications of evolutionary theory for human 
social thought, see Steven McLean, The Early Fiction of H.G. Wells: Fantasies of 
Science (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 4. 
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Evolutionary theory conditioned Wells’ subsequent encounter with philosophy— “a way 
of taking logic in the flank” (SI 253). The human “thinking apparatus”—its brain, 
instincts, structures of thought, and adaptability to new technical tools—are just as 
subject to “adaptations and approximations” as the human body, are in no way 
“mysteriously different and better” (SI 253). Wells had expected logic and language to 
share the same “profoundly provisional character” as the evolving natural world, but 
instead found only “a sort of intellectual hardihood,” an assumption of permanence 
incompatible with humankind’s constitutive plasticity (SI 253). Wells images the human 
“thinking apparatus” as a sort of synthetic technology comprising somatic matter, 
technical tools, and structuring concepts—a composite cognitive instrument that remakes 
the material world in its own image: “The forceps of our minds are clumsy forceps, and 
crush the truth a little in taking hold of it” (SI 256; italics original). The flimsy 
imprecision of human concepts mirrors the plasticity of the human itself: "Every species 
is vague, every term goes cloudy at its edges” (SI 257). Again, that key term “vague”—
coordinating the constitutive instability of both mind and matter that together mediate 
into an ersatz, ever-changing thinking apparatus whose apparent permanence 
philosophers have sought to formalize in “relentless logic…a sort of intellectual 
pigheadedness” (SI 257).  
 Biological evolution prompts Wells to contest humanity’s supposed domination 
over nature. Wells challenges the epistemological authority of modern thought and 
dissolves the ontological stability of scientific and philosophical conceptual paradigms. 
In this way, Wells’ essay anticipates the insights of contemporary media theorists who 
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assert the primacy of cultural techniques over the ontology of concepts. These theorists 
seek to describe the historically and culturally contingent technics and media 
technologies that underwrite supposedly universal “philosophical idealizations.” 
Bernhard Siegert, for example, echoes Wells’ synthetic “thinking apparatus” when he 
asserts that “humans as such do not exist independently of cultural techniques of 
hominization.”226 These techniques range from seemingly banal rituals of self-care to the 
weighty conceptual structures that Wells’ essay attacks. Most crucial is to recognize the 
techniques through which privileged cultural abstractions are distinguished from wider 
material nature. Siegert urges us to recognize a door, for example, as “both a material 
object and a symbolic thing,” which partially produces the evidence permanence of our 
technologically-mediated spatialization of the outer world. Doors are cultural techniqies 
because “the operation of opening and closing them processes and renders visible the 
distinction between inside and outside.”227 For Siegert, to attend closely to cultural 
techniques is not to repudiate ontology, but to recognize ontological distinctions as 
themselves the effect of mediation: the theory of cultural techniques is not “anti-
ontological,” bur rather “moves ontology into the domain of ontic operations.”228 We 
should read Wells’ essay as an early version of Siegert’s contemporary critical project—
uncovering the “relentless logic” and rigid classificatory schemes of modern thought as 
ontology-producing cultural techniques avant la lettre. But what, then, is the relationship 
 
226 Bernhard Siegert, Cultural Techniques: Grids, Filters, Doors, and Other Articulations 
of the Real, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young (New York: Fordham University Press, 
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of Wells’ post-Darwinian proto-media theory and the wider project of A Modern Utopia? 
How does Wells’ critique of modern thought—its artificially fixed ontology—animate 
and inform his sociological literary form?   
 That Wells chose to publish “Scepticism of the Instrument” as the appendix to A 
Modern Utopia suggests a strong interpretive relationship between the texts that invites 
us to bring Wells’ philosophical critique to the intensely mediated social world of kinetic 
utopia. Like Tarde, Wells’ utopianism ultimately takes aim at the anthropocentric 
conceptual structures of modern thought—both recognize that social transformation 
requires a radical conceptual upheaval. Rigid conceptual paradigms that allocate the 
world into subjects and objects and cordoned social types interfere with the project to 
remake or reimagine the social. Language and literary form have a role to play in 
producing and sustaining these structures. Wells’ aesthetics of “lucid vagueness” is an 
attempt to destabilize the conceptual relationship between representational subjects and 
objects in A Modern Utopia—embedding ontological plasticity within his utopian social 
world.  A Modern Utopia thematizes that plasticity via an infrastructure economy that 
radically entangles the relationship between the natural and the social, gradually 
transforming both nature and society—both world-state and citizens—in an ongoing 
process of mutual adjustment. Wells aspires to give form to the ontological 
transformability of human and nonhuman that rigid conceptual structures and social 
typologies do not allow. But A Modern Utopia is not simply a posthumanist fantasy of 
proliferating and unstructured materiality. As the economics chapter makes clear, these 
abstract philosophical claims ultimately refer back to questions of political structure, 
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social form, and power. Wells does not simply thematize mediation or represent 
infrastructure but seeks a literary form that can contest the rigid conceptual structures that 
underwrite not only positivist thought, but also modern aesthetics. This is the relationship 
between “Scepticism” and A Modern Utopia: the essay diagnoses the limitations of 
modern thought, to which A Modern Utopia seeks a counter-aesthetic.  
Alexander R. Galloway has described the social context of contemporary 
information aesthetics as powerfully shaped by positivist logical structures baked into the 
algorithmic infrastructure of contemporary life. Wells’ critique of logic in “Scepticism” 
offers the prehistory to Galloway’s social diagnosis:  
Today’s systemics have no contrary. Algorithms and other logical structures are 
uniquely, and perhaps not surprisingly, monolithic in their historical development. 
There is one game in town: a positivistic dominant of reductive, systemic 
efficiency and expediency. Offering a counter-aesthetic in the face of such 
systematicity is the first step toward building a poetics for it, a language of 
representability adequate to it.229 
 
 A Modern Utopia is Wells’ attempt to construct such a counter-aesthetic. As Galloway 
asserts, “The point of unrepresentability is the point of power…. The point of power 
today resides in networks, computers, algorithms, information, and data.”230 Wells 
locates the switch-point between material infrastructural networks and positivist 
conceptual systemics in the process of socio-technical mediation itself. The infrastructure 
economy at the heart of A Modern Utopia fantasizes a vision of world-scale mediation 
that radically socializes the natural landscape and thus structurally reformats the 
relationship between nature and society. Wells apprehends the relationship between 
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literary form and social formation as residing in the conceptual structures that distribute 
the world into subjects and objects, autonomous selves and an alienated nature. If modern 
conceptual structures and realist literary form both format the world into subjects and 
objects that are all too easily assimilated into modern structures of power, then A Modern 
Utopia contests that process via its bifurcation into authorial allegories and narratorial 
proxies that figure Wells’ authorial semi-protagonism as both subject and object, neither 
subject nor object.231 This domain of distributed agency and mediated personhood—of 
quasi-subjects and quasi-objects—constitutes the “character-environment complex” of A 
Modern Utopia. Ultimately, Wells addresses the question of how literary form 
symbolizes personhood in the social world that it narrates. The “lucid vagueness” of A 
Modern Utopia is not only Wells’ counter-aesthetic to positivist science, but also a 
counter-method to positivist sociology that identifies its human protagonists and social 
agents in advance—that can only reproduce the world in its own image. 
*** 
At the outset of A Modern Utopia, the Owner of the Voice outlines the 
fundamental axiom of all utopian thought, the premise that his text shares with even those 
older tracts: “the complete emancipation of a community of men from tradition, from 
habits, from legal bonds, and that subtler servitude possessions entail…. the human 
power of self-escape, the power to resist the causation of the past, and to evade, initiate, 
endeavour, and overcome” (MU 13). What makes the text utopian is its dual freedom: not 
 
231 I discuss Wells’ critique of literary realism, especially its incompatibility with socially 
transformative thought, in my discussion of Wells’ preface to Tarde’s Underground Man 
in chapter 1.  
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only the freedom of the author to imagine a fully-transformed social world (without 
narrating the historical process through which those transformations are actualized), but 
also the freedom of the text’s protagonists to shed their earthly burdens and past 
determinations—to enter into free relation with this new society. But both the Owner of 
the Voice and the botanist struggle to reconcile themselves to the fluid sociality of 
modern utopia. The botanist obsesses over his earthly romantic unfulfillment, what the 
Owner of the Voice describes as “this intrusive, petty love story” (MU 25). Rather than 
explore and adapt himself to his utopian surround, the botanist searches for the utopian 
double of his earthly paramour—to the growing resentment of the Voice: “I wish I had 
never brought this introspective carcass, this mental ingrate, with me….The old Utopists 
never had to encumber themselves with this sort of man” (MU 124). As the text proceeds, 
however, the Voice becomes increasingly fixated on locating his own utopian double: 
“That I have come to Utopia is the lesser thing now; the greater is that I have come to 
meet myself” (MU 156). Ultimately neither the botanist nor the Voice is able to liberate 
himself from the past—their earthly determinations constantly impinge upon their 
utopian integration: “Why should a modern Utopia insist upon slipping out of the hands 
of its creator and becoming the background of a personal drama—of such a silly little 
drama?” (MU 173). Both protagonists thus break the fundamental utopian premise. 
Transported intergalactically to the utopian world-state, neither is able to liberate himself 
from his human desires—from bad memories, heartbreak, loneliness, ambivalence.  
This non-calibration of desire and world is also activated at the level of literary 
genre. “Personal drama” overwhelms utopia; the novel overtakes sociology. The 
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protagonists’ romantic unfulfillment and social jealousies increasingly overtake the 
narrative frame. Utopia fades from foreground to background, and the materials of a 
perfected utopia slowly devolve into those of a second-rate novel. This is Wells’ response 
to the “magical thinking" of Morris-style utopia—giving literary form to the difficult, 
gradual process of adaptation and mutual adjustment that utopian social transformation 
necessarily entails, but that prior texts have failed to give shape. For Wells, the paradox 
immanent to utopian speculation resides in this contradiction underwriting its premise of 
“freedom from determination”—the impossibility of freely imagining the world 
otherwise without prior determination by the world that is. Human desire is the obstacle 
to utopia—though prior utopian texts do not recognize it as such, failing to give shape to 
the conservatism of human memory and the provincialism of human desire. Reconciling 
this constitutive smallness of the human thinking apparatus with the radical futurity of 
genuine utopian speculation and social transformation is the literary-formal problem that 
Wells tries to crack in A Modern Utopia. It is not enough, then, to speculate on the social 
structures and customs of a perfected modern utopia. Wells addresses a more 
fundamental question regarding the social function of utopian sociology and the 
mechanisms of social transformation: How does genuine change come into being? More 
to the point, where does the agency of social transformation reside—in the transformation 
of structures, or in the transformation of humans? Is it sufficient simply to construct more 
perfected social structures, or do the beings that populate those structures need to 
transform more meaningfully? And how might literary form aesthetically mediate this 
historical-imaginative tension?  
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 The conceptual intractability of this question in A Modern Utopia explains the 
generic un-reconciliation of its literary form, in which utopian discourse scaled to social 
structure and novelistic narration scaled to individual experience compete for symbolic 
priority. At the text’s conclusion, the botanist finally encounters the utopian double of his 
long-lost earthly paramour, for whom he longingly pines throughout the text. The 
botanist is shocked, however, to learn that the utopian version of his lover is happily 
married and has no interest in his romantic affection. When the Owner of the Voice tries 
to reason with the botanist, informing him that his emotion has “no place” in utopia—that 
his pain is merely a “scar from the earth—the sore scar of your past”—the botanist 
responds with violent rage: “Of course we are covered with scars, we live to be scarred, 
we are scars! We are the scars of the past! These dreams, these childish dreams―!” (MU 
237). This pained outcry marks the final instant of utopia—the “bubble bursts” and both 
characters are suddenly transported back to earth. The text’s fragile utopian vision fails to 
withstand the botanist’s emotional wounds, and utopia fails to uphold its first premise: 
freedom from past determination. But the Owner of the Voice tells us that this utopian 
dissolution results not from the botanist’s narcissism or melancholia, but from a more 
general perspectival incompatibility. Our protagonists have become too invested in the 
individuals populating utopia, rather than its perfected social structure:  
To find the people assuming the concrete and individual, is not, as I fondly 
imagine, the last triumph of realisation, but the swimming moment of opacity 
before the film gives way. To come to individual emotional cases, is to return to 
the earth. (MU 234)  
 
Utopia is unrepresentable at the level of the emotional case—the concrete and individual. 
But if utopia is incompatible with the experience of the individual narrative subject, then 
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how to present it to individuals? How to communicate it? The social function of Wells’ 
sociological utopia is to translate the world to the individual reader without narrating the 
egocentric, obfuscating experiences of the individual: “This infinite world must needs be 
flattened to get it on one retina. The picture of a solid thing, although it is flattened and 
simplified, is not necessarily a lie… We fail in comprehension, we fail so variously and 
abundantly. We see as much as it is serviceable for us to see, and we see no further” (MU 
245). This is the formal mandate and representational challenge of Wells’ infrastructural 
modernism—to compress the global aggregate to the scale of the human thinking 
apparatus while indicating the provincial conservatism of that very same individual point 
of view. But where, then, does this leave the individual? 
 A Modern Utopia concludes with a final, italicized “portrait of the author,” 
pulling away from one set of semi-Wells proxies to a third. In shifting from the Owner of 
the Voice to the author, this conclusion dissolves the first-person narration of the Voice 
and objectifies that character within a wider authorial gaze. The Owner of the Voice is 
transformed from organizing center of consciousness and pseudo-utopian cicerone to 
anonymous and unexceptional case study—a perspectival shift that deflates the text’s 
utopian cerebration into the personal dreams of a rather ordinary mind:  
The omnibus sways forward. Rapt and prophetic, his plump hands clasped round 
the handle of his umbrella, his billycock hat a trifle askew, this irascible little man 
of the Voice, this impatient dreamer, this scolding Optimist, who has argued so 
rudely and dogmatically about economics and philosophy and decoration, and 
indeed about everything under the sun, who has been so hard on the botanist and 
fashionable women, and so reluctant in the matter of beer, is carried onward, 
dreaming dreams, dreams that with all the inevitable ironies of difference, may be 
realities when you and I are dreams (MU 246). 
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Why qualify over 200 pages of seemingly earnest utopian speculation, filtering them 
through the limited and finally ironized figures of the Owner of the Voice and the 
botanist? In its concluding pages, A Modern Utopia reveals itself as simultaneously 
utopian tract and novel. The text projects a perfected social world—the modern utopia—
as an object of desire and sociological speculation, but then contains that desire within 
the minds of fissured authorial proxies and autobiographical semi-protagonists, each new 
version of Wells objectifying and ironizing the one that came before. The final paragraph 
resolves neither the inner conflict within the author, nor the genre conflict within the text, 
staging an unresolvable conflict between “that great scheme”—the collective—and his 
own human passions: 
At times that great scheme does seem to me to enter certain men's lives as a 
passion, as a real and living motive; there are those who know it almost as if it 
was a thing of desire; even for me, upon occasion, the little lures of the immediate 
life are seen small and vain, and the soul goes out to that mighty Being, to 
apprehend it and serve it and possess. But this is an illumination that passes as it 
comes, a rare transitory lucidity, leaving the soul's desire suddenly turned to 
presumption and hypocrisy upon the lips. One grasps at the Universe and 
attains—Bathos. The hungers, the jealousies, the prejudices and habits have us 
again, and we are forced back to think that it is so, and not otherwise, that we are 
meant to serve the mysteries; that in these blinkers it is we are driven to an end 
we cannot understand. And then, for measured moments in the night watches or 
as one walks alone or while one sits in thought and speech with a friend, the 
wider aspirations glow again with a sincere emotion, with the colours of 
attainable desire…." (MU 247-48) 
 
The author describes his inconstant desire for social transformation, always reverting 
back to personal pleasure and self-satisfaction. The author wants to desire the social, but 
finally acknowledges the fundamental disconnect between the impenetrable opacity of 
the social totality and his own egocentric limitations. He is capable neither of 
intellectually nor emotionally reconciling himself to totality. He is not overwhelmed, but 
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unmoved. The question that A Modern Utopia ultimately addresses is whether there is 
any way—conceptually or representationally—to close the gap between an increasingly 
entangled social totality and the emotional resources of the modern individual, the 
conceptual resources of modern thought. How can a sociological literature address and 
repair that disconnect? Discussing Wells’ sociological method, Ruth Levitas describes 
the pedagogical vocation of utopia: “the education of desire. Utopia creates a space in 
which the reader is addressed not just cognitively, but experientially, and enjoined to 
consider and feel what it would be like not just to live differently, but to want 
differently.”232 But in A Modern Utopia Wells does not educate so much as humiliate. 
The text can only ironize and parody this idealistic, pedagogical social desire, as Wells 
implicates himself more and more deeply within the narcissistic circuits that his 
sociological better-half aspires to transcend. A Modern Utopia does not narrate 
development so much as dramatize its limit. Wells’ stagnating characters ironize and 
undermine the formal logic symbolically baked-in to the nineteenth-century novel of 
individual experience, development, and dialectical social reconciliation. But is this grim 
aesthetics of humiliation and non-development merely nihilistic? What positive 
representational function might this convoluted “experiment in form” serve? 
The radical, world-scale social transformation that Wells aspires to represent is 
not attainable or narratable in the timescale of the human lifespan. No human individual 
can be the subject of utopian social transformation. Hence Wells makes himself into a 
series of ironic self-parodies that interfere with the coherent, stable conceptual division 
 
232 Levitas, “Back to the Future,” 542. 
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between narrative subject and narrative object. This distribution of narrative agency 
dissolves the autonomy of Wells’ characters and gives positive form to the imaginative 
impasse between self and society that so consumes the “author” at the text’s conclusion. 
A Modern Utopia refuses formal dialectics—refuses to reconcile self and society in 
narrative or symbolic literary form. Instead, Wells gives form to the scalar-imaginative 
impasse between self and social totality as the representational object of a sociological 
literary method that aspires to intervene in and transform the social, rather than represent 
its infinitude or allegorize its ungraspable immensity. History, then, is symbolized not in 
the dialectical ir/reconciliation of self and society, but rather in the conceptual flexibility 
of Wells’ semi-objectified characters. Wells’ preferred literary techniques—figural 
“vagueness” and characterological plasticity—encode the utopian promise not only of 
new conceptual instruments and literary forms, but also of new forms of collectivity and 
socio-technical mediation (symbolized in A Modern Utopia by the transformative 
entanglement of the just-barely-thinkable infrastructure economy). A Modern Utopia 
frustrates the dialectical reconciliation of self and society, then, in order to give aesthetic 
form to socio-technical mediation—to entanglement-in-action. But this aesthetic project 
entails reimagining the very representational logic of the nineteenth-century novel—
remaking the novel of character into the character-environment complex of infrastructural 
modernism.  
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Forms of Entanglement: Tono-Bungay 
What, then, does Wells’ sociological criticism—his engagement with Tarde, 
sociological essays, and sociological utopia—tell us about how to read Wells’ more 
frequently studied and recognizably literary texts? For Wells, the vocation of the 
sociologist was not to represent or typologize existing social worlds, but to imagine better 
ones—and to make explicit the constitutively aesthetic quality of social projection and 
thus the representational-conceptual structures underwriting politics. In a condition of 
unprecedented infrastructural extension, Wells’ sociological criticism poses entanglement 
as the animating historical condition of modernity and the privileged representational 
object of modern literature. Socio-technical mediation—and the ever-intensifying 
entanglement of human and nonhuman social actors into closer relation and widening 
planetary extension—posed both an unprecedented formal challenge and conceptual 
opportunity. Rather than distribute social units into a static, positivist grid, Wells’ literary 
sociology seeks to reimagine the concepts and aesthetic forms through which human 
beings relate to and apprehend the wider world. A Modern Utopia imagines a future 
social world in which infrastructural mediation and the institutional apparatus of the state 
could unproblematically merge at planetary scale. Contemporary readers are often put off 
by the Eurocentric political naiveté of Wells’ world-state politics, but in A Modern 
Utopia the political institution of the world-state seems secondary to Wells’ primary 
locus of utopian agency: a planetary infrastructural network and energy economy that 
radically transforms the relationship of humans and environment, society and nature. 
Socio-technical mediation structures both the form and content of A Modern Utopia—not 
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only does Wells depict a thickly mediated future social world, but he also dramatizes his 
protagonists’ struggle to assimilate—to mediate—with that world. The static, recursive 
form of A Modern Utopia lays bare Wells’ apprehension of fundamental deadlocks in 
modern social thought—art/science, present/future, subject/object—and reframes those 
structural binaries as a formal genre problem: the bourgeois individualism of novelistic 
fiction unable to reconcile itself to a genuinely transformed utopian social world. The text 
imaginatively projects a perfected future but is unable to narrate its realization as 
historical process. 
 Tono-Bungay, begun by Wells in 1906, just one year after the publication of A 
Modern Utopia, is Wells’ effort to represent socio-technical mediation as a historical 
process shaping modern social life at the turn of the century. Described by Wells in 1925 
as his “finest and most finished novel upon the accepted line,” Tono-Bungay immanently 
critiques the structures of individuation that so frustrate A Modern Utopia.233 Casting the 
nineteenth-century novel as a literary technology of individuation, Tono-Bungay corrodes 
and ironizes the Bildungsroman as a novelistic form that bolsters the autonomy of the self 
and domesticates a vast, entangled world to the scale of individual experience. At the 
same time, Wells searches for representational perspectives through which to transcend 
and transform both the literary-formal and conceptual structures of bourgeois 
individuation.  
 
233 H.G. Wells, preface to Tono-Bungay (Atlantic Edition, 1925), in Tono-Bungay (New 
York: Penguin, 2005), 3. 
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Equal parts condition-of-England novel, Bildungsroman, novel-within-a-novel, 
and adventure story, Tono-Bungay shares with A Modern Utopia a composite generic 
make-up. Written as the autobiographical novel of our first-person protagonist-author, 
Tono-Bungay narrates the life of George Ponderevo as he rides the coattails of his Uncle 
Edward’s financial rise and fall in late-nineteenth-century England. George earnestly 
pursues a socially-useful end for his lower-middle-class scientific studies until his life is 
suddenly swept up in the spectacular commercial success of Tono-Bungay, a tonic 
produced and marketed by his Uncle Edward. Tono-Bungay, via a dubious admixture of 
bad science, financial speculation, and innumerable deceptions, takes on a powerful 
agential force in George’s life—leading up to the violent climax of George’s disastrous 
trip to Africa, whose ill-fated outcome coincides with his uncle’s financial failure. In a 
bare-faced depiction of colonial violence and resource extraction, George recounts his 
ruinous journey to plunder quap, a miraculous energy commodity discovered on the 
African coast, and his subsequent murder of a retreating native man. 
 Returning to the question of Wells’ modernism which this chapter begins, it is 
clear that the overt display of colonial plunder and murder in Tono-Bungay differs from 
the stylistic registration of the ungraspable imperial totality influentially outlined by 
Fredric Jameson in “Modernism and Imperialism.” If the directness of Wells’ 
representation of colonial violence is bound up with his ambivalent, conflicted status as 
modernist, then might Tono-Bungay offer a counter-model for apprehending the 
relationship between modern literary form and late-stage capitalism-as-imperialism? 
Jameson proposes that British imperialism inaugurates an historically unprecedented 
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extension of the capitalist economic system beyond the existential experience of 
metropolitan daily life. This extension provokes a “spatial disjunction” that renders 
subjects unable to grasp the imperial system as a whole.234 Modernist style—a new 
spatial language of the imperial-infinite—formally registers the meaning-loss attendant 
on this world-scale imperial extension and thus obliquely assimilates the economic 
conditions of British modernity, its “new spatial language” now the “marker and the 
substitute...of the unrepresentable totality.”235 Jameson extends the Lukácsian idea of 
modernism as the definitive art of lost totality, historicizing Lukács’ account of the 
incipient universality of reification to late-stage imperial England. In “Reification and the 
Consciousness of the Proletariat,” Lukács describes the total power of the commodity “to 
penetrate society in all its aspects and to remould it in its own image.”236 Systematically 
submitting subjects, objects, ideas, and things to a consolidated regime of universal 
exchange, reification inexorably concretizes the concept of “totality” into the social field 
itself, as the commodity becomes “the universal category of society as a whole.”237 
Lukácsian reification has provided an invaluable tool for coordinating the governing 
structures of capitalism and modern culture. As C.D. Blanton explains, reification has 
provided “the ground bass of an account of modernism in particular, the conceptual 
instrument through which a materialist criticism might discern in twentieth-century art 
the apparently final crisis of a social order ungraspable with the more limited tools of 
 
234 Fredric Jameson, “Modernism and Imperialism,” in The Modernist Papers (London: 
Verso, 2007), 157. 
235 Jameson, “Modernism and Imperialism,” 163. 
236 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 85.  
237 Ibid., 86. 
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what Lukács termed ‘bourgeois reason.’”238 Building out from Lukács, Jameson’s 
imperial-modernist style aesthetically processes the formal contradiction of a thinkable 
but unrepresentable social totality concretely shaped by commodification. 
 But where does this account leave Tono-Bungay? Near the outset of “Modernism 
and Imperialism,” Jameson makes explicit Wells’ exclusion from the essay’s analytic 
field, assimilating Wells into the “literature of imperialism,” which is "not modernist in 
any formal sense, and, emerging from sub-canonical genres like the adventure tale, 
remained ‘minor’ or ‘marginal’ during the hegemony of the modern and its ideology and 
values.”239 Wells’ engagement with the mass-cultural adventure tale evidently submits 
his fiction to the reifying logic of commodification—its penetration by the commodity 
inhibiting its capacity to dialecticize the historical contradictions of imperialism into 
modernist art. Jameson’s brilliant reading thus has the bizarre side-effect of disqualifying 
from modernism some of the most explicit engagements with British imperialism in 
modern art.240 But if critics have moved away from gatekeeping definitions of modernism 
derived from self-affirming modernist ideology and if, as Jameson suggests, literary style 
 
238 C.D. Blanton, “Modernism and Reification: Lukács, Benjamin, Adorno” in The 
Cambridge History of Modernism, ed. Vincent Sherry, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 804. 
239 Jameson, “Modernism and Imperialism,” 152. 
240 Despite Jameson’s explicit exclusion, critics have applied the interpretive framework 
of “Modernism and Imperialism” to Tono-Bungay. See, for example, Parry: “Fredric 
Jameson’s observation of the ways expansionism affected the cognitive vistas of 
metropolitan novels written at the century’s turn are abundantly confirmed in a book 
where domestic space is reconciled on an imperial scale, and the prospect on the local 
and familiar is infused by imaginings of the distant and exotic. What is unknown about an 
alien colonial world is conjectured in the narrator’s encounters with the capital city 
whose visible perimeters are suggestive of yet farther and inconceivable boundaries” 
(Postcolonial Studies 150-51). 
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registers imperialism in a politically unconscious manner, why should shared aesthetic 
values or marginal canonicity disqualify Wells from sophisticated formal engagement 
with the historical conditions of global capitalism? The Marxist humanism of Lukács and 
Jameson relies on the commodity form to coordinate the governing structures of culture 
and capitalism—projecting the social totality as the ungraspable aspirational object of 
modernist alienation. But what if we can look to Wells for an alternative conceptual 
structure coordinating capitalism and modern literary form?  What this chapter proposes 
is that Wells’ fiction is governed by a Lukácsian "intention towards totality”—does 
aspire toward a totalization of the social effects of global capitalism in service of utopian 
social transformation—but that Wells seeks representational strategies and conceptual 
structures outside of ungraspable totalities and alienated nature. 
 Jameson’s essay proceeds through a reading of Forster’s Howards End (itself an 
imperial-age condition-of-England novel published just one year after Wells’ Tono-
Bungay). In Jameson’s reading, Forster constructs a compensatory social world of legible 
and achieved community as symbolic affirmation of social unity—Forster’s humanist 
ideology of connection is dialectical counterpart to the meaning-loss attending imperial 
extension: 
Because in the imperial world system this last [the representation of inner or 
metropolitan space itself] is now radically incomplete, it must by compensation be 
formed into a self-subsisting totality: something Forster uniquely attempts to 
achieve by way of his providential ideology, which transforms chance contacts, 
coincidence, the contingent and random encounters between isolated subjects, 
into a Utopian glimpse of achieved community. This glimpse is both moral and 
aesthetic all at once, for it is the achievement of something like an aesthetic 
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pattern of relationships that confirms it as a social reality, however 
ephemeral[.]241  
 
The bounded social world of Howards End transmutes chance encounter into meaningful 
social relationship and symbolically projects a knowable totality. It should be clear that 
Forster’s ideology of humanist connectivity is difficult to reconcile with Wells’ post-
Darwinist evolutionary plasticity (even if, as we have already seen, Forster’s confidence 
in that liberal humanism is undermined in short fiction like “The Machine Stops”). Wells’ 
fiction and nonfiction tend to reject the utopian consolations of Forster’s nostalgic 
knowable social world as wholly inadequate to an imperial modernity constitutively 
mediated by world-scale infrastructure. As we observed in A Modern Utopia, for Wells 
modernity is constitutively extensive (technological mediation extends human social form 
to a planetary scale) and intensive (technology mediates human and nonhuman agency in 
ever new combinations). Wells’ literary fiction—like his sociological method—seeks to 
intervene in the dynamic mediation of individual and social world in order to mutually 
transform both. For Wells, utopian promise ultimately hinges on the ontological plasticity 
of human subjects and environments, and both his literary and extra-literary texts project 
radically recomposed social worlds whose transformation require the socio-technical 
entanglement of human and nonhuman agency. Coordinating Wells’ exclusion from 
accounts of modernism with the influence of Lukács on twentieth-century histories of the 
novel, this chapter argues that Wells’ fiction apprehends capitalism outside of the 
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humanist logic of the commodity form.242 Less interested in the historical destiny of the 
bourgeoisie or the psychic degradations of reification, Wells’ fiction traces the limits of 
human agency in an era of unprecedented socio-technical mediation. For Wells, global 
capitalism is not a sovereign totality only thinkable via the commodified traces of our 
own alienation, but rather a powerful composite of human and nonhuman agency whose 
mechanisms of socio-technical mediation can be represented and transformed. This 
intensifying entanglement of agency constitutes the modern historical condition to which 
Wells’ literary form is responsive and allows us to reread Tono-Bungay not as 
commodified anti-modernism, but sociological anti-realism—or, alternatively, 
infrastructural modernism. 
*** 
 Giving retrospective account of his feud with Henry James in Experiment in 
Autobiography, Wells describes the representational crux of their aesthetic rivalry:243  
 
242 For two revealing accounts that do read Tono-Bungay as structured by the commodity 
form, see Esty, Unseasonable Youth and James, Maps of Utopia. Esty interprets George 
as a subject whose inner life is shaped by reification, his development “hijacked by the 
unstable logic of commodity fetishism and the unpredictable rhythms of the business 
cycle” (116). Esty reads George’s dysfunctional personality and erratic desire as 
symptoms of concrete processes of modernization and interprets the deformed 
Bildungsroman structure of Tono-Bungay as formally responsive to the dissolution of the 
soul/nation allegory in imperial modernity. James argues that Tono-Bungay “replaces the 
Bildungsroman as its narrative model with the art of the advertisement.” Commodities 
replace socially-sanctioned conduct as the promised guarantors of happiness, dissolving 
morality from the novel’s narrative logic. “Advertising is the negative image of Wells’ 
ideal of didactic art, in which the effect of beauty to inspire, move, and change the mind 
is used to cause harm to the body” (109). 
243 For more on the Wells/James debate, see the correspondence and intellectual 
responses collected in Henry James and H.G. Wells: A Record of Their Friendship, Their 
Debate on the Art of Fiction, and Their Quarrel, eds. Leon Edel and Gordon N. Ray 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958). 
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I sketch out scenes and individuals, often quite crudely, and resort even to 
conventional types and symbols, in order to get on to a discussion of 
relationships. The important point which I tried to argue with Henry James was 
that the novel of completely consistent characterization arranged beautifully in a 
story and painted deep and round and solid, no more exhausts the possibilities of 
the novel, than the art of Velasquez exhausts the possibilities of the painted 
picture….Competent critics have since examined this supreme importance of 
individualities, in other words of “character” in the fiction of the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century. Throughout that period character-interest did 
its best to take the place of adjustment-interest in fiction. With a certain justice 
these authorities ascribe the predominance of individuation to the example of Sir 
Walter Scott. But more generally it was a consequence of the prevalent sense of 
social stability, and he was not so much a primary influence as an exponent. He 
was a man of intensely conservative quality; he accepted, he accepted wilfully, 
the established social values about him; he had hardly a doubt in him of what was 
right or wrong, handsome or ungracious, just or mean. He saw events therefore as 
a play of individualities in a rigid frame of values never more to be questioned or 
permanently changed. His lawless, romantic past was the picturesque prelude to 
stability; our current values were already potentially there. Throughout the broad 
smooth flow of nineteenth century life in Great Britain, the art of fiction floated 
on this same assumption of social fixity. The Novel in English was produced in an 
atmosphere of security for the entertainment of secure people who liked to feel 
established and safe for good. Its standards were established within that 
apparently permanent frame and the criticism of it began to be irritated and 
perplexed when, through a new instability, the splintering frame began to get into 
the picture. I suppose for a time I was the outstanding instance among writers of 
fiction in English of the frame getting into the picture.244  
 
Wells relinquishes both psychological depth and realist consistency in service of “the 
discussion of relationships,” subordinating “character-interest” to “adjustment-interest.” 
In a fortuitous example that renders Wells’ contrast with Lukács obvious, Wells asserts 
the conservatism of Sir Walter Scott, whose Waverley (1814) represents for Lukács “the 
classical form of the historical novel.”245 For Lukács, Scott’s novels exemplify bourgeois 
realism in its productive and progressive phase, prior to its historical-aesthetic dissipation 
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following the failure of the 1848 revolutions. Waverley and its successors synthesize 
psychic and collective life, realized in the concretion of character as historical type and 
protagonist of historical narration. Implicitly challenging Lukács’ humanist account of 
historical narration, Wells perhaps unintuitively suggests that the narration of national 
formation and class conflict is in fact conservative, subsumable to a static “social fixity.” 
Whatever historical dynamism inheres in Scott’s raw materials is contained by his 
novels’ orientation to the status quo of the present, functioning as the mere 
“entertainment of secure people who liked to feel established and safe for good.” Wells’ 
own literary practice breaks with the emphasis that nineteenth-century fiction places on 
character and individuality—rejecting both the “concrete typicality” of realism and 
“abstract particularity” of modernism.246  
 David Lodge builds his reading of Tono-Bungay out this retrospective Wellsian 
account. Lodge argues that “the main vehicle of Wells’ social analysis of the condition of 
England in Tono-Bungay is not the story or the characters, but the descriptive 
commentary”—the landscape, townscape, and architecture whose description constitute 
the narrative frame of Wells’ novel.247 For Lodge, this web of description transfers 
characterological significance onto England itself, which functions not as setting or 
symbol, but as “the central character” of Tono-Bungay.248 Lodge equates the Wellsian 
unfixed frame with national description and identifies England as the novel’s organizing 
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social referent. But Wells’ description of the unfixed frame comes just after a rather 
extensive discussion contesting “the prevalent sense of social stability” scaled to the 
nation-state—“the broad smooth flow of nineteenth century life in Great Britain.” Wells 
does not repudiate “the novel of completely consistent characterization” simply to 
relocate that centralized protagonism into the nation-state, but rather to represent 
“relationship,” what he calls “adjustment-interest.” Unfixing the social frame requires 
unloosing both character and environment into flexible plasticity. Relationship is 
apprehensible only through the dynamic entanglement of human and nonhuman social 
actors, of characters and environments. What renders conservative the historical narration 
of Scott (and, we might wager, Lukács) is the thickly consistent humanism of their 
history—an anthropocentric medium of human progress unable to describe the dynamic 
relation between human agency and its material conditions of existence. Post-Scott 
realism is shaped by a “rigid frame of values” that structures the social domain and 
identifies its protagonists in advance—unfixing the social requires re-opening the 
question of who and what counts as a social actor. Wells’ conception of the human as a 
plastic and sociotechnical animal—“a being of compromises and adaptations”—
destabilizes the centrality of the human foothold on the universe and opens up narrative 
to relationship and adjustment.249 This narrative and characterological intervention takes 
the shape via the character-environment complex of infrastructural modernism, which in 
the case of Wells we can also describe negatively as an overtly sociological anti-realism. 
But what, then, is the hermeneutic function of a plastic narrative subject enmeshed in 
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dynamic relation with its environment? What is the referential logic of the plastic 
subject? 
 The form of Tono-Bungay—quasi-Bildungsroman and semi-condition-of-England 
novel—is constitutively shaped by its novel-within-a-novel structure: Tono-Bungay is 
both a novel written in 1909 by H.G. Wells and the autobiographical manuscript written 
by our first-person protagonist-author George Ponderevo. The opening lines of Tono-
Bungay address this same question of coherent characterization that Wells critiques in 
James. But rather than assert the conservatism of consistent Jamesian point-of-view or 
Lukácsian social types, George laments their absence. Consistency of character is 
unavailable to him: 
Most people in this world seem to live “in character”; they have a beginning, a 
middle and an end, and the three are congruous one with another and true to the 
rules of their type….They have a class, they have a place, they know what is 
becoming in them and what is due to them, and their proper size of tombstone 
tells at last how properly they have played the part. But there is also another kind 
of life that is not so much living as a miscellaneous tasting of life. One gets hit by 
some unusual transverse force, one is jerked out of one’s stratum and lives 
crosswise for the rest of the time, and, as it were, in a succession of samples. That 
has been my lot, and that is what has set me at last writing something in the nature 
of a novel.250 
 
George figures “type” as an organizing category imposed from without and granting the 
very possibility of the individual life’s narratability—lending meaningful shape to the 
bare chronicity of the lifespan. George is able to read others as social types, but not 
himself. Struck by a mysterious “transverse force,” George seeks to make himself a 
literal character in the story of his own life, to give symbolic shape to his own 
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“crosswise” experience. George’s symbolic lack is ultimately what motivates him to 
write “something in the nature of a novel.” From the outset, then, Tono-Bungay is 
presented as an aspirational project of self-symbolization, a technology of self-
production. Wells figures the novel not as a lens into the psychic life (however degraded) 
of the ultimately sovereign subject, but rather as a technology that sustains the very 
notion of the subject—of the narrating self striving to disentangle its individual autonomy 
from the “transverse forces” of modern life and requiring the figural projection of 
aesthetic form in order conceptually to cohere. 
 George returns to these meta-reflexive narrative questions just a few pages later at 
the beginning of the second chapter, addressing again the organizing principle of his 
autobiographical novel: 
I’ll own that here, with the pen already started, I realise what a fermenting mass 
of things learnt and emotions experienced and theories formed I’ve got to deal 
with, and how, in a sense, hopeless my book must be from the very outset. I 
suppose what I’m really trying to render is nothing more nor less than Life—as 
one man has found it. I want to tell—MYSELF, and my impressions of the thing 
as a whole, to say things I have come to feel intensely of the laws, traditions, 
usages, and ideas we call society, and how we poor individuals get driven and 
lured and stranded among these windy, perplexing shoals and channels. I’ve got, I 
suppose, to a time of life when things begin to take on shapes that have an air of 
reality, and become no longer material for dreaming, but interesting in 
themselves. (TB 12) 
 
George cannot seem to motivate his life story into narration without distinguishing his 
self from the wider web of life. This time moving away from the mediating category of 
the “type,” George pivots between life and self, individual and society. His novel aspires 
to reconcile these realms but seems to stumble at the very prospect of disentangling them 
into distinct categories. George wants to give holistic account of that thing “we call 
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society,” but he seems unsure of what that even entails. What precisely is “society,” and 
what is its relationship to “we poor individuals”? Is George, as Lodge contends, 
describing England, or something wider and more difficult to delimit conceptually? A 
confused perspectival jumble between transverse forces and human agency, life and 
society, the individual and the we, George’s novel struggles even to name its 
representational object, let alone conceptually grasp the “thing as a whole.” In this way, 
Tono-Bungay mirrors and reverses the formal structure of A Modern Utopia. Again Wells 
depicts a semi-autobiographical version of himself and struggles to motivate the text into 
narrative action. But rather than repeatedly parody himself (and thus transform what 
looks like sociology into something more literary), the author of Tono-Bungay asks its 
readers to work out the sociology immanent to its literary content. Not so much realist 
description of England or allegory of capitalist modernization, the animating 
representational logic of Tono-Bungay entails the sociological drama that it stages from 
the outset: not only George’s ongoing effort to describe that inchoate assemblage “we 
call society,” but also the reader’s effort to identify that “we” and George’s relationship 
to it. Of what social referent (if any?) is George representative? 
 Early in his life, George’s sense of “we” is stabilized by the residual aristocratic 
England of the Bladesover estate that employs his mother as housekeeper. The gentry 
values and social hierarchies of Bladesover adopt a sort of structuring social-interpretive 
function for George throughout his life: “Bladesover has never left me; it is, as I said at 
the outset, one of those dominant explanatory impressions that make the framework of 
my mind. Bladesover illuminates England…It is my social datum” (TB 65). But this 
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country-house model of social form is challenged and strained upon George’s first visit to 
London, which he can only understand as a deformed version of Bladesover:  
A city of Bladesovers, the capital of a kingdom of Bladesovers, all much shaken 
and many altogether in decay, parasitically occupied, insidiously replaced by 
alien, unsympathetic and irresponsible elements…. Such was the world into 
which I had come, into which I had in some way to thrust myself and fit my 
problem, my temptations, my efforts, my patriotic instinct, all my moral instincts, 
my physical appetites, my dreams and my sanity. (TB 103)  
 
In London, the bounded Bladesover model proves an inadequate unit of social analysis—
distended, decayed, overgrown, and occupied. While George is unable to represent or 
interpret London, he does recognize the necessity of reconciling his own individual 
desires to the total socio-economic apparatus of the city. Unable to represent the social 
totality, George instead narrates his own uncomprehending process of social ill-
adjustment in the heart of the British empire. 
 George is only able to reconcile his desire with the London social world through 
commerce—the production and sale of the bogus health tonic Tono-Bungay. Infatuated 
with the lower-middle-class Marion, but unable to support her financially, George finally 
abandons his scientific studies and accepts employment from his Uncle Edward. Backed 
by low costs of production, financial speculation, and Teddy’s genius for the arts of 
modern advertising, Tono-Bungay takes off, and George receives the financial windfall 
necessary to marry Marion and kickstart his social ascent. George accepts the money 
despite reservations about Tono-Bungay, which upsets his moralized sense of social 
value. George complains to his uncle that “‘it’s a damned swindle!’” (TB 135). But 
Teddy contests the accusation of deceit and insists, “‘It’s as straight as—It’s fair 
trading!’” Asserting the positive social function of advertising and commerce—
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suggesting that their bogus tonic might bolster confidence in the case of an epidemic!—
Teddy insists that Tono-Bungay is no more deceptive than any other commodity: “‘I’d 
like to know what sort of trading isn’t a swindle in its way. Everybody who does a large 
advertised trade is selling something common on the strength of saying it’s 
uncommon…’” (TB 135). Tono-Bungay the commodity invites an interpretive question 
analogous to that staged by Tono-Bungay the autobiographical novel: Is Tono-Bungay, 
like George, exceptional or typical? Is bogus health tonic the distorted parody or the 
exemplary form of value production in global capitalism? Teddy is right about the 
swindle inherent to the logic of capitalism in the late-imperial world-system. His ability 
both to recognize and enact the constitutive swindling at the heart of global capitalism 
enables his meteoric success in that system. Teddy contrasts with the uncomprehending 
George, marked from the outset by his inability to represent or understand the “transverse 
forces” pressing upon his agency. Despite his expressed reservations, George’s incapacity 
for guilt and unwillingness to extricate himself from the exploitative circuits of capitalist 
value production are the signs of his typicality as subject of British imperial capitalism. 
What fascinates Wells is the complicity between George’s indifference to the social 
violence that he perpetrates (along with Teddy) and the activity of fiction writing that so 
determinatively structures the novel’s autobiographical form. Dramatizing the ethical, 
political and imaginative limits of George’s conceptual grip on a world that he 
nevertheless exploits, Tono-Bungay traces the dynamic relationship between George’s 
agency and the techno-scientific and financial networks into which he is increasingly 
insinuated, and which finally overwhelm his sense of personal autonomy. Itself a kind of 
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meta-reflexive media theory avant la lettre, Wells’ Tono-Bungay explores the 
technologies and techniques—including the Jamesian novel of “completely consistent 
characterization” that George’s autobiographical Tono-Bungay seemingly epitomizes—
through which the swindling at the heart of modern capitalism is conceptually and 
representationally shaped into something else, something more palatable and socially 
energizing, and thus more difficult to transform or contest. 
*** 
 Teddy understands the violence inherent to his model of society-as-swindle. 
Describing his plan to corner the market on medicine, Teddy imagines a profit-generating 
scheme as the quintessence of supply and demand: “‘You watch your chance, wait for a 
tropical war breaking out, let’s say, and collar all the quinine….Lord! there’s no end of 
things—no end of little things. Dill-water—all the suffering babes yowling for it” (TB 
69). When George replies that Teddy’s market interference will surely hinder doctors, 
Teddy jumps at the opportunity to imaginatively project his swindling into capitalist art: 
“‘They got to look out for themselves. By Jove, yes. They’ll do you if they can, and you 
do them. Like brigands. That makes it romantic. That’s the Romance of Commerce, 
George’” (TB 69). Teddy rationalizes an economic system constitutively structured by 
individuals’ mutual pursuit of self-interest through its metaphorization in literary form—
transmuting systemic social violence into “the Romance of Commerce,” which functions 
throughout Tono-Bungay as a sort of self-justifying slogan for Teddy’s financial exploits. 
The symbolic logic of “romance” reformats the exploitation and suffering of crying 
babies into an adventure of interpersonal exchange at the level of individual desire, 
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experience, and satisfaction. Romance structurally effaces the victims of Teddy’s 
adventure capitalism, imaginatively sustaining the coherence of a world structured by 
exploitation. 
 In addition to rationalizing his own activity, Teddy asserts the positive social 
value of trade and advertisement, which has replaced the symbolic social function of 
religion in modernity:  
“There’s Faith. You put Faith in ‘em…. It’s the modern way! Everybody 
understands it—everybody allows for it…. [I]t MAKES TRADE! And the world 
lives on trade. Commerce! A romantic exchange of commodities and property. 
Romance. ‘Magination. See? You must look at these things in a broad light. Look 
at the wood—and forget the trees!’” (TB 135)   
 
Teddy describes the imaginative sustenance that advertising bestows to the incoherence 
of modern commodity exchange. “Romance” formally coordinates Teddy’s swindle and a 
“modern” social world that thrives on the symbolic coherence that advertising and 
commodity exchange project after the death of God. What interests Wells is how the 
symbolic logic of Teddy’s self-justifying slogan—figuring the modern world as an object 
to be plundered by the bourgeois capitalist—takes on agency in the wider world. The 
romance of commerce begins as motto, but what if it also has a kind of agency in the 
transmutation of the natural world into “nature”—into natural resources available to the 
imperial subject?: “Look at the wood—and forget the trees!” For Wells, this material 
transformation—from natural world to natural resource—is continuous with a symbolic, 
literary process foundational to the logic and mechanisms of capitalist imperialism.  
The romance of commerce reaches its apotheosis in Teddy’s giant map revealing 
the gradual colonization of England by Tono-Bungay:  
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Section by section we spread it over the whole of the British Isles; first working 
the middle-class London suburbs, then the outer suburbs, then the home counties, 
then going (with new bills and a more pious style of “ad”) into Wales, a great 
field always for a new patent-medicine, and then into Lancashire. My uncle had in 
his inner office a big map of England, and as we took up fresh sections of the 
local press and our consignments invaded new areas, flags for advertisements and 
pink underlines for orders showed our progress. 
 
“The romance of modern commerce, George!” my uncle would say, rubbing his 
hands together and drawing in air through his teeth. “The romance of modern 
commerce, eh? Conquest. Province by province. Like sogers.” (TB 149) 
 
Wells here analogizes the representational logic of cartography (projecting geographical 
space as legible to and available for colonial appropriation) and the social function of 
literary romance. Teddy’s “romance of commerce” not only symbolically transvalues the 
world into the open frontier of his commercial imperialism, but also transforms himself 
into the heroic agent of that conquest. Demonstrating the mutually sustaining agencies of 
romance and map, Wells asserts the symbolic logic of literary form as a crucial, 
necessary technology in wider processes of imperialism—bestowing the narrative 
perspective and symbolic coherence required to motivate self-serving swindle into 
modern religion. Not only does Teddy recognize that “fiscal instruments are at root 
economic fictions dependent upon popular confidence,” but also—to reverse William 
Kupinse’s reading—that literary fiction can function as an economic instrument, 
symbolically reconciling bourgeois economic agency with the wider world. 251 As both 
Fredric Jameson and Nicholas Daly have argued, fin de siècle romance functioned to 
imaginatively project symbolic coherence and utopian social reconciliation, the formal 
 
251 William Kupinse, “Wasted Value: The Serial Logic of H. G. Wells's Tono-Bungay.” 
Novel: A Forum on Fiction 33.1 (1999): 59. 
 
 
 
172 
counterpart to ever-fragmenting realist and naturalist narrative modes in the wake of 
capitalist commodification, world-scale imperial extension, and the atomization of social 
life.252 Teddy draws on a literary form scaled to utopian social wholeness, social 
reconciliation, and symbolic coherence in order to obfuscate the systemic forms of world-
scale social violence that his financial manipulations instigate. Whatever the 
transformative potential projected by utopian romance, it is here the very form and cover 
for capitalist exploitation and imperial social violence: the “courageous fiction” 
sustaining capitalist social life (TB 221). Finally George recognizes this enabling fiction 
as an infrastructural agency crucial to the operation of technological modernity: 
The whole of this modern mercantile investing civilisation is indeed such stuff as 
dreams are made of. A mass of people swelters and toils, great railway systems 
grow, cities arise to the skies and spread wide and far, mines are opened, factories 
hum, foundries roar, ships plough the seas, countries are settled; about this busy 
striving world the rich owners go, controlling all, enjoying all, confident and 
creating the confidence that draws us all together into a reluctant, nearly 
unconscious brotherhood. (TB 221-22) 
 
 
252 In The Political Unconscious, Jameson describes turn-of-the century romance as 
dialectical counterpart to the “reification of realism in late capitalism” and literary form 
in which utopian social transformation is historically thinkable: “Romance now again 
seems to offer the possibility of sensing other historical rhythms, and of demonic or 
Utopian transformations of a real now unshakably set in place” (104-5). For Jameson, the 
“ultimate condition of figuration” of romance “is to be found in a transitional moment in 
which two distinct modes of production, or moments of socioeconomic development, 
coexist. Their antagonism is not yet articulated in terms of the struggle of social classes, 
so that its resolution can be projected in the form of a nostalgic (or less often, a Utopian) 
harmony” (148). Daly argues that turn-of-the-century romance forms share with 
modernism a resistance to the mass-cultural commodity—culturally and psychologically 
“training” readers to life within capitalist modernity: “the romance revival provided the 
narratives and the figures that enabled late Victorian middle-class culture to successfully 
accommodate certain historical changes, notable modernizing processes” (24). 
Modernism, Romance and the fin de siècle: Popular Fiction and British Culture, 1880-
1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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What is it that holds this “reluctant, nearly unconscious brotherhood” together? 
Structurally equivalent to railway systems and energy infrastructures, Teddy’s quasi-
literary capitalist fiction sustains this modern social world. The social function of 
advertisement is to produce the fiction of social cohesion, the romance of commerce. 
Thomas Richards has shown how advertising in Tono-Bungay functions as “a fantasy of 
information control… a massive attempt to control the entropic character of the capitalist 
economic process.”253 Richards helps us to see the infrastructural quality of advertising, 
sustaining the illusion “an achieved discursive order” that lends purposive coherence to 
the chaotic extension of world-scale commodity exchange, resource extraction and labor 
exploitation. But what Richards does not address is that in Tono-Bungay this 
infrastructural, socially productive quality of fiction is not cordoned off into the self-
evidently capitalist “ideological functions” of advertisement but implicates the novel 
form itself. The interpretive question that preoccupies Wells throughout Tono-Bungay is 
what it is that distinguishes the bourgeois novel of “consistent characterization” from the 
“romance of commerce.” 
 Early in Tono-Bungay George asserts that “it isn’t a constructed tale I have to tell, 
but unmanageable realities” (TB 13). George’s autobiographical novel insists upon the 
clear distinction between representation and reality. But as the novel progresses, the 
fictional and the material interpenetrate more and more persistently and confusedly, as 
George implicitly analogizes between the “life”-forming fiction of the novel (scaled to 
 
253 Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Power 
(London: Verso, 1993), 97. 
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the individual) and that of his uncle’s finance capitalism (scaled to the social)—both 
novel and advertisement sustain “the one reality of human life—illusion” (TB 221). This 
interpenetration of the fictional and material intensifies in the build-up to George’s 
disastrous trip to Africa to steal raw materials in order to corner the market on electric 
light filaments. Discussing the source of power that they seek to produce and enact, 
George declares to his uncle, “‘Anglo-Saxon energy,’” who enthusiastically responds:  
“That’s it, George—energy. It’s put things in our grip—threads, wires, stretching 
out and out, George, from that little office of ours, out to West Africa, out to 
Egypt, out to Inja, out east, west, north and south. Running the world 
practically…. Very likely destroy Christianity…. Well, we got to run the country, 
George. It’s ours. Make it a Scientific Organised Business Enterprise. Put idees 
into it. ‘Lectrify it. Run the Press. Run all sorts of developments.” (TB 262).  
 
Wells obscures the distinction between two different kinds of “Anglo-Saxon energy”: the 
bourgeois initiative of our two capitalist heroes, and the electrical grid—the wider field of 
infrastructural technologies that will enable the radical expansion of their consumer base. 
Teddy’s aspiration to “run the country practically” captures in its overdetermined 
ambiguity the central representational tension saturating George’s narration of his life, 
the raw material of Wells’ novel—frustrating the clear distinction between the human and 
the technological, the individual and the infrastructural. 
 George and Teddy first learn of quap from Gordon-Nasmyth, a Conradian 
caricature who seemingly emerges from the world of fin de siècle imperial romance: “that 
queer blend of romance and illegality….a lank, sunburnt person in tweeds with a yellow-
brown hatchet face and one faded blue eye—the other was a closed and sunken lid” (TB 
223). Gordon-Nasmyth gives personified form to Teddy’s “romance of commerce,” 
embodying both the antirealist fantasy of romance and the colonial resource extraction of 
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capitalist commerce. This romantic unreality structures George’s apprehension of 
colonial plunder, which he can only imagine as shaped by a fairy tale: “our world was 
England, and the places of origin of half the raw material of the goods we sold had 
seemed to us as remote as fairyland or the forest of Arden” (TB 226). However, when 
George finally sails to the African coast, this symbolic logic breaks down—the romantic 
fairy-tale of colonial plunder dissolves and becomes real when George encounters the 
brute materiality of quap:  
So it was quap came into our affairs, came in as a fairy-tale and became real. 
More and more real it grew until at last it was real, until at last I saw with my eyes 
the heaps my imagination had seen for so long, and felt between my fingers again 
that half-gritty, half soft texture of quap, like sanded moist-sugar mixed with clay 
in which there stirs something—One must feel it to understand. (TB 228) 
 
Confronted with quap’s unmeaning physical presence, the fictional projections enabling 
George’s “Anglo-Saxon energy” corrode. The brute materiality of quap dissolves his 
commercial fairy-tale, and the symbolic projections sustaining capitalist social life in the 
imperial center no longer hold. In Tono-Bungay, then, the meaning-loss of British 
imperialism does not register in the imperial-infinite of the metropole, but rather at the 
scene of colonial resource extraction itself. Less interested in mapping the ungraspable 
totality of the imperial world-system, Wells instead depicts the mechanisms through 
which that meaning-loss is repressed and supplemented by compensatory symbolic and 
literary forms that motivate, enable, and justify colonial expropriation: adventure tropes, 
advertisement, the realist novel. 
 After examining a quap sample stolen by Gordon-Nasmyth, George discovers its 
potential value as key component of electric light filament. As the financial health of 
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Tono-Bungay deteriorates, George and Teddy recognize an opportunity to rejuvenate 
their business empire by cornering the market on light fittings and monopolizing the 
electric lamp market. Quap, a fictional energy commodity, is introduced to the reader and 
to George as a natural resource to be expropriated. This predetermined symbolization of 
quap as extractable resource is emphasized by its name, which is Gordon-Nasmyth’s 
approximation of a native pronunciation that he does not bother to learn: “‘They call it 
quap, or quab, or quabb,’ said Gordon-Nasmyth; ‘but our relations weren’t friendly 
enough to get the accent right....But there the stuff is for the taking’” (TB 223). Colonial 
appropriation is baked in to quap’s very name, the symbolic marker of its status as source 
of capitalist value to-be-expropriated. But as we have already seen, as George approaches 
Mordet Island firsthand, his epistemological bearing starts to break down, conceptual 
identities dissolve, and the extractable source of use-value takes on an animating force of 
its own—a “sanded moist-sugar mixed with clay in which there stirs something” (TB 
228). The animated materiality of quap exceeds its totalizing symbolization as natural 
resource and leaves George at a loss for words (a rarity!): “One must feel it to 
understand” (TB 228). Mordet Island continues to disorient George, resisting his efforts 
to find meaning both in his labor and in the natural landscape. The longer he stays, the 
more his psychic and symbolic orientation dissolves, as the island seems to generate its 
own alien mythology. Early in his stay, for instance, a young laborer restages a sort of 
Biblical creation myth: “But I cannot now write the history of those days of blundering 
and toil: of how Milton, one of the boys, fell from a plank to the beach, thirty feet 
perhaps, with his barrow and broke his arm and I believe a rib” (TB 330-31). The 
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Miltonic poet of paradise lost is reimagined as literal fallen man, his broken rib impotent 
to affect the life-giving agency of the Biblical original. Wells parodically reimagines the 
creation of “man,” forcing George to confront the artificial, quasi-mythic constructedness 
of his own understanding of “humanity.” This symbolic breakdown increasingly irritates 
George into violent and unmeaning social discomfort, corroding his usually decent 
manners into uncomprehending hatred of an increasingly uncertain “humanity”: “I found 
out many things about myself and humanity in those weeks of effort behind Mordet 
Island. I understand now the heart of the sweater, of the harsh employer, of the nigger-
driver…. But I hated all humanity during the time that the quap was near me” (TB 331-
32). Once the fairy tale deteriorates, and the Tono-Bungay swindle is no longer mediated 
by romance, George is overwhelmed by the brute violence of colonial theft, which 
suddenly resists symbolic rationalization and meaningfulness.  
 George’s hateful derangement culminates in his inexplicable murder of a 
retreating native man encountered while aimlessly exploring. Narrating the event in 
retrospect, George describes his initial encounter with the stranger as a meeting of two 
mutually sentient human beings: “[E]ach of us was essentially a teeming vivid brain, 
tensely excited by the encounter, quite unaware of the other’s mental content or what to 
do with him” (TB 333). But George’s initial recognition of human reciprocity is canceled 
when his counterpart turns to run away. Fearing that the stranger will sabotage his 
unlawful plunder, George coldly shoots him in the back: “I saw, and saw with a leap of 
pure exaltation, the smash of my bullet between his shoulder blades. ‘Got him,’ said I, 
dropping my gun and down he flopped and died without a groan” (TB 334). Considering 
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the body of the man he has just murdered, George reflects, “I looked about me and then 
went forward cautiously in a mood between curiosity and astonishment to look at this 
man whose soul I had flung so unceremoniously out of our common world. I went to him 
not as one goes to something one has made or done, but as one approaches something 
found” (TB 334). The mutuality of their initial encounter wholly effaced, George 
apprehends his victim as a soulless fleshy husk, a thing found rather than a fellow being 
intentionally murdered.  
 Although he does not deny the criminality of his actions or make a strong effort to 
conceal his actions from the reader, George is unable to make sense of the murder in the 
narrative of his life:  
It was the most unmeaning and purposeless murder imaginable. Even as I write 
down its well-remembered particulars there comes again the sense of its 
strangeness, its pointlessness, its incompatibility with any of the neat and definite 
theories people hold about life and the meaning of the world. I did this thing and I 
want to tell of my doing it, but why I did it and particularly why I should be held 
responsible for it I cannot explain” (TB 333)  
 
George is able to understand this murder as a crime, but not as an ethical violation. 
Despite George’s persistent efforts to downplay the significance of the African plunder 
and murder on the course of his life, the episode is crucial to the meaning of Wells’ novel 
because it transposes the systemic-infrastructural violence of imperialism into the ethical 
dimension of individual morality, meaning, and agency. The episode marks the narrative 
switch-point of George’s agency from the systems-infrastructural to the individual-
existential dimension of colonial violence, and the enabling fictions that had allowed him 
to comprehend the ethical legitimacy and social meaningfulness of imperial resource 
extraction—“the romance of commerce”—no longer make sense when shooting another 
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man in the back, so that George is finally forced to confront his actions’ “incompatibility 
with any of the neat and definite theories people hold about life and the meaning of the 
world.” George recognizes his guilt but does not feel guilty. Recognizing the African 
stranger as a fellow embodied creature—a fellow “teeming, vivid brain”—George is 
nonetheless unable to recognize him as a shared member of “humanity” against whom he 
has committed a morally reprehensible act. George is unable to process this collective, 
systemic violence of British imperialism at the level of individual ethics or in the 
narrative form of the bourgeois novel of individual experience. In the symbolic logic of 
Tono-Bungay, George’s unnamed victim is structurally equivalent to the nameless 
quap—a source of value to be expropriated from the colony. George’s unfeeling 
incomprehension at his own murderous act reveals the inadequacy of individual ethics or 
life stories to narrate or critique the infrastructural agencies of colonial modernity. 
Confronted with the colonial violence in which he was complicit far before he shot a man 
in the back, George retreats into uncomprehending disconnect and denial. We ultimately 
see that the question of George’s individual guilt or remorse is to some extent irrelevant, 
posing an ethical dilemma to a political problem requiring collective social 
transformation. 
 How, then, can a novel hope to intervene in such a situation? The sociological 
antirealism of Tono-Bungay aspires to critique and ironize the individuating and ethical 
logic of the bourgeois novel from the inside out. George’s retrospective narration frames 
the African plunder episode as a journey into the brute wilderness of nature from the 
socialized imperial center:  
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All these African memories stand by themselves. It was for me an expedition into 
undisciplined nature out of the world that is ruled by men…They are memories 
woven upon a fabric of sunshine and heat and a constant warm smell of decay. 
(TB 325)  
 
George’s strenuous effort to cordon his colonial murder from his wider life to story—to 
convince both his readers and himself that it was “the most irrelevant adventure in my 
life”—is analogous to his mental effort to distinguish the nature of Africa and the society 
of England (TB 223). Positing an “undisciplined nature” ontologically distinct from the 
ethical mandates of “the world that is ruled by men,” George insists and relies on a space 
outside of his imperial social world from which he can expropriate the necessary value 
from natural resources and colonial subjects to sustain his own “Anglo-Saxon energy.” 
This projection of a separable “nature” is the enabling fiction of George’s colonial 
plunder and murder.   
It is helpful, finally, to recall Timothy Mitchell’s description of  the world-
structuring agency of socio-technical infrastructure in the early-twentieth-century 
colonial periphery: “These projects began to arrange the world as one in which science 
was opposed to nature and technical expertise claimed to overcome the obstacles to social 
improvement....Such programs and campaigns manufactured a world that appeared as 
natural resources versus technology, bodies versus hygiene, men versus machines.”254 
Mitchell describes the techniques and processes through which socio-technical projects—
for instance, the extension of the electric grid via powerful new forms of electric light—
format the world in self-sustaining ways. The infrastructural agency that Mitchell 
 
254 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 51. 
 
 
 
181 
describes is both representational and real, both material and symbolic. These processes 
and techniques of infrastructural extension symbolically encode and materially transform 
the wider environment into natural resources, human bodies into expropriable labor. In 
Tono-Bungay, then, Wells draws attention to forms of capitalist value expropriation 
outside of the factory system, wage relation, or Lukácsean proletariat qua metasubject—
and frames these less socially-recognized forms of value extraction as the real motor of 
capitalism-as-imperialism at the turn of the century.255 What motivates the composite 
form of Tono-Bungay is Wells’ recognition of the complicity of fairy tales, romance, and 
even, individuating novelistic form in producing and sustaining—both materially and 
symbolically—the infrastructural agency that Mitchell describes. By what narrative 
techniques, Wells asks, can the novel of individual experience not only represent the 
enabling fictional structures of colonial violence (as in the African plunder episode), but 
also critique and perhaps transform the infrastructural agency of modern literary form? 
To what extent can Tono-Bungay tell the lie and expose the violence latent within the 
nature/society distinction? 
While figured by George as a site of imperial resource extraction, the landscape of 
Mordet Island is saturated with heaps of rank, festering matter that resist the expropriable 
use-value of commodified nature: “white dead mangroves and the black ooze of brackish 
 
255 For a recent description of capitalism emphasizing the constitutive role of natural-
resource and colonial-labor value expropriation (as distinct from waged labor 
exploitation), see Jason Moore, “The Capitalocene, Part I: on the nature and origins of 
our ecological crisis.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 44.3 (2017): 594-630 and “The 
Capitalocene, Part II: accumulation by appropriation and the centrality of unpaid 
work/energy.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 45.2 (2018): 237-279. 
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water” (TB 223). The decaying matter that pervades this “zone of stunted vegetation” 
offers a version of the natural world that resists the expropriating logic of the “natural 
resource”—the lifeblood of capital that George vampirically seeks to extract in a last-
ditch effort to save his dying enterprise (TB 333). Upon his first encounter with quap, 
George begins to suspect its powerfully disintegrative agency. But he only experiences its 
material agency of decay after hoarding mass quantities onto his ship, whose hull the 
quap literally disintegrates. George and his crew barely escape with their lives, but their 
plunder is lost. After returning to London, George regains the calculating rationality that 
his imperial voyage had agitated and unsettled. Seeking to rationalize his once-fevered 
apprehension of quap’s rotting material agency, George adopts the static positivism of 
geological science, outlining “the full particulars of my impression of all this in the 
Geological Magazine for October, 1905” (TB 329). But the decaying materiality of quap 
resists its scientific containment—and in the latter section of Tono-Bungay quap begins to 
take on a life of its own, as its festering materiality saturates the representational texture 
of George’s novel. Convinced of quap’s rotten, corrosive properties, George expounds 
upon the physically and morally deteriorating effects of quap with abandon, a radical 
promiscuity of real and metaphorical decay:  
This is no imaginative comparison of mine. To my mind radio-activity is a real 
disease of matter. Moreover, it is a contagious disease. It spreads.... It is in matter 
exactly what the decay of our old culture is in society, a loss of traditions and 
distinctions and assured reactions...I am haunted by a grotesque fancy of the 
ultimate eating away and dry-rotting and dispersal of all our world. So that while 
man still struggles and dreams his very substance will change and crumble from 
beneath him.... Suppose, indeed, that is to be the end of our planet; no splendid 
climax and finale, no towering accumulation of achievements, but just—atomic 
decay!... Science can see ends—to this strange by-play of matter that we call 
human life. (TB 330) 
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Like George’s Anglo-Saxon energy, the energy-commodity quap equally refers to the 
individual body it sickens and the social body that it dissolves. George equates the 
radioactive materiality of quap qua matter to the wider deterioration of “culture” in 
“society.” What culture provides to society are the assured traditions and distinctions that 
stabilize social hierarchies and secure social identity—precisely those qualifies of stable 
selfhood that George lacks at the novel’s outset and that he seeks to attain by writing his 
life story. But writing Tono-Bungay has the opposite effect. By the novel’s conclusion, 
the rank, decadent material agency of quap seems to overtake George himself:  
It may be I see decay all about me because I am, in a sense, decay. To others it 
may be a scene of achievement and construction radiant with hope. I, too, have a 
sort of hope, but it is a remote hope, a hope that finds no promise in this Empire 
or in any of the great things of our time. How they will look in history I do not 
know, how time and chance will prove them I cannot guess[.] (TB 382) 
 
By the conclusion of his 400-page autobiographical novel, George’s sense of self has 
dispersed into material agencies of dissolution and decay—taking on the very qualities of 
the nature that he had sought to extract. On the whole, this seems a rather grim 
conclusion to George’s life story. But in what, then, does the “remote hope” that attends 
this experience of decay consist? The hope, George tells us, resides not in the Empire nor 
in “any of the great things of our time,” but rather in a far-flung futurity that seems more 
the domain of Wells’ late-nineteenth scientific romance. The decaying quap—exceeding 
its social designation as natural resource—in fact becomes a major agent in George’s life, 
finally overtaking even his sense of personal autonomy and identity. This decay—
perhaps aligned with the transverse forces that destabilize his coherent character in the 
novel’s first lines—opens George’s and our own imaginative horizon to an apprehension 
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of self and world that undoes the nature/society dualism on which George’s colonial 
resource extraction relied. Instead, George perversely signals hope through a radical 
dispersal of self and world. And it is here that the ironized bourgeois realism of Tono-
Bungay intersects with the sociological futurity of A Modern Utopia: in a model of 
selfhood constituted via transformative entanglement with the nonhuman. George 
dramatizes the “vagueness” of the plastic human subject in action. He is a 
characterological device for narrating the transformative entanglement of human and 
nonhuman agency that Wells describes in his sociology. This agential transformation of 
seemingly passive matter—quap—metonymizes Wells’ wider representational project in 
Tono-Bungay: a narrative model of history shaped not by the dialectical reconciliation of 
self and society, but rather the shifting distribution of agency between character and 
environment.  
At the same time, Tono-Bungay dramatizes George’s worry and Wells’ 
apprehension that the stable and sovereign subject might not be the content, but rather the 
product of fictional narrative form. Like the laborers in his uncle’s factory that he 
effectively mechanizes and the steamboats named after canonical British authors—
Caxton, Pepys and Shakespeare—the sight of which incites in George a wish “to take 
them out and wipe them and put them back in some English gentleman’s library,” 
George’s life story registers and narrates a world where both bourgeois subjects and 
bourgeois literature are becoming infrastructural—technological handmaidens to the 
systemic forces of late-stage capitalism-as-imperialism (TB 387). From the “romance of 
commerce” to the bolstering selfhood of the novel, Tono-Bungay is deeply invested in 
 
 
 
185 
disclosing the agency of literature in shaping how its readers symbolize and 
conceptualize the world around them—and its potential complicity in the swindling and 
systemic violence of imperialism.  If the nineteenth-century novel domesticates 
entanglement via the humanist dialectics of self-and-society or the autonomous subject-
as-protagonist, then Tono-Bungay seeks to render that process visible. 
 Finally, then, we can recognize the literary-sociological ambition embedded in the 
novel’s final sentence: “We are all things that make and pass striving upon a hidden 
mission, out to the open sea” (TB 389). Across all of these texts—“The So-Called 
Science of Sociology,” A Modern Utopia, Tono-Bungay—Wells seeks a kind of literature 
engaged in actualizing a collective subject that does not yet exist. If the vocation of 
sociology is to image a collective “struggling to exist and realize itself in a world of 
egotisms, animalisms, and brute matter,” then the realization of that collective is 
practically but powerfully shaped by literary fiction. Tono-Bungay is a call, then, not for 
the enabling fictions of imperial resource extraction, the sovereign self, or the capitalist 
swindle—or even of existing nations and empires. More than anything, Tono-Bungay 
pursues a “we” that is not the subject of literary representation but rather its utopian 
desired object. 
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CHAPTER 3: The Secret Agency of Standardization: Narrative Standard Time and Other 
Modernist Infrastructures in Joseph Conrad 
 
There is a – let us say – a machine. It evolved itself (I am severely 
scientific) out of a chaos of scraps of iron and behold! – it knits. I am 
horrified at the horrible work and stand appalled. I feel it ought to 
embroider – but it goes on knitting. You come and say: “this is all right; 
it’s only a question of the right kind of oil. Let us use this – for instance – 
celestial oil and the machine shall embroider a most beautiful design in 
purple and gold.” Will it? Alas no. You cannot by any special lubrication 
make embroidery with a knitting machine. And the most withering 
thought is that the infamous thing has made itself; made itself without 
thought, without conscience, without foresight, without eyes, without 
heart. It is a tragic accident – and it has happened. You can’t interfere with 
it. The last drop of bitterness is in the suspicion that you can’t even smash 
it. In virtue of that truth one and immortal which lurks in the force that 
made it spring into existence it is what it is – and it is indestructible!  
 
It knits us in and it knits us out. It has knitted time, space, pain, death, 
corruption, despair and all the illusions – and nothing matters. I’ll admit 
however that to look at the remorseless process is sometimes amusing. 
   —Letter from Joseph Conrad to R.B Cunninghame 
Graham (1897) 
 
 
Making Time 
Throughout his long and restless career as novelist and essayist, Joseph Conrad 
sought to give shape to the paradoxical presence of the social: coercive, tangible, 
invisible, formless. Probing the limits of maritime imperial romance, international spy 
fiction, and perspective-shifting psychological fiction, Conrad’s novels of the early-
twentieth century aspire to give representational and conceptual shape to the limits and 
mechanisms of social cohesion—what he had earlier described as the “knitting machine” 
of the social in a letter to R.B Cunninghame Graham. What makes the political 
imagination of Conrad’s fiction so difficult to grasp is the profound ambivalence Conrad 
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himself seems to exhibit towards this totalizing machinery of modern social life—finally 
registering only a noncommittal amusement at the “remorseless process” that “knits us in 
and knits us out.” In this chapter, I argue that Conrad most fully explores the socio-
technical machinery of modern social life in his extended reflection on the socially-
productive agency of standardization in The Secret Agent. Registering the late-nineteenth 
century proliferation of socio-technical infrastructures—from time standardization to the 
repetitive circulation of mass media—Conrad explores the constitutive role of 
standardization in shaping the modern subject. What would it mean for the novel, Conrad 
invites us to ask, if the cohesion of modern “society” is shaped not by interpersonal 
intimacy, sympathy, or culture, but by infrastructure—the technologized circulation of 
material and symbolic standards that coordinate the practices and mentalities of 
teemingly diverse individuals? What is the social function of literature in a world in 
which the infrastructural knitting machine has encroached on the humanist domain of 
culture? 
 The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries witnessed a radical expansion 
in the infrastructure of international communication—what we might understand as the 
material analogue of Conrad’s imaginative “knitting machine.” British and imperial 
advocates imagined an extensive system of intercontinental cables to function as a 
“public service network for the British Empire.”256 Perhaps the most persistent of these 
advocates was Sandford Fleming, a Scottish-born engineer today best remembered as an 
 
256 Dwayne R. Winseck and Robert M. Pike, Communication and Empire: Media, 
Markets, and Globalization, 1860–1930 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 30. 
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influential champion both of global communications technology and international 
standard time. In a series of essays published in 1907, To the Citizens of the Empire, 
Fleming calls on the British Empire to establish: 
an unbroken chain of state-owned cables connecting the self-governing British 
communities in both hemispheres....By bringing the several governmental units, 
now separated by great oceans, into one friendly neighborhood, electrically and 
telegraphically, results will follow of the most satisfactory character,—commerce 
will be quickened, the ties of sympathy will be made more effective, the bonds of 
sentiment will become more enduring, and by this means, unity, strength and 
permanence will be assured to the family of nations constituting the Empire.257 
 
Fleming offers a far more benign figuration of infrastructural social cohesion than 
Conrad’s mechanical and merciless knitting. In Fleming’s description, the infrastructural 
cable-system functions not only as a powerful symbol through which to envision the 
imagined coherence of a technologically, financially and sympathetically unified imperial 
world-system, but also as the material means through which this communicative social 
integration would be achieved. In Fleming’s self-described “cosmopolitan” vision, global 
cable networks and international standard time collaborate as the enabling conditions of 
possibility for communication at a global scale—a fantasy of worldwide communication 
facilitated not only by material communications technologies, but also by immaterial and 
symbolic ones. Taken to its limits, Fleming’s vision blurs the line between imperial 
hegemony and cosmopolitan transnationalism, and his detractors resisted this fantasy of 
social integration as a dangerous threat to national sovereignty in the age of empire. 
Charles Piazzi-Smyth, astronomy professor at the University of Edinburgh, responded to 
 
257 Sanford Fleming, To the Citizens of the Empire (1907), quoted in Winseck and Pike, 
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189 
a paper circulated by Fleming with a warning against the degraded social effects of this 
cosmopolitan temporality, deriding “the dread international conference which transcends 
all mere radical politicians in seeking ever by blood and fire to destroy most completely 
the ancient and necessary barriers between the nations, and to form all mankind into one 
vast, headless society.”258 The infrastructural and communicative unification of the world 
threatens to decapitate the body politic.  
The integrating liberalism of Fleming and the neo-Burkean backlash of Piazzi-
Smyth track the ambivalent relationship among national, imperial and utopic-
transnational forms of mass-mediated social organization. A crucial question posed by 
the proliferation of world-scale infrastructure—and especially time standardization—is 
the extent to which the socio-technical entanglement of ever-widening swaths of 
humanity into technological relation meaningfully transforms the political units and 
social categories that mediate human collective life. In an earlier essay on time-
standardization, Fleming asks: 
The human race is no longer confined within a narrow area. It has overspread the 
surface of the earth; in the old and new worlds it has grown, in some portions of 
their extent it is still growing, from an infantile condition to a state of manhood. 
Are we not yet able to look beyond one individual horizon and enlarge our range 
of vision so as to include a system which will satisfy the requirements, not of a 
locality, but of the whole globe?259  
 
 
258 Charles Piazzi-Smyth, remarks forwarded to the Marquis of Lorne, quoted in Adam 
Barrows, The Cosmic Time of Empire: Modern Britain and World Literature (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 2010), 34. 
259 Sanford Fleming, Time-reckoning for the Twentieth Century (Montreal: Dawson 
Brothers, 1886), 49.  
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Fleming quietly slips from spatial-material “growth”—the widening extension of 
infrastructural communication networks across “the surface of the earth”—into the 
developmental “growth” of transformative maturation—“from an infantile condition to a 
state of manhood.” Does spatial growth necessarily entail transformative, developmental 
growth? Have human social relations outgrown—spatially and/or developmentally—
Piazzi-Smyth’s nation-state? New forms of standardization knit human beings together in 
radically uncertain ways at the turn of the twentieth century: Was the socio-technical 
entanglement of ever-more humans into standardized networks the next developmental 
stage in the history of human progress, or merely a replacement for the declining 
symbolic purchase of culture? Does standardized time measure the developmental growth 
of human progress, or is time the synthetic, chronometric invention of corporate-capitalist 
interest? If time is made, then might the same be true of the human? What is the agency 
of standardization? 
 
Rethinking Standardization 
 Following Adorno’s critique of the culture industry, standardization most 
commonly enters the purview of modernist studies as symptom of the disenchanted world 
of reification and alienation. As culture splinters off from social and political life in 
modernity, its hard-fought autonomy is shown to have already been determined by the 
capitalist market economy. Modern culture—both “high” and “low”—is constitutively 
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structured “by the administered world, by standardization and eternal sameness.”260 Thus 
for decades scholars have productively understood modernism by reference to the 
commodity form. In “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,” for example, Fredric 
Jameson influentially insisted that critics of modern culture abandon the strict separation 
of “high” and “low” in favor of an approach that reads “high and mass culture as 
objectively related and dialectically interdependent phenomena, as twin and inseparable 
forms of the fission of aesthetic production under capitalism.”261 Jameson contends that 
modernism is only thinkable as responsive to the historically unique, standardizing 
effects of late capitalism, the tendency “to dissolve and to fragment or atomize [unified 
social groups] into agglomerations of isolated and equivalent private individuals, by way 
of the corrosive action of universal commodification and the market system.”262 Finally, 
then, modernism can only be understood as the dialectical counterpart of mass culture: 
“for modernism, the commodity form signals the vocation not to be a commodity.”263 Of 
course, Jameson’s (and countless other critics’) extensions of Frankfurt School critical 
theory have been incredibly generative for the study of modern culture, expanding both 
the field of analytic objects and the political horizons of modernist studies. But what has 
the persistent return to the hermeneutics of the commodity obscured? Scholars have 
increasingly sought methodologies that apprehend cultural objects outside of the 
 
260 Theodor W. Adorno, “The Position of the Narrator in the Contemporary Novel,” in 
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structuring logic of the commodity form. In this section, I read a modernist text especially 
self-reflexive in its thematization of standardization—The Secret Agent—in order to 
analyze the new forms of mediation that come into view when we disarticulate 
standardization from the commodity. 
 Critics have generally seen Conrad’s novel as harshly critical of standardization, 
reading Verloc’s botched assault on the Greenwich Observatory as an attack on time 
standardization itself. Tanya Agathocleous suggests that we read the Greenwich Meridian 
in Conrad’s novel as “the ur-symbol of standardized time.”264 Although he has little 
patience for the anarchists who perpetrate the terrorist attack, she argues, Conrad does 
sympathize with their plot to “‘smash’...time coordination, a concept singled out for 
critique by many modernist writers because of its reifying, homogenizing role in national 
life, and its connection with capitalist efficiency.”265 Similarly, Adam Barrows contends 
that Conrad’s novel resists “the injunction to fit all human time into a single standardized 
system of measurement explicitly designed for the maintenance of global commerce.”266 
Despite the novel’s sustained “ironic method,” both critics agree that Conrad sincerely 
endorses the explosion of global standard time. But just how earnest is this endorsement?  
 
264 Tanya Agathocleous, Urban Realism and the Cosmopolitan Imagination in the 
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 Early in The Secret Agent, Mr. Vladimir outlines his long-winded “philosophy of 
bomb throwing” to Verloc, stressing the apolitical nature of his chosen target.267 Most 
significant for Vladimir is that the target confound conventional rationalizations of 
anarchist violence: class interest, poverty, religion, revenge. Instead, he targets modern 
society’s “sacrosanct fetish”: science (SA 23). Only through an “act of destructive 
ferocity so absurd as to be incomprehensible, inexplicable, almost unthinkable” does 
Vladimir imagine he can blunt “the sensibilities of the class you are attacking....You can’t 
count upon their emotions either of pity or fear for very long” (SA 25, 24). In this 
Aristotelian poetics of the bomb, Vladimir fashions himself a terrorist-poet competing 
against the homogenized bourgeois values both symbolized and reproduced by the 
popular press: “I defy the ingenuity of journalists to persuade their public that any given 
member of the proletariat can have a personal grievance against astronomy. Starvation 
itself could hardly be dragged in there—eh?” (SA 26). Vladimir seems to embody the 
modernist disposition that Agathocleous and Barrows attribute to Conrad himself—
fantastically negating standard time, the homogenizing forces of capitalism, and 
commoditized news culture in a single aesthetic explosion. But what this reading neglects 
is the extent to which Vladimir’s plan relies on those mechanisms that it would ostensibly 
destroy. Vladimir nominally calls for “a clean sweep of the whole social creation,” but he 
in fact constructs a plan that constitutively depends on journalists and standardized 
communications circuits so as to “have any influence on public opinion” (SA 24). 
 
267 Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent: A Simple Tale (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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Vladimir aspires to destroy immaterial targets that are symbolically rich (pure 
mathematics, standardized time, astronomy, science), but is in fact blind to his own 
reliance on the material and cultural infrastructures that he would otherwise destroy. 
Rather than earnestly endorse Vladimir’s plan, then, Conrad subtly and ironically exposes 
Vladimir’s (willful or naive) ignorance of the material conditions on which his plan 
relies, conditions sustained by time standardization and the Greenwich Observatory.  
 Vladimir’s “philosophy of bomb throwing” dramatizes the capacity of modern 
infrastructure to frustrate the distinction between the material and the symbolic. Vladimir 
aspires to assault the fetishized ideals of science by attacking time standardization, which 
he understands as the idealized scientific rationalization of a genuinely anarchistic 
temporality. Vladimir hopes to destroy the symbolic ideal by detonating the material 
base, but we can recognize the futility of his enterprise from the very start. Vladimir 
orchestrates a terrorist attack on Greenwich Meridian—both the material and symbolic 
zero degree of time standardization. But the Greenwich Meridian does not produce time 
standardization. Time standardization emerges through its continual reproduction in the 
material technologies, international institutions, and embodied subjectivities that enact 
and live those standardizations across global and local contexts. The scientific ideals of 
standardization only become social reality through their mediation in technical 
infrastructures and subsequent social reproduction. In the passage above, Conrad figures 
this crucial force of infrastructural mediation in the newspaper—the media technology 
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whose daily circulation reproduces the socially-symbolic effect of collective standardized 
time.268 
 It is no accident that Vladimir’s philosophy of the bomb (the passage in The 
Secret Agent that engages with the material and symbolic dimensions of time 
standardization most explicitly) brings us to the newspaper—to what many critics of 
modernism have read as the paradigmatic form of commoditized culture. As several 
critics have shown, Conrad’s novel does voice a critique of the popular press and of 
commoditized culture more generally.269 But it also examines the productive social 
function of infrastructural mediation that can fall out of view when we read The Secret 
Agent—both the novel itself and its own reflexive representations of mass culture—in 
terms of the commodity form. In The Secret Agent, Conrad figures both time 
standardization and the newspaper as mutually-reinforcing modern infrastructures with 
powerful roles in the cohesion of modern social worlds. Conrad’s novel explores the 
processes of mediation through which scientific idealizations become material social 
reality through infrastructural mediation—of which the newspaper is perhaps the most 
powerful agent. Reading the newspaper as infrastructure rather than commodity requires 
that we recognize not only the psychically-degrading effects of modern forms of 
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standardization (i.e., Lukácsian reification), but also the powerful mediating role of 
standardization in the cohesion of modern social worlds. This recognition of the powerful 
agency of both standardization and the newspaper within The Secret Agent calls for a 
different critical practice than the familiar modernist paradigms of “high/low culture” and 
the commodity form—a critical hermeneutics in which standardization does not 
inevitably refer to the homogenizing effects of reification and rationalization. 
 In his reading of the politics of time standardization, Barrows draws on Peter 
Osborne’s The Politics of Time, and Osborne’s account of the relationship between 
standard time and the homogenizing force of capitalism nicely captures the logic 
underwriting most accounts of time standardization in The Secret Agent: “Capitalism has 
‘universalized’ history, in the sense that it has established systematic relations of social 
interdependence on a planetary scale...thereby producing a single global space of 
temporal co-existence or coevalness, within which actions are quantifiable 
chronologically in terms of a single standard of measurement: world standard time.”270 
Osborne reads time standardization as the measure of capitalism—what Adorno would 
call “the total social process” of commodification and mutual alienation. In this account, 
capitalism is the sovereign agent that organizes the planet in its image, producing the 
global space most amenable to its own reproduction.  
 In modernist studies, the commodity form has served a function similar to 
Osborne’s standard time—a stable unit always in reference to the scale of capitalism, 
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drawing its agency (or lack thereof) from that measure. In their introduction to an edited 
special issue on “Financialization and the Culture Industry,” C.D. Blanton, Colleen Lye, 
and Kent Puckett describe the structuring function of the commodity as stable unit of 
measure for cultural critics in the wake of Adorno and Lukács: “[the commodity] stands 
not only as capitalism’s minimal unit of analysis but also as the source of the logic that 
ultimately governs the structure of culture.”271 The commodity form functions for critical 
theory as the analytic unit coordinating cultural objects and the total social process of 
capitalism. For critics in the wake of Lukács, Adorno, and Jameson, the structure of 
culture in capitalism is understood to be governed by reification, alienation, and 
ideological misprision. If the commodity is the constitutive unit of the “total social 
process,” then the vocation of critical theory must be to relate our cultural objects back to 
the agency and logic of that process. When we confine our understanding of “media” to 
the commodity form, then, we circumscribe the agency of those media objects within the 
structuring logic described by Blanton, Lye, and Puckett—media objects can only 
coordinate the sovereign agency of capitalism with the subjectivities that it alienates. In 
this paradigm, standardization can only be understood through reference to the dual 
phenomena of Weberian rationalization and Lukácsian reification. Commodified mass 
culture is the conceptual unit that coordinates the homogenization of the rationalized 
material world with the reified subjectivities of the masses. But what would it look like to 
imagine media objects and forms of mediation that are not subject to the sovereign 
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agency and interpretive horizon of the total social process of capitalism? What would it 
look like, finally, to read standardization not as a monolithic capitalist technology that 
can be detonated (whether via bombs or critical theory), but rather as a series of 
techniques and technologies that enable new forms of social connection across a 
complexifying media environment? 
 In order to address this question, we must return to that media form so central to 
Conrad’s socio-political investments in The Secret Agent: the newspaper, which Conrad 
invites us to read not only as mass-cultural commodity, but also as infrastructural media 
technology. Critics have already noted the interpretive centrality of the newspaper in 
Conrad’s novel. In a comprehensive reading, Peter Mallios reads the The Secret Agent as 
responsive to the commercialization of the press, enabling “an extension of a bourgeois 
administrative logic” through the increasingly extensive influence of new journalism.272 
Mallios links the “priority of the newspaper as a money-making commodity” to its 
increasingly pervasive “agency of social control.”273 Ultimately, in tracing the forms of 
ideological power exerted by the newspaper, Mallios reads The Secret Agent as a 
meditation on Baudrillardian simulation. The press “substitut[es] signs for the real.”274 
Mallios rightly emphasizes the fate of Ossipon, whose identity disintegrates following his 
abandonment of Winnie and her subsequent suicide. Ossipon learns of her fate in a 
newspaper and is psychically tormented by “the beauties of its journalistic style,” 
compulsively repeating its vague account: “An impenetrable mystery seems destined to 
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hang for ever over this act of madness or despair.” Ossipon does not understand this 
sudden dissolution of his personality; he is “menaced by an impenetrable mystery—the 
mystery of a human brain pulsating wrongfully to the rhythm of journalistic phrases” (SA 
227). In Mallios’ reading, Ossipon’s psychic disintegration is the price paid for his clear-
eyed recognition of the newspaper's ideological power of simulation.  
 Before responding to Mallios’s reading, I want to bring in a passage that he does 
not discuss—a competing moment depicting Ossipon in the wake of Winnie’s suicide:  
He walked. He crossed the bridge. Later on the towers of the Abbey saw 
in their massive immobility the yellow bush of his hair passing under the 
lamps. The lights of Victoria saw him too, and Sloane Square, and the 
railings of the park....The clock tower boomed a brazen blast above his 
drooping head. He looked up at the dial. . . . Half-past twelve of a wild 
night in the Channel....And again Comrade Ossipon walked. His robust 
form was seen that night in distant parts of the enormous town slumbering 
monstrously on a carpet of mud under a veil of raw mist. It was seen 
crossing the streets without life and sound, or diminishing in the 
interminable straight perspectives of shadowy houses bordering empty 
roadways lined by strings of gas lamps. He walked through Squares, 
Places, Ovals, Commons, through monotonous streets with unknown 
names where the dust of humanity settles inert and hopeless out of the 
stream of life. He walked.  (SA 219-20) 
 
This is a bizarre passage in the context of the novel. The narrative perspective, which 
throughout The Secret Agent quietly vacillates between ironic distance and intimate 
omniscience, suddenly and somewhat jarringly pulls back. The buildings and streets of 
London sentiently observe the wandering Ossipon, who momentarily gains perspectival 
agency in order to observe the clock tower and note the (standardized) time. As the 
passage moves from particular London buildings to the more abstract geometry of 
London’s municipal infrastructure, the narrative gaze momentarily shifts from Ossipon to 
“the dust of humanity.” Figuring Ossipon first as subject, then as object, the passage 
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suggests that what we recognize as “humanity” is merely the effect of how formless life-
dust has taken shape in its larger technical and natural environment—just as Ossipon’s 
identity is given shape by the familiar structures that allow him to recognize himself in 
the newspaper. The passage elaborately stages the contingent nature of distinctions 
between person and thing, subject and object, nature and culture—distinctions that are 
supported by material and symbolic standards: time, municipal infrastructure, and the 
familiar repetitions of mass media. Read in conjunction with Ossipon’s haunted 
relationship to the newspaper, this passage suggests that the mutually-reinforcing 
infrastructural technologies of standard time and daily newspaper are not just coercive 
simulations, the ideological lubricant and constitutive analytic unit of capitalism. This 
passage alternatively invites us to recognize the foundational role of technical 
infrastructure in producing and sustaining material conditions of modern personhood. 
Conrad’s infrastructuralism invites us to reframe standardization not as a limit on human 
agency, but rather as producing the very conditions through which a recognizable 
“humanity” can come into being. 
 While contemporary sociological analyses of standardization can lack historical 
specificity, these texts rightly emphasize the constitutive relationship between the 
codification of new forms of standardization and the historical emergence and experience 
of modernity.275 John Durham Peters and Paul N. Edwards both connect the 
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pervasiveness of standardization in modern social worlds to the development of modern 
infrastructures.276 Drawing on Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star’s influential 
account of standardization in Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences, 
Peters emphasizes how the hiddenness of standards, their tendency to escape from view, 
obscures the logistical aspect of media.277 For Peters, “Logistical media have the job of 
ordering fundamental terms and units....The job of logistical media is to organize and 
orient, to arrange people and property, often into grids....They prepare the ground on 
which we can make such distinctions as nature and culture.”278 Peters invites us to read 
“media” not only as symbolic, ideological, or simulated, but also as technical—
implicated in materially structuring the world and the social forms that inhabit it. Peters 
invites us to understand logistical media as a sort of Greenwich Meridian, the zero-degree 
of mediation necessary for the cohesion of social worlds: “In arraying things around polar 
points, logistical media set the terms in which everyone must operate. The zero is the 
paradigm case of a logistical medium: an apparent nothing that marks out longitude and 
latitude, and orders of magnitude, and thus shapes the world; it is an operator that 
arranges data and regulates processing.”279 Peters figures time standardization as the 
paradigmatic metaphor through which to explicate the logistical aspect of more familiar 
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“media” objects like the newspaper. Conrad’s novel anticipates and imaginatively tests 
the limits of this contemporary media-theoretical insight.  
 In Sorting Things Out, Bowker and Star explicitly frame their examination of 
standardization against Baudrillard’s simulation—against the notion “that it is impossible 
to sort out media representations from ‘what really happens.’”280 They worry that 
Baudrillard “pays no attention to the work of constructing the simulations, or the 
infrastructural considerations that underwrite the images or events” and argue that “there 
is more at stake—epistemologically, politically, and ethically—in the day-to-day work of 
building classification systems and producing and maintaining standards than in abstract 
arguments about representation.”281 Without endorsing their dismissal of representation, I 
do think that their concern with the simultaneously symbolic and material aspects of 
standardization—their rejection of a strict distinction between “some otherworldly ‘real’ 
or ‘constructed’ nature”—helps us to read Conrad’s novel differently and rethink 
standardization in literary studies more generally.282 Building on Mallios’ Baudrillardian 
reading of The Secret Agent, I want to suggest that we read the newspaper not as an 
ideological simulation in service of bourgeois social control, but as part of a larger 
technical infrastructure of logistical mediation. The logic of simulation relies upon 
maintaining an absolute difference between representation and the world that is 
represented, between social construction and reality. Paying attention to the material, 
logistical quality of the newspaper (that comes into view in concert with time 
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standardization throughout The Secret Agent) reveals forms of “media” that explicitly do 
not constitute a virtual world, cutting Ossipon off from some more real, more material 
reality. Rather than concluding with Ossipon’s recognition that he has been living in a 
world composed of simulations—ideological representations separable from a more 
authentic reality—the novel instead terminates with Ossipon’s devastating recognition 
that what he had earlier dismissed as “mere newspaper gup” is in fact, like time 
standardization, what has held him in relation to the social world (SA 53). 
 Rethinking standardization as not only a monolithic technology of capitalist social 
control, but also as a series of techniques that confer commensurability to the practices 
and mentalities of diverse individuals highlights larger questions regarding the sources 
and limits of human agency, both in Conrad’s novel and in our own critical practice. 
Understanding standardization as a social process immanent to the culture industry or 
commodity form will always refer standardization to the same logic of capitalism—a 
capitalist logic to which we tend to attribute an internal logic, inherent rationality, or 
general structure that’s given credit or lends explanatory force to our interpretations. 
Disarticulating standardization from the commodity form and from this determining 
capitalist logic allows us to re-open questions of power and agency, rather than treating 
them as answers known in advance. Must all forms of standardization necessarily refer to 
the same total social process? Rethinking standardization entails recognizing the extent to 
which many of our interpretive paradigms immanently refer to the not-so-secret-anymore 
agents of rationalization, reification, and alienation. Disarticulating standardization from 
the commodity form might allow us, then, to grasp the positive force of technical 
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mediation in the formation of social worlds and to imagine new forms of political agency 
by recovering both the technical and representational nature of human agency. But what, 
then, is the status of the human subject in such a world? 
 
Un-Knitting the Human 
Throughout The Secret Agent, readerly agency is undermined by the novel’s 
structural and dramatic ironies—what Mark Wollaeger describes in his reading of The 
Secret Agent as “an aesthetic of formal perfection and controlled violence” that enacts 
“an aggressively punitive discipline linked to authorial efforts to master the audience.”283 
The most jarring of these structural ironies are the novel’s temporal disjunctions, 
manipulating chronology both forward and backward to disorienting effect. In the first of 
these shifts, Conrad jumps from Verloc’s anxiety after meeting with the anarchists in 
Chapter III to the aftermath of the Greenwich explosion in Chapter IV. This temporal rift 
initially obscures the identity of the bomb victim (we, like the Professor, have no reason 
to believe that the bodily remains are those of Stevie rather than Verloc) before placing 
the reader in a position of dramatic irony for much of the novel’s second half, as the 
knowing reader watches the characters unravel the mystery for themselves. This dramatic 
irony is felt most painfully in Chapter VIII, in which the narrative shifts back in time 
before Stevie’s death to recount his and Winnie’s mother’s journey to deposit herself in 
the almshouse in a misguided and ineffectual gesture of self-sacrifice for her son, 
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believing that the relief of her burdensome presence will make Verloc likelier to provide 
for her children. 
 These structural ironies—both the representational aporia of the failed bombing 
and the gratuitous temporal backtrack of the cab ride—unsettle the stable chronicity of 
the novel’s narrative texture. Both temporal rifts also constellate around the central figure 
of Stevie, whom critics have often read as the interpretive center of The Secret Agent. 
Critical readings of Stevie tend to cast him into one of two camps: Stevie is either 
emblem of the canny, modern artist (“That Stevie is identified as the novel’s artist-figure 
as well as its conscience says much about Conrad’s sense of art’s inefficacy, its inability 
to bring about any change in the world.”284) or, alternatively, paradigmatic example of the 
naive reader whose depth has been corroded by commodified mass culture (“Stevie is the 
most obvious manifestation of the novel’s decidedly unflattering estimation of the 
general reading public: in his gullible excitability and his woeful lack of verbal or 
political sophistication, he stands as Conrad’s cruel caricature of ‘public opinion.’”285). 
Focusing either on Stevie’s sympathetic vulnerability to the shocks and manipulations of 
lowbrow journalism or on the anti-mimetic geometric formalism of his compulsive circle 
drawing, critics tend to understand Stevie via reference to the commodity form. 
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Understood as the site of either symbolic resistance or vulnerability to commodification, 
Stevie is trapped within the interpretive dialectic of modernism and mass culture, casting 
Stevie as either the psychically-degraded or socially-ostracized outcome of the total 
social process of modern cultural production. But is there an alternative to this powerfully 
structuring interpretive paradigm? More to the point, can we coordinate Stevie’s 
overdetermined relationship to the modern cultural field with the wider chronological 
ironies structuring the novel’s narrative form? And why do these temporal and dramatic 
ironies circulate so persistently around the figure of Stevie in particular? 
 The question of irony has of course motivated readers of the The Secret Agent for 
decades, critics often implicitly or explicitly responding to Irving Howe’s influential 
reading in Politics and the Novel of the The Secret Agent’s “thick fog of irony which 
steadily eats away at the features, the energies, the very vitals of its major characters.”286 
Howe sees Conrad’s irony as an aesthetic weakness, a totalizing and suffocating derision 
that “turn[s] in upon itself, becoming facile through its pervasiveness and lack of 
grading.”287 Howe’s vision of an all-encompassing scorn that corrodes the freedom of the 
novel’s characters casts Conrad’s ironic method as a saturating aesthetic fog whose 
totalizing aspect mirrors the “total social process” of capitalized modernity. In Howe’s 
reading, Conrad’s diegetic landscape is subject to a totalizing pressure that constrains the 
fate and meaning of the novel’s characters in a manner duplicative of the standardized, 
homogeneous texture of the modern administered society of commodity exchange and 
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mutual alienation. This understating of irony is ineluctably bound to the question of 
determinism. But must we follow Howe in locating monolithic and totalizing vectors of 
narrative determinism? It is my view that the novel’s relevance and value for 
contemporary readers resides not in the philosophical stalemate between freedom and 
determinism, but rather in the dynamic exchange between cultural and technological 
agencies of determination in the making of modern subjects.  
 Returning to the question of Stevie, we can begin to rethink his function in 
Conrad’s convoluted narrative knitting machine by adopting and developing in a rather 
different direction Joseph Valente’s insight that the impairment of Stevie’s “idiocy” 
resides “not in his powers of ideation but in his powers of mediation.”288 Valente shows 
that Stevie’s disability is not a function of diminished intellect but of “a 
phenomenological circuitry (sensory, perceptual, affective, cognitive) overloaded to the 
point of derangement, a state of hyperesthesia or systematic overstimulation that 
spasmodically distorts the information to be processed by intensifying it.”289 While 
Valente reads Stevie’s phenomenological circuitry as psychologically mimetic, bearing 
an indexical relationship to neurosensory disorder via a psychological realism that my 
reading generally resists, I want to borrow and to emphasize the active and dynamic 
mediatory relationship between subject and world that Valente helps us to see. More than 
subject to the mutually-constituting processes of the culture industry and Howe’s ironic 
fog, Stevie is constantly processing and giving form to the world around him.  
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 Conrad offers two glimpses into Stevie’s paradigmatic mode of artistic 
production: the compulsive drawing of circles. The first scene shows Stevie tensed with 
aesthetic precision and metrological exactitude: “His spare time he occupied by drawing 
circles with compass and pencil on a piece of paper. He applied himself to that pastime 
with great industry, with his elbows spread out and bowed low over the kitchen table” 
(SA 8). The second glimpse reveals an unloosed symbolic proliferation: “the innocent 
Stevie, seated very good and quiet at a deal table, drawing circles, circles, circles; 
innumerable circles, concentric, eccentric; a coruscating whirl of circles that by their 
tangled multitude of repeated curves, uniformity of form, and confusion of intersecting 
lines suggested a rendering of cosmic chaos, the symbolism of a mad art attempting the 
inconceivable” (SA 34). Only 26 pages separate these two brief scenes of artistic 
production, but Conrad neither draws attention to nor explains why Stevie vacillates 
between two wildly divergent aesthetic styles. In fact, despite their differences, these 
circles are easily subsumed within the totalizing irony condemned by Howe: despite the 
aesthetic aspirations and symbolic longing that the narrator attributes to Stevie’s artistic 
production, the circles are only of interest to the novel’s characters as evidentiary 
measure of Stevie’s pathological degeneracy. As Ossipon mutters to Verloc after 
examining Stevie at work: “‘Very good. Very characteristic, perfectly typical.’ ‘What’s 
very good?' grunted inquiringly Mr. Verloc, settled again in the corner of the 
sofa….‘Typical of this form of degeneracy—these drawings, I mean’” (SA 34). 
 But rather than read the circles as evidentiary symptom—either of mental 
disability or of the pressures of the culture industry—attending to these moments of 
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aesthetic production as scenes of mediation allows a shift in interpretive emphasis. The 
mediation paradigm invites us to read these scenes as staging and exploring the dynamic 
process of calibrating self and environment. Taken together, the two circle tableaux stage 
competing modes of symbolization and social description, as Stevie grasps for an 
aesthetic form to reconcile his inner turmoil with the outer world. Throughout the novel 
Stevie is characterized by his “convulsive sympathy” and “immoderate compassion”—
his excessive empathy for the pain of others—that he struggles to reconcile with the 
“monstrous town” surrounding him. The measured exactitude of Stevie’s compass and 
first aesthetic style indexes his desire for an aesthetic form of social wholeness or 
coherence that could reconcile this dialectic of self and society; the second aesthetic 
mode, the violent and chaotic proliferation of tangled circular derangement, is 
countermeasure to that first style’s impossibility, the negative allegory of social 
indescribability. To read Stevie as “ostracized artist” or “degraded reading pubic” 
replicates Ossipon’s facile diagnostic imaginary and conforms to Howe’s totalizing, 
homogenized landscape of ironic determinism. The purpose of Conrad’s irony is not to 
flatten Stevie into a series of hyper-legible symptoms, but to anticipate, preempt and 
ironize our own impulse to replicate the diagnostic hermeneutics of Ossipon. Taking 
Stevie seriously as embodiment of an ongoing (if failing) process of mediation allows us 
to examine how he mediates between self and world and to trace how that dynamic 
relationship changes in relation to his surrounding environment. 
 If Stevie’s degenerate pathology in The Secret Agent is conditioned by his 
inability to mediate successfully with his environment—to process and give symbolic 
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form to the world around him—can we come to a more specific understanding of the 
nature of this failure? In the sentences immediately preceding our first glimpse of 
Stevie’s circular compulsion, Conrad emphasizes Stevie’s age, poised on the threshold of 
maturity: “By this time a growth of thin fluffy hair had come to blur, like a golden mist, 
the sharp line of his small lower jaw” (SA 9). From the outset, Conrad presents Stevie as 
the novel’s lone figure of youth, a budding artist on the cusp of adulthood. That this 
youthful emblem of potentiality is so quickly pathologized and then unwittingly exploded 
in a failed terrorist attack orchestrated by his self-centered brother-in-law via the Russian 
embassy is of course a measure of Conrad’s bleak irony. For a few moments, Conrad’s 
narrator briefly glimpses the potential subject of the modern Künstlerroman before 
shifting its attention to the novel's wider field of hypocrites, shams and narcissists. In this 
novel, evidently, Stevie is only meant for victimhood, unable to mediate self and world or 
to develop to individualized maturity in the social context of modernity. But if Conrad 
figures Stevie as an emblem of Bildung, The Secret Agent is decidedly not an anti-
Bildungsroman or novel of frustrated formation, non-development, stagnation, or regress. 
Stevie has blown himself to bits long before the novel can trace the wounding of modern 
institutions or narrate anything resembling stalled development. Instead, in the form of 
Stevie, Conrad offers a fleeting glance of Bildung-as-anachronism, its holistic and 
measured forms of social description failing and devolving into a parody of modernist 
formal derangement before its literal explosion. 
 And yet, Stevie—emblem of anachronistic Bildung—returns ghostlike after his 
death in the temporal backtrack of the cab ride to the almshouse. Circling back to the 
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wider interpretive question of the novel’s structural-chronological irony, we can see that 
the mediatory function of Stevie becomes more legible when we examine Stevie in 
relation to the environment in which he seems most at home: in the residual Dickensian 
representational field of the cab ride chapter. In terms of strict narrative motivation, the 
cab ride chapter is surely the least essential and seemingly gratuitous in a novel filled 
with obscure connections and vaguely-networked relations. The chapter does not advance 
the plot, and in fact shifts backward chronologically in order to depict the final 
interaction of Winnie and Stevie’s mother with her children before their deaths. The 
primary effect of the chapter is to generate a devastating and painful dramatic irony, as 
the reader observes the mother's misguided assumptions and ineffectual self-sacrifice in 
full awareness of the futility of her actions. We have already come to learn that it was 
Stevie who was killed in the Greenwich explosion and not Verloc—rather than secure 
Stevie’s future, she has left him even more vulnerable to the self-interested manipulations 
of her daughter’s husband. At the same time, this shift backwards within the narrative 
chronology seems to correspond to a wider historical-representational shift at the level of 
narrative imagery, as the chapter is filled with caricatured images that seem to have been 
pulled from the universe of Victorian social realism: 
The conveyance awaiting them would have illustrated the proverb that 
“truth can be more cruel than caricature,” if such a proverb existed. 
Crawling behind an infirm horse, a metropolitan hackney carriage drew up 
on wobbly wheels and with a maimed driver on the box. This last 
peculiarity caused some embarrassment. Catching sight of a hooked iron 
contrivance protruding from the left sleeve of the man’s coat, Mrs. 
Verloc’s mother lost suddenly the heroic courage of these days. (SA 114-
15) 
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The chapter seems to fold back temporally into a residual Dickensian universe filled with 
images of social violence scaled to nineteenth-century urban realism—the emaciated 
horse, dilapidated carriage, and hook-handed driver all allegories for the class 
degradations and inequity of the poor that characterize nineteenth-century social fiction. 
At the same time, the narrator highlights the stereotyped, preprocessed effect of these 
images with an introductory pseudo-aphorism—“truth can be more cruel than caricature.” 
Why ostentatiously construct a hypothetical proverb, whose distance from the echoed 
original (“truth is stranger than fiction”) begs us to consider the relationship among 
caricature, fiction and truth?  
Conrad’s narrator insists that the maimed hansom driver and his sickly horse are 
truth and not caricature within this diegetic world. But of course they are caricatures. In 
the cab ride chapter, then, the stereotypical, mediated images of Dickensian social 
realism saturate and perceptually structure the world in a manner functionally 
indistinguishable from diegetic “reality.” The chapter initiates a chronological shift 
backwards that is more significant than simply rewinding the diegesis to the days before 
the disastrous explosion. Instead, the chapter textually constructs a world subject to the 
representational logic of Dickensian social realism—a logic examined by Jonathan 
Grossman in his reading of the worldview embedded in Dickens’ depictions of 
nineteenth-century transit networks. In a literary-critical gloss on the cab ride chapter’s 
essential conceit, Grossman shows that Dickens’ narrative engagement with forms of 
public transit gave representational purchase to the interconnected, networked community 
of his Victorian readers: “In Dickens’ hands, the novel as an art not only could enable his 
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community, whose individuals were increasingly atomized, to come to know their 
manifold unseen connectedness, but also, more specifically, could help to produce its 
self-comprehension in terms of a criss-crossing journeying of characters simultaneously 
circulating all around.”290 Grossman helps us to see how Victorian formal strategies—
omniscient narration, simultaneity, serialization, multiplottedness—give representational 
purchase and legible social description to a world increasingly difficult to grasp through 
transit networks that extend beyond the scope of the city and Londoners’ everyday lived 
experience. In the cab ride chapter, then, Conrad constructs a world whose anachronism 
matches that of Stevie—a world whose representational texture promises the 
comprehensive social legibility that Grossman finds in Dickens and in which Stevie’s 
mediatory impulses may finally find resolution.  
 It is in this residual Victorian environment that Stevie-as-Bildung finally becomes 
legible and his mediatory impulses seem something other than degenerate symptoms.291 
As the chapter and cab ride progress, Conrad emphasizes the overwhelming nature of 
Stevie’s “convulsive sympathy”: “He could say nothing; for the tenderness to all pain and 
all misery, the desire to make the horse happy and the cabman happy, had reached the 
point of a bizarre longing to take them to bed with him. And that, he knew, was 
impossible. For Stevie was not mad. It was, as it were, a symbolic longing” (SA 123). As 
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with his circles, Stevie seeks a symbolic language adequate to mediate his desire with the 
wider social world, but he can only imagine a form of compassion scaled to the 
individual—taking the world to bed with him. In the frustration of his straining mediatory 
imagination, Stevie is overcome with the dialectical counterpart of his sympathy: violent 
unrestraint. “The anguish of immoderate compassion was succeeded by the pain of an 
innocent but pitiless rage” (SA 124). Stevie vacillates between these conditions in a rising 
state of inner turbulence and agitation before finally achieving a moment of achieved 
mediation—of successful calibration with his environment. Grasping “the view newly 
opened to his sympathies of the human and equine misery in close association,” Stevie 
finally achieves mediatory expression: “Bad world for poor people” (SA 125, 126).  
 What do we make of this brief mediatory success? Critics have generally seen this 
moment as a genuine—if temporary—aesthetic triumph.292 But we must remember that 
this brief fulfillment is conditioned by its containment in Conrad’s wider structural irony. 
Retroactively placing the deceased Stevie within the anachronistic urban environment of 
nineteenth-century social fiction, Conrad highlights Stevie’s symbolic incompatibility 
with the “monstrous town” of twentieth-century London. If the social realism of Dickens 
gave aesthetic form to the division of labor and class dynamics of industrial London 
through a political aesthetic of sentiment and liberal pity, those formal dynamics have 
become mere index of pathological degeneracy in the modern world of The Secret 
Agent’s early chapters. Instead, The Secret Agent discloses the representational 
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exhaustion of high social-realist and naturalist forms that imagine the city as the adequate 
representational scale at which to register the social violence of modernity. Unwittingly 
implicated and exploded in a terrorist attack beyond the bounds of his own 
comprehension, Stevie registers a geopolitical horizon that exceeds the liberal sympathy 
of Dickens’ national class politics and whose indescribability his fragmented body can 
only negatively allegorize. Stevie’s exploded body desentimentalizes the liberal 
sympathy hermeneutic framework of Dickensian social realism, obviating the 
insufficiency of Bildung as symbolic form to an infrastructural modernity scaled to the 
geopolitics of terror.  
 We can thus begin to understand the essential relationship between Stevie as 
anachronistic Bildung and Conrad’s wider structural ironies and chronological 
disjunctions. Bildung, figuratively detonated within the narrative, is subsequently 
withheld from the relation between the novel and its reader. First demonstrating the 
insufficiency of Bildung as meaningful symbolization of social desire in modernity 
through the pathologized figure of Stevie, the novel then repudiates any sort of 
pedagogical vocation of cultural formation with its reader through an aggressive formal 
and textual irony that dissolves the bonds of sympathetic attachment and human 
recognition between narrative voice and reader. Even the pedagogical and cultural-
formational potentialities latent in Stevie’s brief moment of aesthetic synthesis are 
overtaken by Conrad’s irony. But despite the inefficacy of Stevie’s own convulsive 
sympathy, it is undeniable that Stevie himself is an object of pity within the narrative of 
The Secret Agent—a hapless victim of forces that exceed his comprehension yet 
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implicate him within their violence. How do we reconcile this evident contradiction? If 
Conrad’s irony desentimentalizes the readerly pity that the novel otherwise solicits, what 
should we make of Stevie’s victimization? Besides the indescribability of modern social 
worlds that his exploded body negatively symbolizes, does Stevie have a positive 
meaning within the novel? 
 The effect of the novel’s dramatic irony—of the fact that we know Stevie will 
soon fall victim to a terrorist plot orchestrated by his brother-in-law that his liberal 
sympathy will be inadequate either to resist or to represent—pulls the reader’s 
imagination away from this chapter and towards the unnarrated scene of Stevie’s death. 
The jarring chronological shift that signals the cab ride chapter as set-piece and ostensible 
interpretive center of the novel at the same time discredits our impulse to read Stevie’s 
convulsive sympathy redemptively. Instead, this chapter’s haunting dramatic irony 
directs the reader’s imagination to the unnarrated aporia at the heart of The Secret Agent: 
the explosion at Greenwich Park. The explosion marks both the narrative event around 
which the plot of The Secret Agent turns and the site of Stevie’s exploded remains that 
hover at the margins, darkening the pathos of the cab ride chapter. Although the 
explosion itself is not narrated, throughout the novel we see characters like Winnie and 
Inspector Heat try to come to terms with the fact of a body so scattered that “they had to 
gather him up with the shovel” (SA 191). The interpretive recalcitrance of the bodily 
remains seems to fascinate Conrad not only as a literary-representational limit, but also a 
larger philosophical-conceptual one. “The fact of a man blown to bits,” Conrad admits in 
the Author’s Note, “could not be laid hold of mentally in any sort of way” (SA 229). As 
 
 
 
217 
Heat considers “the shattering violence of destruction which had made of that body a 
heap of nameless fragments,” Conrad draws the reader’s attention to the conceptual limit 
that distinguishes Stevie-the-person from a mere heap of matter (SA 65). The remains 
form “a sort of mound—a heap of rags, scorched and bloodstained, half concealing what 
might have been an accumulation of raw material for a cannibal feast” (SA 64). The 
unsettling quality of this image resides in the fact that it upsets the basic Levi-Straussian 
distinctions between nature and culture—nature and humanity—so constitutive to our 
familiar philosophical, literary, and quotidian orientation to the world. As Arata suggests, 
“For Conrad the image of a dismembered body is horrific because, among other things, it 
forces us to confront the ontological question of what constitutes the human.”293  
 Stevie’s remains highlight the contingent marker between nature and culture, 
implicitly disclosing the extent to which these basic distinctions produce “humanity.” It is 
my view that in literally exploding the novel’s lone emblem of developmental Bildung, 
the novel instead reorients our attention to a different mode of subject formation—to the 
basic ontological distinctions through which human beings come to understand 
themselves as such. More to the point, The Secret Agent formally investigates the 
powerfully-structuring but also historical conditions through which these distinctions 
emerge. In this way, Conrad directs us to questions central both to contemporary media 
theory and to newer forms of philosophical materialism—questions regarding the 
relationship between human agency and its wider natural, social and media 
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environments.294 Stevie’s exploded body is only the most literal emblem of a wider 
question that haunts The Secret Agent: what is it that distinguishes the seemingly 
sovereign human subject from “a mere heap of matter”? How is it that the “dust of 
humanity” comes to distinguish itself from the "stream of life”? By what means does this 
humanity attain its particular capacities and agencies, and to what extent are they 
historically contingent? Is humanity the sovereign subject of history, or is there another, 
secret agent of which the seemingly sovereign subject is mere effect? 
 Returning, finally, to the question of totalizing irony posed by Howe at the outset 
of this section, we can newly appreciate the prescience of his complaint that “the sense of 
a They—whatever in the outer world imperils and destroys human life—is 
overwhelming; the sense of a We—whatever in ourselves can resist this enemy—is 
extremely faint.”295 Howe bemoans the novel’s lack of “some dramatic principle of 
contradiction, some force of resistance; in a word, a moral positive to serve literary 
ends.”296 But be misses the point in looking for a “we” when it is precisely that “we” 
which The Secret Agent works to unsettle. Howe is right that the novel destabilizes our 
sense of “they” and “we,” “us” and “them,” but he can only see this breakdown darkly, 
unable to grasp the possibility—the ontological openness—inherent in such a 
 
294 See, for example Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey 
Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); 
Bernhard Siegert,  Cultural Techniques: Grids, Filters, Doors, and Other Articulations of 
the Real, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015); 
Peters, The Marvelous Clouds. These materials are discussed more fully in the 
introduction. 
295 Howe, Politics and the Novel, 95. 
296 Ibid., 96. 
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representational strategy. Taking us to the paradigmatic ontological limit of “humanity,” 
Conrad shows this border to be dynamically co-constituted with the material world, 
changeable and historical. Remembering Wollaeger’s idea that the aesthetic form of The 
Secret Agent reflects “authorial efforts to master the audience,” it is my view that such a 
form does so not to discipline its readers so much as to reveal the infrastructural forms on 
which even the media technology of the novel relies. It is Conrad’s commitment to 
locating an ethical narrative standpoint within the complexifying socio-technical forms of 
modern social life that characterizes his infrastructural modernism.297  
 Modern fiction relies on the spatialized sense of time and temporal simultaneity 
produced by Greenwich standardization. When jarring chronological shifts unexpectedly 
disrupt the novel’s stable chronicity, and the secure foundation of narrative standard time 
is pulled away, Conrad exposes the extent to which such chronicity is the assumed 
ground orienting our phenomenological experience of and assumptions about the text. If 
media theorists like Friedrich Kittler and Bernhard Siegert insist that the novel is one of 
society’s most powerful technologies for the domestication of the idea of the subject, then 
 
297 It is this insistence on the material agency of infrastructure and other forms of 
mediation in the co-construction of subject and environment that differentiates my 
reading of infrastructural modernism from the Foucauldian emphasis on practices of 
social discipline encoded in nineteenth-century realist fiction influentially theorized by 
D.A. Miller in The Novel and the Police. Miller’s emphasis on the role of literary 
narrative in the active production of the modern liberal subject does bear a close affinity 
to my own reading of the constitutive role of media in the production of human agency in 
modernity. But whereas Miller is more interested in the processes of social discipline 
encoded into literary form, my reading instead emphasizes the ways that modernist texts 
process, theorize, and represent forms of mediation that both constrain and enable the 
agencies that we come to recognize as human. Miller, The Novel and The Police 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 
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Conrad shows that the subject of novels is not the “whole human” of Bildung, but rather 
the organic outcome of certain infrastructure effects: standardization, municipal planning, 
novels. Like Ossipon walking the streets, the distinction between culture and media, 
person and thing, is often one of perspective. At the same time, Conrad can only present 
this infrastructural vision of the co-constructed relationship between human and world 
through forms of irony that are locked in to categories of the individual human subject 
(ethical judgments and proclamations, the existential experiences of individual 
characters, the characterization of grotesque individual bodies). This inability to 
apprehend or to critique the modern world outside of the structuring perspective of the 
human is not an embarrassment for Conrad. Both the challenge and the promise of 
Conrad’s infrastructural modernism resides in the effort of his fictional form to find a 
perspective within human language and conceptual categories through which to critique 
the ontological permanence of seemingly stable distinctions between subject and object. 
 What a reading of The Secret Agent attuned to its infrastructural modernism 
demands is attention to the formal strategies through which the division of labor between 
what is and is not human—between subject and object—is processed and represented. In 
this chapter, I have sought to address this question through a reading of Conrad’s 
structural ironies, but the larger question remains: by what aesthetic concept or literary 
feature do texts negotiate the relationship between character and environment, subject 
and object? Contemporary media theory and philosophical materialisms have made this 
question timely, and expanding out of the more historicist use of the term in literary 
studies, this chapter has sought to expand the conceptual scope of “infrastructure” to 
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serve as a material and theoretical resource for conceptualizing this dynamic relation 
between subject and environment in modern literature: a way of representing and 
theorizing an increasingly mediated world. 298 Infrastructural modernism allows us to 
conceptualize a world composed wholly neither of circulating objects and affects nor of 
intersubjective subjects impervious to the agency of objects and environment. Thus we 
can finally see the bizarre knitting machine that is the mechanistic, ironic plot-apparatus 
of The Secret Agent as an infrastructural aesthetic form with three vocations: (1.) To 
represent and critique institutions that produce social violence in capitalist modernity (2.) 
To register the manner in which those institutions, practices and technologies produce 
and circulate ontological distinctions through which “humanity” comes into focus (3.) To 
represent the division of labor between subject and object in a world multiply in flux. 
Bringing this infrastructural humanism back to Howe’s reading of The Secret Agent, we 
can see that the novel’s utopian promise resides precisely in the breakdown of “them” 
 
298 For an important example of this kind of historicist orientation to infrastructure in 
modernist studies, see Michael Rubenstein, Public Works: Infrastructure, Irish 
Modernism, and the Postcolonial (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). 
Rubenstein analyzes infrastructure through the heuristic of “public works”: public 
utilities that serve a common good outside of the capitalist motivation for profit, while 
still subtending the basic mechanisms and goals of capitalism (7). Rubenstein analyzes 
the particularly ambivalent status of infrastructure in the postcolonial state, focusing his 
analysis on the Irish state from 1922-1940, a period later than that of The Secret Agent. In 
contrast, I emphasize a less stable and codified apprehension of infrastructural mediation 
in an earlier moment in the history of media forms and technical systems. In this earlier 
moment before the conceptual disarticulation of what we have come to see as 
analytically-distinct kinds media objects (i.e., time standardization and newspapers), 
modernists like Conrad apprehended these infrastructural objects as sharing a new agency 
of mediation with a powerful role in the composition of modern social worlds and the 
production of human agency. 
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and “we”—but what we have to accept is that a changed world may entail an 
unrecognizable transformation of “us.” 
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CHAPTER 4: Scales of Justice: Overdetermined Embodiment and the Semiotics of State 
Racism in W.E.B. Du Bois and Charles Chesnutt 
 
 
To the car-window sociologist, to the man who seeks to understand and know the 
South by devoting the few leisure hours of a holiday trip to unravelling the snarl 
of centuries,—to such men very often the whole trouble with the black field-hand 
may be summed up by Aunt Ophelia's word, “Shiftless!” [….] 
 
So wofully unorganized is sociological knowledge that the meaning of progress, 
the meaning of “swift” and “slow” in human doing, and the limits of human 
perfectability, are veiled, unanswered sphinxes on the shores of science. 
    —W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903) 
 
W.E.B. Du Bois: The Hesitations of Sociology 
Over the past decade, historians of social thought have brought into focus W.E.B. 
Du Bois’ largely unrecognized role as “founder of American sociology.”299 Despite his 
structuring influence in shaping the trajectories of US sociology, however, Du Bois 
maintained an ever-shifting and ambivalent relationship to the academic 
institutionalization of modern social science. Du Bois worried that the disciplinary 
protocols of sociology were distorting the temporal horizon of human social life: 
compressing “the unravelling snarl of centuries” into “a few leisure hours,” domesticating 
 
299Aldon D. Morris, The Scholar Denied: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Birth of Modern 
Sociology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), xvii. Morris argues that 
Booker T. Washington and Robert E. Park (the influential architect of Chicago School 
sociology) “conspired to obstruct and silence Du Bois politically,” obfuscating his major 
role in shaping the protocols of academic sociology (xvii). See also: Reiland Rabaka, 
Against Epistemic Apartheid: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Disciplinary Decadence of 
Sociology (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010); Dan S. Green and Robert A. 
Wortham, “Sociology Hesitant: The Continuing Neglect of W.E.B. Du Bois.” 
Sociological Spectrum 35.6 (2015): 518-33; Earl Wright II, The First American School of 
Sociology: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Atlanta Sociological Laboratory (London: Routledge, 
2016).  
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“the limits of human perfectability” to the Victorian timescale of liberal progress, 
cordoning the dynamism of social transformation into a static, typological grid. 
Nonetheless, despite his fluctuating relationship to the institutional academic apparatus, 
sociology provided a young Du Bois with his “first full self-reflexive formulation of a 
sense of vocation—as student and scholar in the pursuit of the human sciences…as they 
could be brought to bear on the study of the situation of the so-called Negro question.”300 
The nascent institutionalization of modern sociology energized Du Bois’ early career at 
the turn of the twentieth century, giving intellectual direction to his multi-faceted 
investigation of the symbolic, material, environmental and conceptual intractability of 
this so-called Negro question, the question of “how the category of the Negro qua Negro 
appeared on the stage of modern politics.”301 But into the twentieth century, Du Bois’ 
increasing frustration with and alienation from academic sociology informed his 
subsequent experiments in literary, historical, and autobiographical form in texts ranging 
from The Souls of Black Folk (1903) to Darkwater (1920) and beyond. This chapter 
builds out of recent scholarly efforts to excavate Du Bois’ engagement with modern 
sociology not to cast him once again as lost architect of American sociology, but in order 
to show how Du Bois’ growing disaffection with academic sociology clarifies the 
intellectual motivations underpinning his literary experiments, offering a new 
interpretation of what Paul Gilroy has described as Du Bois’ “black literary 
 
300 Nahum Dimitri Chandler, introduction to The Problem of the Color Line at the Turn of 
the Twentieth Century: The Essential Early Essays (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2014), 1-2. 
301 Alexander Weheliye, Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black 
Feminist Theories of the Human (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 20. 
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modernism.”302 Excavating Du Bois’ efforts to think with, against, and through sociology 
explicates the intellectual stakes of Du Bois’ shift to literary experimentation at the turn 
of the century, revealing perhaps unexpected connections between Du Bois’ experimental 
sociological modernism and the wider aesthetic forms of infrastructural modernism. 
As Nahum Dimitri Chandler has shown, “[a]cross the years of early 1898 through 
to the end of 1901,” Du Bois pursued a fastidious empirical-sociological research 
program, “constructing, distributing, and collating the results of numerous questionnaires 
and surveys on all aspects of the social life of this group; assuming responsibility for the 
organization of an annual conference in the ‘study of the Negro problems,’…participating 
in…United States Census Bureau initiated studies of Negro American communities” at 
both the local and national level.303 Fresh off his doctoral research in sociology and 
economic history at Harvard and the University of Berlin, Du Bois maintained 
confidence regarding the relationship between empirical social research and ameliorative 
social reform. Upon accepting the directorship of the Atlanta Conferences in 1897, Du 
Bois “thought that pursuing the systematic study of social phenomena would enable both 
rational prediction and the deliberate modification of social action legitimated by a moral 
imperative.”304 Social issues, then, were legitimate objects of scientific inquiry, whose 
 
302 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1993), 115. 
303 Chandler, introduction to The Problem of the Color Line at the Turn of the Twentieth 
Century, 19. 
304 Ronald A.T. Judy, “Introduction: On W. E. B. Du Bois and Hyperbolic Thinking.” 
boundary 2 27.3 (2000):16. Judy suggests that “Du Bois’ emphasis on the significance of 
empirical research as an instrument for social reform stemmed from his German 
formation—in particular, the influence of his dissertation director, Schmoller, whose own 
work argued for a science based on ethics” (16). 
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rational pursuit could reveal their elemental, structuring “truth”—the underlying laws 
governing human activity and behavior. For example, in a paper presented to the First 
Sociological Club at Atlanta University in 1897, “A Program for a Sociological Society,” 
Du Bois defines sociology as “that vast field of inquiry” which studies not “human action 
under all circumstances,” but rather “that human action which by its regularity gives 
evidence of the presence of laws.”305 These social laws refer to and authorize the 
conceptual horizon of “society,” the constitutive analytic unit of sociology and “simply a 
general name for the regularities of human action.”306 While sociology runs the risk of 
devolving into a “mass of partially digested facts,” Du Bois at this point was heavily 
invested in a scientific positivism that could yield “evidence of the working of scientific 
laws” in order to facilitate the realization of wider moral and political transformation.307 
Scholars like Morris, Judy, and Chandler have revealed the tremendous 
intellectual ambition animating the Atlanta Conferences, which Du Bois sought to 
organize as “as a hundred-year program of data gathering and analysis, divided into a 
series of ten decade-long studies in specified areas that coincided with developments in 
various disciplines of the human sciences.”308 Du Bois sought to collect 
epistemologically-distinct layers of empirical data that reflected the codifying 
organization of knowledge in the modern university—psychological, economic, 
 
305 W.E.B. Du Bois, “A Program for a Sociological Society, ca. 1897.” MS 312, W.E.B. 
Du Bois Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, University of 
Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, 3. 
306 Ibid., 4. 
307 Ibid., 3. 
308 Judy, “On W.E.B. Du Bois and Hyperbolic Thinking,” 17. 
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anthropological, and so on—in order to realize and facilitate the practical, socially 
transformative function of the university via the scientific analysis of racial 
discrimination and modern social environments. For Du Bois, then, “the question of the 
Negro’s social status in America was basically one of legitimate intellectual activity or 
method,” and this intellectual method was a powerful agent of transformative social 
change.309  
 Du Bois’ exhaustive, intensive brand of empirical sociology reached its apex 
with the publication of his magisterial The Philadelphia Negro (1899). Hired by Susan 
Wharton of the Philadelphia Settlement Society in cooperation with the University of 
Pennsylvania, Du Bois developed new empirical techniques to study the black population 
of the Seventh Ward at the turn of the century, undertaking extensive interviews with 
families, statistical surveys, archival research, and new kinds of ethnographic data-
gathering techniques generated via participant observation.310 An explicit challenge to 
social Darwinist theories of black inferiority and racial essentialism, The Philadelphia 
Negro systemically develops structural and cultural frameworks to expose the role of 
discrimination and neglect in shaping the degraded social environments impoverishing 
Philadelphia’s black community, revealing “a silenced history of active indifference, 
deliberate deregulation, and a tactical passivity toward the material inequalities of 
capitalist expansion” that create a hazardous urban environment shaped by the 
 
309 Ibid., 18. 
310 For a more technical discussion of Du Bois’ innovations in empirical data-gathering 
techniques in the history of sociology, see Morris, A Scholar Denied, 46-7. 
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differentiated distribution of disease, risk, and economic vulnerability.311 As Susan 
Mizruchi has shown, The Philadelphia Negro undoes the “myth of Black morbidity” that 
functioned as “both the means to the containment of a Black labor force and a critical 
psychic measure, designed to feed the sacrificial appetites of an American capitalist 
culture.”312 Du Bois uncovers the interrelated forms of degradation that devalue and 
endanger black lives: a vicious capitalist cycle of discriminatory techniques and degraded 
environmental conditions that systemically entrench black pauperdom and expropriate 
black labor. 
In a concluding “Final Word,” Du Bois circles back to reconsider his animating 
question—“What is the Negro problem?”—through the prism of nearly 400 pages of 
exhaustive empirical data.313 On the one hand, “Negro problems” are continuous with the 
familiar concerns of urban sociology, “the same difficulties over which the world has 
grown gray: the question as to how far human intelligence can be trusted and trained; as 
to whether we must always have the poor with us; as to whether it is possible for the mass 
of men to attain righteousness on earth” (PN 385). But as Du Bois pursues these 
questions, his sociological investigation founders on the more basic, preliminary question 
of the subject of sociology: 
 
311 Stephen Knadler, “Narrating Slow Violence: Post-Reconstruction’s Necropolitics and 
Speculating beyond Liberal Antirace Fiction.” J19: The Journal of Nineteenth-Century 
Americanists 5.1 (2017): 27. 
312 Susan L. Mizruchi, The Science of Sacrifice: American Literature and Modern Social 
Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 273. For more on the wider 
historical-intellectual context of the “myth of Black morbidity,” see Mizruchi chapter 4. 
313 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 385. Further references to this text hereafter cited 
parenthetically by page number and PN. 
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[A]nd then to this is added that question of questions: after all who are Men? Is 
every featherless biped to be counted a man and brother? Are all races and types 
to be joint heirs of the new earth that men have striven to raise in thirty centuries 
and more? Shall we not swamp civilization in barbarism and drown genius in 
indulgence if we seek a mythical Humanity which shall shadow all men? (PN 
385-86) 
 
Sociology, Du Bois recognizes, is subsumable into the wider question of “Humanity.” Is 
humanity a species-referent or something more narrow? Du Bois here apprehends that the 
category of “Man,” the liberal-humanist subject, mediates and authorizes which human 
beings are granted full access to “Humanity” in his late-nineteenth-century social context. 
War, technology, commerce and infrastructure have intensified human social 
connection—“the world has glided by blood and iron into a wider humanity”—but “still 
this widening of the idea of common Humanity is of slow growth and to-day but dimly 
realized” (PN 386). Rather than a set of social problems that empirical-sociological 
method can identify and reform, the “Negro problem” instead marks the conceptual-
historical limit of this “wider humanity,” the inhuman residue of the human: 
[B]ut with the Negroes of Africa we come to a full stop, and in its heart the 
civilized world with one accord denies that these come within the pale of 
nineteenth-century Humanity. This feeling, widespread and deep-seated, is, in 
America, the vastest of the Negro problems. (PN 387). 
 
“Nineteenth-century Humanity,” Du Bois insists finally, is “the Negro problem.” And the 
problem with sociology is that its elemental analytic unit—“society”—is shaped by a 
liberal-humanist model of the Human-as-Man, as autonomous subject, from which black 
lives are willfully excluded, as the preceding 400 pages of social data undoubtedly 
affirm. What, then, is the function of sociology? Can it do anything but frame and 
entrench this wider conceptual impasse? In 1899, at the completion of a years-long 
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project of intensive sociological research, Du Bois is not yet able to reimagine or reframe 
this evident contradiction. Instead, the conclusion of The Philadelphia Negro suggests 
that the limits of late-nineteenth-century sociology merely trace the limits of a wider 
glitch in late-nineteenth-century “humanity.” What is needed, Du Bois asserts, is a wider 
“battle for humanity and human culture”: 
 [T]he battle involves more than a mere altruistic interest in an alien people. It is a 
battle for humanity and human culture. If in the hey-dey of the greatest of the 
world's civilizations, it is possible for one people ruthlessly to steal another, drag 
them helpless across the water, enslave them, debauch them, and then 
slowly murder them by economic and social exclusion until they disappear from 
the face of the earth if the consummation of such a crime be possible in the 
twentieth century, then our civilization is vain and the republic is a mockery and a 
farce. (PN 388) 
 
However laudable its reformist desire or meticulous its methods, sociology is finally, it 
seems, complicit in—rather than critical of—a wider social logic deadly to black life. Du 
Bois here seems to anticipate Sylvia Wynter’s more recent theorization of “the sociogenic 
principle,” the framework that names and conceptually organizes what is and is not 
contained within the category of the human within a given culture or historical 
condition—the conceptual structures that fix and frame the human.314 For Du Bois’ 
“nineteenth-century Humanity,” this sociogenic principle refers to a liberal-humanist 
subject—“Man”—whose autonomous selfhood conceptually delimits whatever 
universality a so-called democratic “society” might claim at the dawn of the twentieth 
 
314 See Sylvia Wynter, “Towards the Sociogenic Principle: Fanon, Identity, the Puzzle of 
Conscious Experience, and What It Is Like to Be “Black”” in National Identities and 
Sociopolitical Changes in Latin America, eds. Mercedes F. Durán-Cogan and Antonio 
Gómez-Moriana (London: Routledge, 2001), 30-66. See also: David Scott and Sylvia 
Wynter, “The Re-enchantment of Humanism: An Interview with Sylvia Winter,” Small 
Axe 8 (2000): 119-207. 
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century. At the conclusion of The Philadelphia Negro, Du Bois does not suggest concrete 
strategies for social reform so much as begin to theorize a volatile but structuring 
relationship between race and the human: “nineteenth-century Humanity” not only 
generates, but is constituted through processes of racialization that hierzrchize human 
beings into humans and nonhumans. While Du Bois is here unable or unwilling to 
reimagine a positive alternative to the liberal individual, a new research question 
glimmers in the margins: what different models of the human—sociogenic principles, we 
might say—are thinkable if we displace the conceptual centrality of the liberal self? Can 
we de-ontologize “nineteenth-century Humanity” and imagine a more inclusive, just, or 
livable modality of the human? And, finally, what is the proper disciplinary discourse, 
aesthetic form, or mode of address in which to think, theorize, and communicate these 
new sociogenic principles? For as Du Bois powerfully demonstrates in The Philadelphia 
Negro, neither empirical facticity nor liberal sympathy can penetrate the negligent 
indifference of the United States to black wellbeing: 
Other centuries looking back upon the culture of the nineteenth would have a 
right to suppose that if, in a land of freemen, eight millions of human beings were 
found to be dying of disease, the nation would cry with one voice, “Heal them!” If 
they were staggering on in ignorance, it would cry, “Train them!” If they were 
harming themselves and others by crime, it would cry, “Guide them!” And such 
cries are heard and have been heard in the land; but it was not one voice and its 
volume has been ever broken by counter-cries and echoes, “Let them die!” “Train 
them like slaves!” “Let them stagger downward!” (PN 387) 
 
Du Bois here seems to anticipate Michel Foucault’s theorization of biopolitics as the 
power of the European state to “make live and let die.”315 In the set of 1975 lectures 
 
315 Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1975-1976, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 241. 
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collected in Society Must Be Defended, Foucault argues that health and the disciplinary 
regulation of the physical body came to constitute a distinct modality of nonsovereign 
power in the nineteenth century. This biological management of the population 
increasingly defines the exercise of modern state power, which manifests as a kind of 
“State racism” that the state directs against itself. Achille Mbembe has more recently 
extended this Foucauldian politics of “letting die” to theorize a “necropoltics” distinctive 
to colonialism and repressive racial orders, a “generalized instrumentalization of human 
existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations” which 
continues to “constitute the nomos of the political space in which we still live.”316 To 
what extent, then, does Du Bois in fact anticipate biopolitics or presage the conceptual 
lack that Foucault later fills? Rather than cast Du Bois as vague harbinger of Foucault’s 
theoretical elaboration, I want here to present a more dynamic, mutually illuminating 
relationship between Du Bois and Foucault. As we will see, Foucault clarifies the 
historical tensions and transformations that Du Bois’ experimental social theory 
mediates, while Du Bois’ infrastructural modernism suggests limitations inherent to 
Foucault’s biopolitical model of modern state power. 
In the Society lectures, Foucault describes the emergence of a new type of 
disciplinary power that comes to overtake “the field delineated by juridical sovereignty 
and the institution of the State” in the nineteenth century.317 This disciplinary power,  
Foucault insists, holds “modern” society together—it is this “tight grid of disciplinary 
 
316 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” trans. Libby Meintjes. Public Culture 15.1 (2003): 
14. 
317 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 34. 
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coercions that actually guarantees the cohesion of the social body.”318 Disciplinary power 
authorizes not a rule of law, but a rule of the norm—a “code of normalization” that 
“refer[s] to a theoretical horizon that is not the edifice of law, but the field of the human 
sciences.”319 Disciplinary power, then, actualizes both the discourse of sociology and its 
referent—both the human sciences and the “normalizing society” subject to its academic-
disciplinary gaze.320 This “code of normalization” deepens a binary structure that runs 
through society, codifying a discourse of race struggle, which over the course of the 
nineteenth century becomes the discourse of power itself: “a race that is portrayed as the 
one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against 
those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological 
heritage.”321 The historical precondition of biopower, then, is the disarticulation of an 
autonomous “society” from the sovereign political unit of the nation-state. Foucault, then, 
provides an important theoretical frame for understanding the historical co-emergence of 
technological social extension and the modern social sciences that this dissertation has 
traced across the infrastructure era. Foucault argues that from the late-nineteenth-century 
into the present, the nation-state exerts political agency by weaponizing the biological 
purity of a now-autonomous “society” against its citizens: “It is no longer: ‘We have to 
defined ourselves against society,’ but ‘We have to defend society against all the 
biological threats posed by the other race, the subrace, the counterrace that we are, 
 
318 Ibid., 37. 
319 Ibid., 38. 
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despite ourselves, bringing into existence.’”322 Racism thus emerges as a technology 
deployed by the state permitting the exercise of biopower—that which “make[s] possible 
the murderous functions of the state.”323 Foucault calls this political agency of social 
bifurcation “State racism”: “a racism that society will direct against itself, against its own 
elements and its own products….the internal racism of permanent purification, and…one 
of the basic dimensions of social normalization.”324  
Foucault’s lectures help to explicate two key issues underlying Du Bois’ growing 
distrust of the positivist empirical sociology of his doctoral training—his wavering 
confidence in his professional vocation as sociologist-cum-social reformer expressed in 
the conclusion to The Philadelphia Negro:  
(1.) The political entanglement of “society” and the nation-state. What is the 
proper political referent or conceptual horizon to contest systematic racial oppression if 
the political agency of the nation only emerges via the weaponization of a more dispersed 
society? Can close attention to the lower wards of Philadelphia capture within its 
conceptual-geographic-temporal frame the root mechanisms or social agencies that 
explicate the degraded social environments that such a sociology chronicles?  
(2.) The entanglement of biopower and the human sciences, particularly 
sociology. Foucault’s lectures theorize more concretely Du Bois’ growing suspicion at 
the turn of the twentieth century that the conceptual frame of “society” was implicated in 
the very dehumanizing oppression that he sought to contest. The question that emerges of 
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course is how, then, to contest? We will see that for Du Bois, a reinvigorated and 
politically transformative sociology needs to displace and provincialize liberal-humanist 
“society” itself, in search of a different sociogenic principle of the human and an 
alternative political mediation of collectivity.325 What, then, does this reimagined 
sociology look like? 
Du Bois seeks to address these questions in the experimental literary-sociology of 
The Souls of Black Folk (1903), whose opening lines capture and convert these 
Foucauldian tensions into its central, animating argument: 
Herein lie buried many things which if read with patience may show the strange 
meaning of being black here at the dawning of the Twentieth Century. This 
meaning is not without interest to you, Gentle Reader; for the problem of the 
Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line. 326 
 
Du Bois reframes “the Negro problem” of The Philadelphia Negro into “the problem of 
the color line,” shifting his conceptual frame of reference from the racialized subject to 
the wider sociopolitical relationships that constitute that subject as such. Despite the 
 
325 We will thus come to see the perhaps unexpected connection between Du Bois’ turn-
of-the-century experimental sociology and Latour’s critique of the “sociology of the 
social.” Like Du Bois, Latour describes the politically-conservative humanism of 
nineteenth-century liberal-humanist models of “society”: “To put it broadly, society, this 
19th century invention, is an odd transitional figure mixing up the Leviathan of the 18th 
century and the collective of the 21st. By asking society to do two jobs at once, that is, to 
make the collective traceable and to play the role of a substitute for politics, it has never 
been able to do either of them properly” (161-62). To contest the political limitations of 
“society,” we have to rethink the conceptual paradigms by which we apprehend 
collectivity: “[T]he social, as usually defined, is but a moment in the long history of 
assemblages, suspended between the search for the body politic and the exploration of the 
collective” (247). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2005. 
326 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 
1. Further references to this text hereafter cited parenthetically by page number and SB. 
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historical continuities that link the oppression of African Americans at the turn of the 
century to longer histories of racial domination, Du Bois emphasizes the specificity of the 
Twentieth Century. What distinguishes the Twentieth Century is the Foucauldian-
infrastructural disarticulation of “society” and “nation”—dispersing the political agency 
of racial domination into the color-line. The “problem of the color-line” challenges Du 
Bois’ readers to recognize the relationship between national and transnational vectors of 
social violence, mediations of political agency, and aggregates of collective solidarity. 
The local racism that The Philadelphia Negro chronicles—brutalizing and pauperizing 
black communities in Philadelphia’s lower wards—is reframed as one instantiation of a 
wider global conflict.  
First published in 1903 when Du Bois was 35 and still on faculty at Atlanta 
University, The Souls of Black Folk is a reframed and carefully composed collection of 
old and new writing. Five original pieces and an introductory “Forethought” frame nine 
previously-published (and slightly rewritten) essays. The chapters address a wide-ranging 
array of topics, perspectives, and experiences: post-Civil War race relations; the state of 
black education in the South; intensive sociological and economic analysis of 
Reconstruction-era policy; spirited polemic; short literary fiction; and autobiographical 
introspection, including an elegiac account of the death of Du Bois’ son. The individual 
essays comprising Souls, then, concatenate into a composite generic form blending 
history, sociology, eulogy, autobiography, economics, lyric poetry, cultural criticism, 
literary fiction and ethnographic anthropology. As we will come to see, this generic 
synthesis formally encodes and cues the reader to the kind of perspectival mobility and 
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conceptual flexibility that reimagining the conceptual referent of sociology—that 
reimagining “society”—requires. 
Du Bois opens Souls by retraining the empirical-sociological gaze of The 
Philadelphia Negro upon himself. The opening paragraph of Souls reframes the 
alienation between self and world that this dissertation has traced across modernism—
from the epistemic rift of the alienated consciousness described by Lukács to a praxis of 
domination subtending white supremacy: 
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by 
some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly 
framing it. All, nevertheless, flutter round it. They approach me in a half-hesitant 
sort of way, eye me curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying 
directly, How does it feel to be a problem? they say, I know an excellent colored 
man in my town; or, I fought at Mechanicsville; or, Do not these Southern 
outrages make your blood boil? At these I smile, or am interested, or reduce the 
boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. To the real question, How does 
it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word.327 (SB 3-4) 
 
This opening paragraph directs the reader’s attention not to the alienated subject, but 
rather to alienation itself—to the space of between-ness separating the self from its 
estranged world. The perspectival shift from the empirical sociology of The Philadelphia 
Negro is announced at the outset: “the Negro problem” is no longer a series of social 
issues to be investigated by the sociologist but is now experienced by the sociologist, 
who experiences himself as problem. Alienation is thus not only symptom, but also 
 
327 For more on how Du Bois reframes of the political and epistemological value of 
“alienation” in Souls, see also: Thomas C. Holt, “The Political Uses of Alienation: 
W.E.B. Du Bois on Politics, Race, and Culture, 1903-1940.” American Quarterly 42.2 
(1990): 301-323. 
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evidence and investigative tool. Du Bois elaborates on the distinctiveness of this manner 
of alienation of self and world: 
And yet, being a problem is a strange experience,—peculiar even for one who has 
never been anything else, save perhaps in babyhood and in Europe. It is in the 
early days of rollicking boyhood that the revelation first bursts upon one, all in a 
day, as it were. I remember well when the shadow swept across me. I was a little 
thing, away up in the hills of New England, where the dark Housatonic winds 
between Hoosac and Taghkanic to the sea. In a wee wooden schoolhouse, 
something put it into the boys’ and girls’ heads to buy gorgeous visiting-cards—
ten cents a package—and exchange. The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall 
newcomer, refused my card,—refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it 
dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or 
like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast 
veil. (SB 4) 
 
More than epistemic rift or Lukacsean meaning-loss, Du Bois’ image of the veil gives 
positive form to the alienation of the racialized subject. Du Bois’ schoolboy anecdote 
emphasizes the difference between the veil and capitalist alienation: the young Du Bois 
first recognizes himself as a racialized subject after his exclusion from the mechanisms of 
proto-capitalist trading-card-exchange that constitute the social world of the schoolhouse. 
The coherence of this society-in-miniature attains its conceptual coherence in Du Bois’ 
exclusion—its nineteenth-century sense of “humanity” predicated on the exclusion of its 
less-than-human other. This positive, thinkable, representable alienation of the veil 
affords Du Bois a literally mediating perspective on the relationship between self and 
environment—“between me and the other world.” And this perspective from the middle-
space between self and world allows Du Bois to draw attention to (so as to one day 
transform) the very distinctions—nature/society, human/nonhuman—that racializing 
processes entrench and encode. 
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It is this perspective-shift from outside to inside the “Negro problem” that allows 
to Du Bois to reframe racial domination from empirically-observable phenomenon to a 
dynamic, dispersed, and highly mediated assemblage of relationships and pressures that 
adjudicate the category of “the human.” It is in this sense that we should recognize the 
Du Bois of Souls as an early theorist of what Alexander Weheliye has termed “racializing 
assemblages”: “ongoing sets of political relations that require, through constant 
perpetuation via institutions, discourses, practices, desires, infrastructures, languages, 
technologies, sciences, economies, dreams, and cultural artifacts, the barring of nonwhite 
subjects from the category of the human as it is performed in the modern west.”328 If 
modern sociology is one of those discourses, practices, infrastructures, and/or sciences 
that contribute to the exclusion of the nonwhite subject from the category of the human, 
as both Du Bois and Foucault suggest, then what is the proper conceptual framework, 
disciplinary  discourse, or aesthetic form with which to represent and to contest the status 
quo of racial domination?  
In Souls, Du Bois decenters the structuring sociogenic principle of liberal 
humanism through what Chandler describes as a “two-fold epistemological frame, in 
which the Negro people would be studied in terms of their environment, especially the 
“social” environment, an order that I call systemic and in terms of their internal 
development, an order that I call experiential.”329 Chandler schematizes this two-fold 
epistemology across Du Bois’ two major turn-of-the-century texts: the “systemic” 
 
328 Weheliye, Habeas Viscus, 3. 
329 Nahum Dimitri Chandler, “The Economy of Desedimentation: W.E.B. Du Bois and 
the Discourses of the Negro.” Callaloo 19.1 (1996): 86. 
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sociology of The Philadelphia Negro and the “experiential” literary form of The Souls of 
Black Folk. While I agree with Chandler that Du Bois destabilizes the singular humanist 
frame of the human sciences in order to reckon with and convey “the excessiveness of the 
lives of Negroes to traditional ontology” at the turn of the twentieth century, I think we 
can destabilize his literary-historical framework and recognize the immanent dynamism 
of this “two-fold epistemological frame” within the representational logic of Souls.330 
Despite its multigeneric, literary-experimental form, Souls does not eliminate so 
much as reframe the environmental-empirical sociology of The Philadelphia Negro. 
Souls recontextualizes these modes of economic analysis, sociological fieldwork, 
historical analysis, and statistical description with varying modes of literary description: 
the sorrow songs, lyric poetry, short narrative fiction, autobiography and the travelogue. 
Often within a single paragraph Du Bois combines numeric empirical fieldwork—“Over 
eighty-eight per cent of them—men, women, and children—are farmers”—with lyrical 
and poetic appeals to the reader: “and yet it loves and hates, it toils and tires, it laughs and 
weeps its bitter tears, and looks in vague and awful longing at the grim horizon of its 
life,—all this, even as you and I” (SB 109, 108). Du Bois interpellates both himself and 
his reader via the first and second person—the self-evident selfhood of both reader and 
author quietly testifying to the laborer’s lack, a sort of literary-figural measuring stick of 
the full personhood denied the agricultural class of the Jim Crow South. Du Bois does not 
linger in poetic appeal or willfully solicit the reader’s sympathy, but rather continually 
recontextualizes the experiential-personal in terms of the systemic-environmental. Du 
 
330 Ibid., 84 
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Bois pivots between these modes—the “environmental” and “personal”—in order to 
generate the seemingly paradoxical effect of “intimate contact with the masses”—the 
recognition that “each unit in the mass is a throbbing human soul” (SB 103, 108). What 
Du Bois hopes to convey throughout Souls are the environmental conditions that structure 
and authorize the emergence of liberal-humanist selfhood as such. Du Bois seeks 
representational form for the liberal-humanist sociogenic principle-in-action—the 
racializing assemblages that adjudicate the humanity or inhumanity of the racialized 
subject. This goal—to represent the environmental factors that condition the emergence 
both of literary subjectivity and socially-recognized personhood—leads Du Bois to 
develop a composite generic structure and “two-fold epistemological frame” that give 
new sociological-literary form to the character-environment complex of infrastructural 
modernism. 
Chandler is certainly right that we can schematically map this “two-fold 
epistemological frame” onto Du Bois’ turn-of-the-century transition from the systemic-
environmental sociology of The Philadelphia Negro to the literary-experiential semi-
autobiography of The Souls of Black Folk. But the limitation of this historical model is 
that it leaves these two axes (systemic/environmental and experiential) unresolved and 
separate within Du Bois’ sociological method—never quite addressing the intellectual-
imaginative task posed by the conclusion of The Philadelphia Negro: a genuinely 
transformative sociological method not shaped by a liberal-humanist sociogenic 
principle, not beholden to the autonomous self as measure of humanity. Souls develops a 
literary-sociological form that tries to break free from this sociological frame, but the 
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question still remains: How do these insights regarding the embeddedness of sociological 
discourse within bourgeois models of the human-qua-subject transform the very 
discipline of sociology? To what extent is it possible to reimagine the disciplinary 
protocols and conceptual framework of modern sociology through the representational 
project of Souls—that transcends the conceptual limitations and brutal inhumanity 
embedded in “nineteenth-century Humanity”? 
*** 
In October 1904 Du Bois attended the Congress of Arts and Sciences in St. Louis, 
an intellectual conference convened in conjunction with the 1904 World’s Fair. While Du 
Bois was not invited to present his own research at the conference, he did meet with Max 
Weber (agreeing to contribute to a German journal of which Weber had recently become 
editor).331 The cumulative impact of the conference—the meeting with Weber, the work 
that was presented, and his own inability to participate—had a strong impact on Du Bois,  
and in the aftermath he composed “Sociology Hesitant,” a short, polemical reflection on 
the epistemological contradictions and theoretical possibilities latent in modern 
sociology. The essay, unpublished in Du Bois’ lifetime, was thought to be lost for 
decades and was only rediscovered in the Du Bois archive at the University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst in the past 20 years. In his introduction to the essay, Chandler 
notes its singularity within Du Bois’ wider archive—“no other text in Du Bois’ vast 
 
331 Du Bois’ essay, “Die Negerfrage in den Vereinigten Staaten” (“The Negro Question in 
the United States”) (1906) is published in translation in The Problem of the Color Line at 
the Turn of the Twentieth Century, ed. Chandler. For more on the historical context and 
intellectual motivations underpinning the 1904 Congress of Arts and Sciences, see Judy, 
“On W.E.B Du Bois and Hyperbolic Thinking.” 
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production…addresses itself to this order of metatheoretical reflection and claim.”332 One 
of the first texts written by Du Bois after the publication of Souls, “Sociology Hesitant” 
clarifies the intellectual terms of Du Bois’ shifting relationship to academic social science 
and helps to explicate the epistemological, theoretical, and representational stakes 
underpinning Du Bois’ turn to experimental literary-sociological form. A crucial task 
both for Du Bois scholarship and modernist studies is to uncover and unpack how the 
epistemological-conceptual upheaval outlined in this essay informs the representational 
strategies and modernist aesthetic forms that Du Bois develops in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. 
The essay begins with an assertion of sociology’s widening epistemological 
confusion: “The Congress of Arts and Sciences at St. Louis last summer served to 
emphasize painfully the present plight of Sociology.”333 More than methodological 
disagreement, Du Bois has grown increasingly “conscious of a fundamental confusion of 
thought at the very foundations of our science” (SH 271). Sociology, Du Bois insists, has 
confounded two distinct objects of study: human activity in its material concretion and 
social patterning and laws, “the lines of rhythm that coordinate certain of these actions.” 
(SH 272). Du Bois traces the titular “hesitation” to the originary nineteenth-century 
architects of academic sociology, who were “strangely hesitant as to the real elements of 
 
332 Chandler, introduction to The Problem of the Color Line at the Turn of the Twentieth 
Century, 17. 
333 W.E.B. Du Bois, “Sociology Hesitant” in The Problem of the Color Line at the Turn 
of the Twentieth Century: The Essential Early Essays, ed. Nahum Dimitri Chandler (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 271. Further references to this text hereafter 
cited parenthetically by page number and SH. 
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Society which must some time be studied—were they men or cells or atoms or something 
subtler than any of these?” (SH 272).  What Du Bois contests is that positivist sociology 
has taken the “abstraction” of “Society” as its governing unit of study, rather than the real 
unit of “Human Action,” the individual in its relational matrix (SH 272). Sociology has 
become the domain of “metaphysical wanderings—studying not the Things themselves 
but the mystical whole which it was argued bravely they did form because they logically 
must” (SH 273). Positivism indexes for Du Bois a failure of mind and method to 
apprehend the world in its material concretion. Rather than get closer to “Things 
themselves,” positivist concepts and sociological abstraction only solipsistically describe 
themselves. Modern sociology does not describe “Human Action” or the relationship of 
human beings to their material environment so much as describe the measurement 
protocols of scientific reason—these sociologists can “only limn a shadowy outline of the 
meaning and rhythm of human deed to be filled in when scientific measurement and 
deeper study [come] to the rescue” (SH 273). If sociologists have confounded “Things” 
with “Thoughts of Things” and “the real element of Society” with “the genesis of our 
social ideas,” then what accounts for sociology’s ongoing “hesitation”? Why is this real 
element of society so difficult to apprehend? Sociology founders, Du Bois insists, “on the 
constitutive element of the “incalculable” that distinguishes human activity from other 
kinds of relationality and that exceeds the “rule and rhythm” of deterministic, structural 
social law (SH 274). Du Bois describes a constitutive paradox at the heart of modern 
sociology: 
And yet how much so even the formulation of such a science seemed unthinkable, 
just as insistently came the call for scientific knowledge of men. The new 
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Humanism of the 19th century was burning with new interest in human deeds; 
Law, Religion, Education—all call men to study of that singular unit of highest 
interest—the Individual Man. A Categorical Imperative pushed through all 
thought toward the Paradox:  
 
1. The evident rhythm of human action. 
2. The evident incalculability of human action. (SH 275) 
 
Du Bois describes the paradoxical conceptual framework of a nineteenth-century 
humanism that simultaneously asserts the incomparable value and higher mysteries of 
individual experience while pursuing a positivist scientific account of human activity and 
behavior. What sociology requires, Du Bois insists, is a framework that can apprehend 
the distinctiveness of “human will” without displacing human activity from its social 
context and material environment: 
If this is a world of absolute unchanging physical laws, then the laws of physics 
and chemistry are the laws of all action of stones and stars, and Newtons and 
Nortons. On the other hand, for a thousand and a thousand years, and today as 
strongly as, and even more strongly than, ever, men, after experiencing the facts 
of life, have almost universally assumed that in among physical forces stalk self-
directing Wills, which modify, restrain, and redirect the ordinary laws of nature.  
The assumption is tremendous in its import. It means that from the point of view 
of Science this is a world of Chance as well as Law; that the conservation of 
energy and correlation of forces are not universally true, but that out of some 
unknown Nowhere burst miraculously now and then controlling Energy. So 
utterly inexplicable are the facts thus assumed that they are seldom flatly and 
plainly stated. Protagonists of “free” will are found to be horrified deniers of 
“Chance.” And strenuous defenders of orthodox science are found talking as 
though the destinies of this universe lay largely in undetermined human action—
indeed they could not avoid such talk and continue talking. (SH 275-76) 
 
This passage on first glance appears to reproduce the nineteenth-century humanism that 
Du Bois supposedly contests: projecting “self-directing Wills, which modify, restrain, 
and redirect the ordinary laws of nature.” But Du Bois contains this individualistic 
element of human activity within a wider heuristic of “Chance” that recontextualizes the 
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“incalculable” element of human agency within the wider forces of nature: a miraculous 
burst of “Energy” coplanar with “the laws of physics and chemistry…the laws of all 
action of stones and stars, and Newtons and Nortons.” Chance, then, is prior to Law: it 
both decenters humanist reason and displaces the self-describing measurement tools of 
sociological positivism. As Ronald Judy lucidly glosses, Du Bois here struggles in an 
uncertain way for a “language with which to articulate the enactment of an intelligence 
that exceeds the limits of reason but does not diminish or enthrall human thinking. This is 
an intelligence that is heterogeneous to that of the human—it is about the human but not 
of the human.”334 In order to fulfil its vocation as an authentic science of the social, what 
sociology requires is to develop a new conceptual framework that transcends the 
paradoxical obfuscations of liberal-humanist “society” and that coordinates the domains 
of sociology and physics:  
What then is the future path open before Sociology? It must seek a working 
hypothesis which will include Sociology and physics. To do this it must be 
provisionally assumed that this is a world of Law and Chance. That in time and 
space, Law covers the major part of the universe but that in significance the area 
left in that world to Change is of tremendous import….We would no longer have 
two separate realms of knowledge, speaking a mutually unintelligible language, 
but one realm and in it physical science studying the manifestation of force and 
natural law, and the other, sociology, assuming the data of physics and studying 
within these that realm where determinate force is acted on by human wills, by 
indeterminate force. (SH 277-78) 
 
334 Judy, “On W.E.B. Du Bois and Hyperbolic Thinking,” 12. Judy also emphasizes how 
Du Bois’ privileged heuristic of “Chance” reframes the Lukacsean historical model of 
lost transcendence (a prior fullness of meaning fragmented and dispersed by the 
alienating agency of modern social relations): “Instead of regarding the phenomena of 
social dissolution as the effects of the loss of an antecedent homogeneity—one that by 
definition and circumstance necessarily excluded the Negro—Du Bois takes as his point 
of departure the immanent circumstance of disjunction, or fundamental incongruity of 
heterogeneous processes” (34). 
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Du Bois seeks a social metaphysics that is also a metaphysics of inorganic “nature”—that 
can apprehend the distinctiveness of human activity and its incalculable agency within 
the same conceptual frame as physical science and natural law. Thus, repairing the 
constitutive paradox at the heart of humanism transforms the very organization of 
knowledge: a “reconciliation of the two great wings of Science…which will give scope to 
historian as well as biologist” (SH 278). Finally, then, Du Bois insists that we approach 
sociology not in search of the structural laws of “Society,”  but rather in search of the 
incalculable agency that might transform it: “Sociology then, is the Science that seeks the 
limits of Chance in human conduct” (SH 278). 
What ultimately inhibits sociologists’ ability to measure Chance is “the new 
Humanism of the 19th century” that scales and measures the world to “the Individual 
Man.” This human-scaled individualism produces “a philosophy of history with modest 
and mundane ends, rather than eternal, teleological purpose”—that cannot conceptualize, 
image, or project a meaningfully transformed relationship among humans and their wider 
world (SH 273). For Du Bois, to reimagine sociology is to redistribute the 
epistemological division of labor between historian and biologist— to extend the 
timescale of historical analysis beyond the imaginative horizon and embodied lifespan of 
the liberal subject. But what are the politics of this sociological-conceptual upheaval, and 
what are its literary forms? How can a social theorist like Du Bois actualize or 
communicate these new conceptual frameworks to readers and the wider world? Du Bois 
recognized that the dominant discourse of liberal protest fiction and antiracist polemic 
relied on intersubjective sympathy for this kind of representational-communications 
 
 
 
248 
technology. The representational challenge posed by both “Sociology Hesitant” and The 
Souls of Black Folk is that both texts problematize and renounce nineteenth-century 
models of liberal-humanist sympathy as valid tools to contest racial oppression. As we 
have seen, Du Bois (like Foucault) believed that the nineteenth century marked a 
watershed historical moment via the global-technological emergence of an autonomous 
“society” and the complementary conception of the “self”: 
The nineteenth century was the first century of human sympathy,—the age when 
half wonderingly we began to descry in others that transfigured spark of divinity 
which we call Myself; when clodhoppers and peasants, and tramps and thieves, 
and millionaires and-sometimes-Negroes, became throbbing souls whose warm 
pulsing life touched us so nearly that we half gasped with surprise, crying, “Thou 
too! Hast Thou seen Sorrow and the dull waters of hopelessness? Hast Thou seen 
Sorrow and the dull waters of hopelessness? Hast Thou known Life?” And then 
all helplessly we peered into those Other worlds, and wailed, “O World of Worlds 
how shall man make you one? (SB 164) 
 
The sympathetic reconciliation of selves and society promises an unprecedented 
democratic potential that is ultimately deformed by white supremacy. The mutual 
recognition of selfhood is denied to the racialized subject who can only “helplessly” peer 
into “those Other worlds” and ask how to be made “man.” The problem with sympathy is 
that—like sociology—it is coterminous with the liberal-humanist sociogenic principle. 
What both Souls and “Sociology Hesitant” seek to describe is an alternative model of the 
human—and of freedom—not rooted in the mutual recognition of selfhood as a basis for 
twentieth-century politics, literary form, and social theory. We can return, finally, to the 
passage with which this chapter opens: 
To the car-window sociologist, to the man who seeks to understand and know the 
South by devoting the few leisure hours of a holiday trip to unravelling the snarl 
of centuries,—to such men very often the whole trouble with the black field-hand 
may be summed up by Aunt Ophelia's word, “Shiftless!” They have noted 
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repeatedly scenes like one I saw last summer. We were riding along the highroad 
to town at the close of a long hot day. A couple of young black fellows passed us 
in a mule-team, with several bushels of loose corn in the ear….As we passed we 
noticed an ear of corn fall from the wagon. They never saw it,—not they. A rod 
farther on we noted another ear on the ground; and between that creeping mule 
and town we counted twenty-six ears of corn. Shiftless? Yes, the personification 
of shiftlessness. And yet follow those boys: they are not lazy; to-morrow morning 
they'll be up with the sun; they work hard when they do work, and they work 
willingly. (SB 116) 
 
Du Bois here figures an uncertain relationship to sympathy. The invocation of Stowe’s 
Aunt Ophelia summons the intersubjective sympathy of liberal protest fiction. But the 
politics of liberal pity can only be weaponized against these black laborers. Mirroring the 
racist abolitionist Ophelia, the mutuality of sympathetic recognition is blocked; the 
narrative politics of spectacular melodrama or emotional cathartic connectivity is 
impossible. Du Bois neither bemoans the observers’ lack of sympathy nor asks for more. 
In a reading of this passage, Molly Hiro argues that Du Bois seeks to summon a form of 
readerly sympathy that can communicate the feeling of … multilayered oppression.”335 
Hiro suggests that “we might imagine Souls as a kind of sociology of cross-racial 
sympathy….a reflection of [Du Bois’] conviction that emotions, too, ought to be 
conceived as among the data that sociology should interrogate.”336 But I would argue that 
Du Bois’ target here is sociology itself, or at least the car-window sociology of positivist 
social typification: a model of sociology that gains disciplinary authority by transforming 
social observations on par with Ophelia’s facile racial typecasting, quietly converting 
white supremacy into epistemological objectivity. This kind of car-window sociology—
 
335 Molly Hiro, “How It Feels to Be without a Face: Race and the Reorientation of 
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shaped by the sociogenic principle of liberal personhood ventriloquized by Stowe—
converts what is essentially racist surveillance into a scientifically acceptable intellectual 
activity while establishing the sociological onlooker as safely insulated from the “other 
world” that it observes. 
Another way of framing this argument is to suggest, contra Hiro and many other 
readers of this passage, that Du Bois is not trying to solicit sympathy but rather giving 
form to what Simone Browne has more recently termed “racializing surveillance”: “a 
technology of social control where surveillance practices, policies, and performances 
concern the production of norms pertaining to race.”337 At the turn of the twentieth 
century, we can, I believe, sense Du Bois recognizing sociology as a form of social 
control coplanar with more overt enactments of racializing surveillance that “rely on … 
techniques in order to reify boundaries along racial lines, and, in so doing, [reify] 
race.”338 In this way, the Du Bois of Souls and “Sociology Hesitant” seeks to devise new 
methodological protocols that excavate “the sedimented synchronic and diachronic 
relationality of the Negro,” replacing “the Negro” as biological given with the 
conceptual, infrastructural and political vectors of racialization that constitute the raced 
subject as such. 339 Du Bois de-ontologizes “the Negro” from social Darwinist fact to the 
relational “conglomerate effect” of Weheliye’s racializing assemblages and Browne’s 
racializing surveillance, of which we should recognize Du Bois as an early theorist.340 
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Like Du Bois, both Weheliye’s racializing assemblages and Browne’s racializing 
surveillance theorize race as relational and infrastructural (in the wider sense of 
“infrastructure” that this dissertation has developed, referring both to material technology 
and symbolic conceptual structures).  
Du Bois thus displaces the self-and-society model that conceptually structures 
both liberal-humanist sympathy and empirical sociology in order to redirect his 
sociological gaze to the processes of racialization that mediate the relationship between 
self and world, reframing race not as reified essence or type but rather a complex process 
of social differentiation projected on the human body. To reframe sociology through 
biology, as Du Bois suggests in “Sociology Hesitant,” is to theorize the primacy of 
racialization in the adjudication of personhood and to contest a Foucauldian biopolitics 
that imagines “an indivisible biological substance anterior to racialization.”341 As 
Weheliye insists: “There can be no absolute biological substance, because in the history 
of modernity this field always already appears in the form of racializing assemblages.”342 
But if Du Bois de-reifies “the Negro” into the assemblage of sociopolitical forces that 
allocate human beings into the “human” and “less-than-human,” then blackness is not 
essence but sign. Blackness—“never closed and always under contestation”—signifies an 
ever-shifting assemblage of power structures that adjudicate and hierarchize the 
human.343 Du Bois gives form to a “hieroglyphics of the flesh” in which the racialized 
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body signifies the inhuman remainder of “nineteenth century Humanity,” of “Man,” of 
the liberal-humanist sociogenic principle, of white supremacy.344   
Finally, then, we can see that what Du Bois dramatizes in Souls and theorizes in 
“Sociology Hesitant” is the ongoing and dynamic relationship between biology and 
infrastructure in shaping both the signifying power and the matter of the body. Defying 
the racial determinism of social Darwinism and car-window sociology, Du Bois’ social 
metaphysics of Chance recombines biology and history in order to draw on the 
evolutionary temporality and transformability of the de-individuated body—the body 
apprehended in evolutionary time. Can the epistemological recombination of biology and 
sociology—of “nature” and “society”—displace the liberal subject and project a new 
mediation of collectivity, a new conception of freedom?  In his essay “Evolution of the 
Race Problem” (1909), Du Bois contends: 
What the age of Darwin has done is to add to the eighteenth century idea of 
individual worth the complementary idea of physical immortality of the human 
race. And this, far from annulling or contracting the idea of human freedom, 
rather emphasizes its necessity and eternal possibility—the boundlessness and 
endlessness of possible human achievement. Freedom has come to mean not 
individual caprice or aberration but social self-realization in an endless chain of 
selves[.] 345  
 
Du Bois seeks a new kind of political subject: not the autonomous self of “individual 
caprice,” but rather the collective and generational “endlessness of possible human 
achievement.” Darwin opens the human to its “physical immortality”—to an evolutionary 
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temporality than exceeds the measure of the individual subject. As Kyla Schuller has 
argued, Du Bois’ turn to biology “embedded African Americans in time, overturning one 
of the key registers of antiblackness that suspends bodies in eternal and unchanging 
flesh.”346 Returning to this chapter’s second epigraph, this evolutionary horizon of future 
transformability is the real “meaning of progress” that corrects the woeful organization of 
sociological knowledge scaled to the self. Du Bois thus develops a sociology not of 
unchanging Law but of Chance—the element of human plasticity and latent social 
transformability that culture, science, and technology can activate and engage. As 
Schuller has shown in her discussion of Du Bois and nineteenth-century impressibility 
discourse, “Du Bois’ notion of culture is itself a legacy of impressibility, a framework in 
which culture becomes somatic over time.”347 If Schuller, Weheliye and Browne each 
invite us to think of Du Bois as precursor and early theorist of assemblage theory, in 
which the body materializes and race signifies the compound interplay between soma and 
environment, then how do those insights guide us to rethink the social function of 
literature? 
Du Bois’ social metaphysics of chance—of somatic impressibility and social 
transformability—transfigures the function of literature from a technology of liberal 
sympathy to an agent of mediation—to a media technology that seeks to overturn the 
liberal-humanist sociogenic principle that disciplines bodies into “nature” and “society,” 
human and nonhuman. The concluding “Afterthought” of The Souls of Black Folk is a 
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prayer that transfigures both book and world into a mutually transformative nature that 
reaps a socially transformative harvest: 
Hear my cry, O God the Reader; vouchsafe that this my book fall not still-born 
into the world wilderness. Let there spring, Gentle One, from out its leaves vigor 
of thought and thoughtful deed to reap the harvest wonderful. Let the ears of a 
guilty people tingle with truth, and seventy millions sigh for the righteousness 
which exalteth nations, in this drear day when human brotherhood is mockery and 
a snare. Thus in Thy good time may infinite reason turn the tangle straight, and 
these crooked marks on a fragile leaf be not indeed The End. (SB 200) 
 
Du Bois prays that his literary sociology persists into the Darwinian social time described 
above—that his cultural text can interact with and shape the “physical immortality of the 
human race.” Punning “leaves” mediate culture and biology—whose epistemological 
entanglement signals the realization of “human brotherhood” in some future-to-come. 
Unlike The Philadelphia Negro, Souls concludes not stalled in the paradoxical 
inhumanity of liberal humanism but rather in a future-oriented appeal for a conceptual 
upheaval that can dissolve and reimagine the sociogenic principle of “nineteenth century 
Humanity.” The conceptual, representational, and generic flexibility of literary form 
affords Du Bois the aesthetic tools to theorize the imaginative conditions of genuine 
social transformation that he can only subsequently codify in the sociological discourse 
of “Sociology Hesitant.” We need to recognize Du Bois’ experimental literary sociology, 
then, as another instance of infrastructural modernism—as a modernism that understands 
itself as media, with a vocation to represent and reimagine the relationship between 
nature and society. The question that remains, then, is does there exist a mode of freedom 
in the present not reducible to liberal-humanist recognition, or the laws of the liberal 
state, but that entails a form of emancipation from those very sociogenic modalities of the 
 
 
 
255 
human? It is this desire to imagine and to represent and a positive alternative to the 
liberal-humanist political imaginary that connects the sociology of Du Bois to the fiction 
of Charles Chesnutt, who adapts a Du Boisian critique of nineteenth-century sympathy to 
the form of the realist novel. 
 
 
Charles Chesnutt: The Infrastructural Character of Law 
Any interpretation of the political meaning of the term people ought to 
start from the peculiar fact that in modern European languages this term 
always indicates also the poor, the underprivileged, and the excluded. The 
same term names the constitutive political subject as well as the class that 
is excluded—de facto if not de jure—from politics. 
—Giorgio Agamben, “What is a People?” (1995) 
 
What is the relationship between the law and the people who comprise its 
subjects? Giorgio Agamben has challenged the false universalism projected by the 
democratic concept of “the people,” highlighting a fundamental aporia at the heart of 
both the term and the politics of popular sovereignty that it legitimates. What interests 
Agamben is not simply the suggestively overdetermined resonance of “the people,” but 
more so what its doubled referent—both “the constitutive political subject” and “the class 
that is excluded”—reveals about the operations of sovereignty in democratic politics. For 
Agamben, the concept of “the people” both obscures and sustains “the fundamental 
biopolitical fracture” at the heart of modern democracy.348 Agamben theorizes these two 
competing referents of “the people” in terms of part and whole: “It is what cannot be 
included in the whole of which it is a part as well as what cannot belong to the whole in 
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which it is always already included.”349 The evidently totalizing and inclusive “whole” of 
“the people” is revealed to be partial, to be constituted through a fundamental 
exclusion—an exclusion that “cannot belong” but that is nevertheless “always already 
included.”350 Democracy is only the most contemporary form of sovereignty in a long—
mostly unchanging—history of sovereign power, dating back to ancient Rome. For 
Agamben, the inability to recognize the persistent and foundational operation of 
sovereign power through the creation of bare life accounts for the lack of genuinely 
transformative political change: “Only a politics that has been able to come to terms with 
the fundamental biopolitical split of the West will be able to arrest this oscillation and put 
an end to the civil war that divides the peoples and cities of the Earth.”351 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I examine the manner in which Charles 
Chesnutt’s The Marrow of Tradition (1901) both registers and rethinks the “the 
fundamental biopolitical fracture” that Agamben describes. Chesnutt perceives the 
fundamentally racial line on which the splintering force of the biopolitical fracture is 
drawn in the turn-of-the-century American South and registers how that fracture is both 
reinforced and reflected through a liberal-humanist political imaginary. While Chesnutt’s 
novel imagines and wishes that a different configuration of those political and legal forms 
could undo the violence of the Jim Crow South, The Marrow of Tradition suggests that a 
more fundamental transformation must first occur: before the African American appeal to 
law can hope to be efficacious, Chesnutt ultimately asserts the need to redefine the 
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(seemingly universal) subject of that law—the sociogenic principle of “Man,” of liberal 
individualism that differentially hierarchizes between the human and nonhuman. 
Based on a deeply corrupt and violent political upheaval in Wilmington, North 
Carolina in 1898, Chesnutt’s The Marrow of Tradition chronicles how a small group of 
influential white supremacists manipulate the law, the truth, and public sentiment in order 
to expel the city’s racially-integrated government from power. Launching a concerted 
campaign against the city’s “Negro Domination,” this group orchestrated a brutal coup on 
election day, attacking and murdering non-whites in the streets. The federal government 
ultimately did nothing to prevent or to punish this violent outburst of racist and regressive 
violence against not only a part of its population, but also its systems of local governance 
and political representation. Visiting Wilmington two years later, Chesnutt was dismayed 
at the retrospective portrayal of the riots. Rather than the hysterical outburst of racial 
hatred that he perceived them to be, the Wilmington riots were cast by the press as an 
order-producing revolution against African-American unruliness. A significant 
motivation underwriting The Marrow of Tradition, then, is to re-tell more accurately the 
story of the Wilmington riots—to reveal the deep-seated and profoundly violent racial 
prejudice that Chesnutt believed to be their ultimate motivation. If one of Chesnutt’s 
primary goals in The Marrow of Tradition is to set the historical record straight, however, 
a key question emerges: why obscure the historical referent through fiction? Why not 
write a competing historical account? Why write a novel? I propose that it is through the 
more speculative, non-propositional aesthetic space of the novel that Chesnutt is able 
both to theorize the relationship between racism and the law and to re-imagine alternative 
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social and political transformations outside of the appeal to liberal state. In fictionalizing 
his account of an indexical historical referent, Chesnutt exposes the mutually-reinforcing 
relationship between racism and US juridical apparatus in the Jim Crow South—
revealing the futility of an African-American appeal to law prior to a more fundamental 
redefinition of the supposedly universal subject of that law. 
Chesnutt’s novelization of the Wilmington riots (fictionalized as “Wellington”) is 
deeply interested in the relationship between law and racism as mediated by the everyday 
experiences and lived practices that the law both legitimates and solidifies through habit. 
Especially significant for Chesnutt was the landmark 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision, 
which instituted the separate-but-equal principle. Chesnutt engages most fully with the 
Plessy decision in an early scene in The Marrow of Tradition in which Dr. Miller, the 
novel’s evident protagonist and emblem of the black bourgeois professional is forced into 
a “Colored” train car despite his professional standing and white colleague. Chesnutt 
describes Miller’s entrance to the car: 
The car was conspicuously labeled at either end with large cards, similar 
to those in the other car, except that they bore the word "Colored" in black 
letters upon a white background. The author of this piece of legislation 
had contrived, with an ingenuity worthy of a better cause, that not merely 
should the passengers be separated by the color line, but that the reason for 
this division should be kept constantly in mind. Lest a white man should 
forget that he was white,—not a very likely contingency,—these cards 
would keep him constantly admonished of the fact; should a colored 
person endeavor, for a moment, to lose sight of his disability, these staring 
signs would remind him continually that between him and the rest of 
mankind not of his own color, there was by law a great gulf fixed.352  
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Highlighting the conspicuousness of the placards distinguishing “White” from “Colored,” 
Chesnutt emphasizes that Jim Crow segregation operates through a binary semiology that 
persistently asserts the distinction between black and white. By demonstrating the 
pervasiveness of these literal signs of segregation, Chesnutt shows how blackness comes 
to be coded as “disability” and takes on the power of signification itself. Ultimately, the 
logic and semiology of separate-but-equal takes on a structuring psychic effect—the 
“law” “fix[es]” between the races “a great gulf,” inculcating the sense of a foundational 
ontological difference between black and white. 
Of course, it is not strictly evident through the signs themselves—through the act 
of distinguishing black from white—that the logic of Plessy, of separate-but-equal, is 
continuous with the hysterical racial violence of the Wilmington riots, but this is what 
Chesnutt’s novel systematically demonstrates and asserts. Just two chapters before 
Miller’s experience of racial segregation on the train, Chesnutt shows Major Carteret, one 
of the organizers of the coup and editor of the white-supremacist newspaper, at work 
writing an editorial just after the birth of his first son: 
Taking for his theme the unfitness of the negro to participate in 
government,—an unfitness due to his limited education, his lack of 
experience, his criminal tendencies, and more especially to his hopeless 
mental and physical inferiority to the white race,—the major had 
demonstrated, it seemed to him clearly enough, that the ballot in the hands 
of the negro was a menace to the commonwealth. He had argued, with 
entire conviction, that the white and black races could never attain social 
and political harmony by commingling their blood; he had proved by 
several historical parallels that no two unassimilable races could ever live 
together except in the relation of superior and inferior. (MT 31) 
 
Chesnutt asserts the epistemological impossibility of “separate-but-equal.” Once the races 
have been distinguished—once a “great gulf’ has been fixed by law between them—they 
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will always exist “in the relation of superior and inferior.” Chesnutt reveals the ways in 
which the racial distinction codified and ontologized by law comes to take on a series of 
significations outside of law proper. Once blackness has been separated from whiteness, 
it can more powerfully represent “limited education,...lack of experience,...criminal 
tendencies, and...hopeless mental and physical inferiority to the white race.” Race 
becomes a hermeneutic for political organization—with the capacity to legitimate claims 
as to who should have power over whom. It is in this way that Chesnutt’s reading of 
Plessy produces a legal-political divide in the social body analogous to what Agamben 
describes as the biopolitical fracture both constitutive of and obscured by “the people.” 
 In his reading of Chesnutt’s novel, Bryan Wagner identifies a pervasive 
epistemology of racial violence throughout The Marrow of Tradition. For Wagner, 
Chesnutt presents the white supremacist coup as the result of the increased visibility of 
the black middle class that cannot be assimilated by the whites into “the visual field” of 
the city. The African-American middle class “provokes an epistemological crisis that is 
simultaneously a crisis of white identity.”353 In this sense, Wagner suggests that we can 
understand racial violence in the Jim Crow South “as an attempt to repair the damaged 
epistemology of white supremacy.”354 What makes racial segregation and violence so 
pervasive and persistent, then, is that “racial violence is not simply about political 
strategy or economic self-interest. Indeed, racial violence is nothing less than the 
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prerequisite for the very possibility of white identity.”355 If, as Chesnutt suggests, racial 
violence is continuous with legal segregation (i.e., if the Wilmington coup is continuous 
with the daily segregating practices of “separate-but-equal”), then a revision to the law 
that would genuinely ameliorate the condition of racial violence would require a 
fundamental change in the construction of identity—from what Wagner calls “white 
identity” to some new configuration of identity and human relationship not constituted 
along the racial biopolitical fracture. At the most basic level, for Chesnutt, this 
epistemological transformation requires a direct attack upon the forms of racial 
distinction formed through legal decisions like Plessy, which, as Walter Benn Michaels 
explains, rendered all social conflict as racial conflict: “The fundamental social 
distinction articulated in these decisions and ratified in Plessy was not the distinction 
between classes but the distinction between races….The great contribution of Jim Crow 
racism was its ability to represent all social conflicts as essentially racial and this to 
represent state-sponsored segregation as the way to resolve those conflicts.”356 What 
Benn Michaels and Wagner both emphasize is the manner in which the law both 
produces and sustains forms of racial identity that lead irrevocably to forms of racial 
violence. Chesnutt elaborates a similar insight in The Marrow of Tradition, which, as we 
will see, meditates at length on the mutually-reinforcing relationship between racial 
violence and the law in the Jim Crow South. 
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 Chesnutt most forcefully demonstrates the constitutive racial violence built into 
the law in the chapter “How Not to Stop a Lynching,” in which Miller and Watson seek 
legal recourse to prevent the impending lynching of Sandy. Watson initially implores the 
sheriff to intervene, but “‘he has a white face and a whiter liver. He does not dare call out 
the militia to protect a negro charged with such a brutal crime.’” (MT 191). Miller then 
suggests seeking the intervention of the federal government, but Watson points out the 
impossibility of their plea being heard—the government “‘must be informed through 
designated channels. It never sees anything that is not officially called to its attention. 
The whole negro population of the South might be slaughtered before the necessary red 
tape could be spun out to inform the President that a state of anarchy prevailed’” (MT 
192). Watson ultimately contends that the authority of the law is secondary to that of 
white power—that the law is a tool of white prejudice: “‘When the color line is drawn, if 
they choose to stand together with the rest of their race against us, or to remain passive 
and let the others work their will, we are helpless,—our cause is hopeless’” (MT 192). 
This conclusion is confirmed by the white judge to whom Watson appeals as a last resort: 
He admitted that lynching was, as a rule, unjustifiable, but maintained that 
there were exceptions to all rules,—that laws were made, after all, to 
express the will of the people in regard to the ordinary administration of 
justice, but that in an emergency the sovereign people might assert itself 
and take the law into its own hands,—the creature was not greater than the 
creator. He laughed at my suggestion that Sandy was innocent. “If he is 
innocent,” he said, “then produce the real criminal. You negroes are 
standing in your own light when you try to protect such dastardly 
scoundrels as this Campbell, who is an enemy of society and not fit to live. 
I shall not move in the matter. If a negro wants the protection of the law, 
let him obey the law.” (MT 192-93) 
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If Chesnutt’s novel presciently anticipates Carl Schmitt’s theorization of sovereign power 
as “he who decides on the exception,” then Chesnutt here asserts that this sovereign 
power is ultimately a white one.357 The “sovereign people” that Judge Everett invokes 
contains the same biopolitical fracture that Agamben describes, here constituted through 
binary racial semiology. The judge himself describes the law as the instrumental tool of a 
seemingly universal and unified “sovereign people” that is revealed by Chesnutt to be 
white power. In this passage, Chesnutt exploits not only the aporia contained within 
ordinary usage of “the people,” but also an aporia in the judge’s use of “the law.” In his 
concluding sentence, Judge Everett invokes two different senses of the law—“if a negro 
wants the protection of the law” (i.e., the right to due process and a fair trial) he must first 
“obey the law” (i.e., not violate the set of prescribed legal rules). Chesnutt reveals the 
ways in which this first sense of the law is denied to African Americans, even as they are 
subject to “unjustifiable” forms of violence like lynching at the hands of whites—whites 
who are in this case not forced to maintain this second sense of “the law.” In his reading 
of this moment in Marrow, Andrew Hebard contends that Chesnutt’s novel theorizes a 
“state of abandonment” in which “the state relinquishes its monopoly on violence…and 
the limits of the state are both marked and erased.”358 For Hebard, this state of 
abandonment is distinct from Schmitt’s state of exception in that “unlike a state of 
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exception where the state remains the exclusive source of extralegal violence, the state 
instead permits violence without being its author.”359 Hebard’s reading helps us to see the 
manner in which the law is strategically instrumentalized by a white semi-sovereign 
“society” in Chesnutt’s novel—allowing state officials to participate in extralegal, 
“unjustifiable” mob violence, “but not as representatives of the government.”360  
 But if the law is strategically instrumentalized by white power in The Marrow of 
Tradition, we can also identify competing moments in which it seems that Chesnutt 
imagines a different set of laws and corresponding political forms—a law that is not 
subject to the racial biopolitical fracture. We see this most powerfully in the revelation 
that the parents of Janet Miller (Dr. Miller’s mixed-race wife) were married. Olivia 
Carteret’s shameful secret is not that her father had an extramarital affair with a black 
mistress, but rather that he married her. In the eyes of the law, Janet and Olivia are 
sisters. If with this uncovered secret marriage, Chesnutt seems to symbolize an alternate, 
utopian law—a legal-political alternative to the constitutively racist biopolitical fracture 
of the Jim Crow South—then the larger structure of the novel ultimately undoes the 
potent potentiality of this suppressed past. For we can’t neglect the manifold ways in 
which that secret marriage is ultimately repressed and Janet withheld from her rightful 
inheritance through the machinations of Olivia. The marriage legally occurred but was 
not recognized. In The Marrow of Tradition, law is not only the tool of white sovereign 
power, suspended instrumentally as in Schmitt and Agamben—the law is also actively 
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attacked and suppressed from outside the seat of official legal authority in order to 
maintain the logic of white supremacy. We can see this most clearly in an early complaint 
of General Belmont to Major Carteret:  
“Things are in an awful condition! A negro justice of the peace has opened 
an office on Market Street, and only yesterday summoned a white man to 
appear before him. Negro lawyers get most of the business in the criminal 
court. Last evening a group of young white ladies, going quietly along the 
street arm-in-arm, were forced off the sidewalk by a crowd of negro girls. 
Coming down the street just now, I saw a spectacle of social equality and 
negro domination that made my blood boil with indignation,—a white and 
a black convict, chained together, crossing the city in charge of a negro 
officer! We cannot stand that sort of thing, Carteret,—it is the last straw! 
Something must be done, and that quickly!" (MT 33) 
 
Despite segregating mandates like Plessy, the legal-political structures of the city have 
accommodated the inclusion of an African-American justice of the peace and police 
officer, and it is this legal-political inclusion that constitutes the “Negro Domination” that 
the white supremacists attack. Despite Chesnutt’s imaginative longing for a different 
form of law—for a more just law not split by a racist biopolitical fracture—The Marrow 
of Tradition ultimately resists the notion that such a change could efficaciously 
ameliorate racial violence like that of the Wilmington riots. A more just law would 
simply be attacked like the racially-inclusive forms of local government overrun by the 
white supremacist coup. Rather than revise a law that will always be subject to the 
suspensions, instrumentalizations, attacks, and repressions of white supremacy, in The 
Marrow of Tradition Chesnutt ultimately asserts the need to redefine the evidently 
universal subject of law before any African-American appeal to law can hope to be 
efficacious—to imaginatively project an alternative to the sociogenic principle embedded 
within and shaping the political imaginary of the US juridical assemblage. 
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 If Chesnutt is skeptical that a change in law is adequate to the amelioration of 
racial violence, then can we find an alternative model of politics in The Marrow of 
Tradition? We can begin to address this question by returning to a question posed earlier: 
if one of Chesnutt’s primary goals in Marrow is to set the historical record straight 
regarding the Wilmington riots, why obscure the historical referent through fiction? As 
we have seen, Chesnutt imagined his novel as a direct response to the manner in which 
the Wilmington white supremacist coup had been portrayed in the press: as the order-
producing suppression of a black race riot. However, rather than write a competing 
journalistic or historical account, Chesnutt chose to write his corrective in the form of a 
novel. We can begin to understand this decision by examining Chesnutt’s treatment of the 
press and print journalism in Marrow. As we have seen, in Chesnutt’s novel Major 
Carteret makes his living as editor of The Morning Chronicle, the local mouthpiece for 
Wellington’s white supremacist political party. Chesnutt frequently provides the reader 
with extended excerpts of Carteret’s racist editorials, and he devotes sustained attention 
to the workings of the newspaper in the chapter “The Necessity of an Example,” in which 
Carteret, McBane, and Belmont meet immediately after the murder of Polly Ochiltree, 
intuitively recognizing the white woman’s death as an opportunity to advance their 
political agenda through the newspaper: “These three resourceful and energetic minds, 
representing no organized body, and clothed with no legal authority, had so completely 
arrogated to themselves the leadership of white public sentiment as to come together 
instinctively when an event happened which concerned the public, and, as this murder 
presumably did, involved the matter of race” (MT 180). Chesnutt draws attention both to 
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the political influence and to the lack of legal authority of these men, again emphasizing 
the constitutive extralegal element of racial violence, working through the management 
and manipulation of “public sentiment.” Of course, “public” here functions similarly to 
Du Bois’ “society” and Agamben’s “people”—claiming a political representativeness 
built upon foundational, racial exclusions. But if the white-supremacist public 
understands itself as a “public” through a binary racist epistemology, then Chesnutt here 
suggests that this public is roused to action through sentiment manipulated largely 
through fiction. Over the course of “The Necessity of an Example,” Chesnutt depicts the 
manner in which the white supremacists manipulate the fact of Polly’s death to fabricate 
a story designed to rouse the outrage of the white public to its highest pitch:  
This event, the Chronicle suggested, had only confirmed the opinion, 
which had been of late growing upon the white people, that drastic efforts 
were necessary to protect the white women of the South against brutal, 
lascivious, and murderous assaults at the hands of negro men. It was only 
another significant example of the results which might have been foreseen 
from the application of a false and pernicious political theory, by which 
ignorance, clothed in a little brief authority, was sought to be exalted over 
knowledge, vice over virtue, an inferior and degraded race above the 
heaven-crowned Anglo-Saxon. If an outraged people, justly infuriated, 
and impatient of the slow processes of the courts, should assert their 
inherent sovereignty, which the law after all was merely intended to 
embody, and should choose, in obedience to the higher law, to set aside, 
temporarily, the ordinary judicial procedure, it would serve as a warning 
and an example to the vicious elements of the community, of the swift and 
terrible punishment which would fall, like the judgment of God, upon any 
one who laid sacrilegious hands upon white womanhood. (MT 185) 
 
If, for Chesnutt, the “separate-but-equal” legal imperative of Plessy figures blackness as 
degraded, as inferior to whiteness, then the violated “white womanhood” of this passage 
is its pristine antithesis. Carteret depicts this innocent whiteness as urgently under attack 
by the black enemy. This racial attack can function as “only another significant example” 
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because, as McBane asserts, “‘All niggers are alike’” (MT 181). The white mob asserts its 
sovereign authority to suspend the law in the name of a higher law—a higher law that 
Chesnutt demystifies as hysterical race prejudice, whiteness threatened by the increased 
social and political influence of the black middle class. Chesnutt suggests that the 
editorial’s success in arousing public sentiment is related to its fictional elements—
perfectly constructed to figure both a coherent white identity under attack and an equally 
coherent black antagonist. 
What characterizes the newspaper as a media technology in Chesnutt’s novel is 
the manner in which it necessarily corresponds to the pervasive legal and political forms 
of the public for whom it is written. For Chesnutt, the newspaper editorial is written and 
read along the ideological grain—within and subject to the dominant epistemological 
structure of its social context. But if, as I have suggested above, Chesnutt ultimately 
desires to redefine the evidently universal subject of democratic law, then the media 
technology of the newspaper is inadequate to the task—fundamentally structured by the 
dominant sociogenic principle that Chesnutt aspires to critique and transform. Despite the 
constitutive fictiveness underwriting Chesnutt’s newspaper editorial, only the more 
speculative conceptual flexibility enabled by the aesthetic—in this case, the aesthetic 
form of the novel—affords the epistemological perspective adequate to the genuinely 
transformative political critique to which Chesnutt aspires.  
We can supplement our understanding of the political in The Marrow of Tradition 
by considering Chesnutt’s novel alongside Jacques Rancière’s discussion of the 
relationship between politics and aesthetics through “the distribution of the sensible” in 
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The Politics of Aesthetics. Rancière defines the distribution of the sensible as “the system 
of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of 
something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions 
within it.”361 The division and apportionment of those parts and positions through the 
“distribution of spaces, times, and forms of activity” dictates who can participate in the 
political community and in what manner.362 For Rancière, it is through the aesthetic 
distribution of the sensible that the structure of politics in a community is determined:  
Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around 
what has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of 
spaces and the possibilities of time….Artistic practices are “ways of doing 
and making” that intervene in the general distribution of ways of doing 
and making as well as in the relationships they maintain to modes of being 
and forms of visibility.363 
 
 Aesthetic forms produce not only forms of art, but also forms that “inscribe a sense of 
community.”364 Ultimately, then, the aesthetic is a space in which forms of social 
epistemology are formed and inscribed—a space in which the artist can open up an 
epistemology distinct from that which is legally or politically imposed. It is this mode of 
speculative epistemological openness that Chesnutt does not find in the newspaper 
editorial of Carteret. Rather than construct a propositional counter-argument to the 
fabricated and extralegal claims of the white supremacists (formed through a binary 
epistemology of racial violence), in The Marrow of Tradition Chesnutt engages the more 
 
361 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 7. 
362 Ibid., 8. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Ibid., 9. 
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speculative, non-propositional aesthetic space of the novel in order to re-imagine 
alternative social and political transformations outside of the appeal to the liberal state 
and the socially-dictated epistemology of the racial biopolitical fracture.  
 We can look to the final chapters of The Marrow of Tradition for an especially 
revealing example of this type re-imagined political epistemology—a positive if 
speculative alternative to the liberal-humanist sociogenic principle—made available 
through the aesthetic. In the wake of the Wellington coup, Carteret’s son Dodie falls 
severely ill, urgently requiring a tracheotomy that only Miller is able to perform. But 
Miller’s only son has been shot to death that same day in the course of Carteret’s white 
supremacist riot. Carteret visits the Miller home, imploring the doctor to save his son’s 
life, but Miller rejects his appeal, satisfied with the righteousness of this dismissal. 
Carteret begrudgingly agrees, acknowledging the justice of Miller’s refusal in a 
seemingly transformative moment or cross-racial identification: 
Carteret possessed a narrow, but a logical mind, and except when 
confused or blinded by his prejudices, had always tried to be a just man. In 
the agony of his own predicament,—in the horror of the situation at 
Miller's house,—for a moment the veil of race prejudice was rent in twain, 
and he saw things as they were, in their correct proportions and 
relations,—saw clearly and convincingly that he had no standing here, in 
the presence of death, in the home of this stricken family. Miller's refusal 
to go with him was pure, elemental justice; he could not blame the doctor 
for his stand. He was indeed conscious of a certain involuntary admiration 
for a man who held in his hands the power of life and death, and could use 
it, with strict justice, to avenge his own wrongs. In Dr. Miller's place he 
would have done the same thing. Miller had spoken the truth,—as he had 
sown, so must he reap! He could not expect, could not ask, this father to 
leave his own household at such a moment. (MT 320-21) 
 
Carteret finally sees through “the veil of race prejudice” to acknowledge that he and 
Miller share a fundamental value system and sense of justice, ultimately conceding that 
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he too would have turned himself away—that “he would have done the same thing.” And 
it is not only Miller and Carteret who share these values: “Young Evans felt the logic of 
the situation, which Carteret had explained sufficiently. To the nurse it was even clearer. 
If she or any other woman had been in the doctor's place, she would have given the same 
answer” (MT 322). These shared values initially appear to be the potential basis for a 
transformed cross-racial understanding—the means with which to bridge the racially-
construed biopolitical fracture. But this shared sense of justice—the product of a 
“narrow,” “logical” mind—does nothing to transform the relationship between the two 
families, the two races. The sense of “justice” motivating this evident reversal of racial 
prejudice is in fact still trapped within the binary epistemology that sustains racist 
violence. In this “logical” mode, both men understand justice to be the protection of 
“their own”—their own family, their own race. Both Carteret and Miller recognize a legal 
conception of personhood rooted in property, fully continuous with the sociogenic 
principle of bourgeois “Man.” We can now begin to trace more clearly the relationship 
between the familial and the political plots that coexist and compete within The Marrow 
of Tradition. Chesnutt suggests that the possessive and racially enclosed structure of the 
Southern bourgeois family is continuous with the binary political structure of the Jim 
Crow South. Both derive from the same “nineteenth-century Humanity” comprised of 
sovereign liberal subjects that Du Bois contests in The Philadelphia Negro. If this 
bourgeois familial structure is the conventional representational object of the realist novel 
as aesthetic form, then Marrow critiques the racially enclosed family as the basis for 
political and ethical epistemology—the epistemology of both Miller and Carteret. 
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 Ultimately, this possessive-familial political imaginary is transcended by Janet 
Miller, William’s mixed-race wife and the half-sister of Olivia Carteret. It is Janet who 
advises her husband to save Dodie’s life and who finally, at the novel’s climax, offers an 
alternative to the binary epistemology that has up until this moment structured and 
motivated the entirety of the novel’s plot. When Olivia visits her half-sister and implores 
her to save her son’s life and grant William permission to perform the surgery, Janet 
expresses her exasperated and pained outrage: “‘For twenty-five years I, poor, despicable 
fool, would have kissed your feet for a word, a nod, a smile. Now, when this tardy 
recognition comes, for which I have waited so long, it is tainted with fraud and crime and 
blood, and I must pay for it with my child's life!” (MT 329). Olivia—assuming that her 
request has been denied and following the same logic as her husband, Dr. Miller, Evans, 
and the nurse—can only cede “‘It is but just’” (MT 329). But as she turns to leave, Janet 
stops her: 
“Stay—do not go yet!” commanded Janet imperiously, her pride still 
keeping back her tears. “I have not done. I throw you back your father's 
name, your father's wealth, your sisterly recognition. I want none of 
them,—they are bought too dear! ah, God, they are bought too dear! But 
that you may know that a woman may be foully wronged, and yet may 
have a heart to feel, even for one who has injured her, you may have your 
child's life, if my husband can save it! Will,” she said, throwing open the 
door into the next room, “go with her!” (MT 329) 
 
In this final outburst, Janet offers a different kind of recognition than that offered by her 
sister. Olivia denies Janet “sisterly recognition” on a racial basis, withholding from her 
half-sister both her inheritance and acknowledged inclusion within the bourgeois family 
structure. Janet offers an alternative form of recognition, not rooted in the sisterhood of 
the bourgeois family, but on a different conception of “humanity” constituted not by 
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sympathy or possessive individualism, but rather by deeply-felt experience of suffering. 
Janet does not ask Olivia to recognize her injury or demand her rightful inclusion in the 
family qua nation. Rather than demand recognition or sympathy for her own wounded 
familial attachments, Janet opens the door to a political imaginary of non-possessive 
reciprocity that defies the liberal-humanist individualism that her husband (and nearly 
every other character) espouses throughout the novel. Crucially occupying the symbolic 
position of the mixed-race character, Janet ultimately offers an epistemological 
perspective that transcends the racial binary structuring the ethics of every other character 
in the novel’s social field—even her husband William, the novel’s evident emblem of 
civic virtue and racial progress.  
Marrow devotes the majority of its narrative attention to the decent, socially 
ascendant Dr. Miller. Chesnutt casts Miller as the protagonist-hero of a liberal antiracist 
novel premised on gradual inclusion and racial uplift. William—emblem of bourgeois 
respectability, moral integrity, and fiscal responsibility—imagines himself as the 
protagonist of liberal meritocracy: 
He liked to believe that the race antagonism which hampered his progress and that 
of his people was a mere temporary thing, the outcome of former conditions, and 
bound to disappear in time, and that when a colored man should demonstrate to 
the community in which he lived that he possessed character and power, that 
community would find a way in which to enlist his services for the public good. 
(MT 65) 
 
William “possesses character”—both figuratively and narratively—on the condition of 
his possessive liberal individualism. He aspires to heal his community, but his actions do 
not transform so much as entrench the very social logic of liberal individualism that 
denies sisterly recognition to his wife and dehumanizes Wellington’s black laboring 
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class. At the climax of the novel, then, Chestnutt undoes the logic of realist 
characterization in which narrative attention imparts protagonistic significance. Despite 
Miller’s evident centrality to the novel’s first 300 pages, Janet wrests the novel’s 
narrative agency at the climax, enacting a genuinely transformative political imaginary 
rooted in material, embodied pain, rather than a possessive individualism whose injuries 
demand recognition from the liberal state—a logic enacted by both her husband and the 
white supremacist Carteret. Why, then, does Chesnutt play this narrative trick? Why 
highlight Miller and marginalize Janet only to reverse their narrative-symbolic roles on 
the novel’s final page?  
 William and Janet embody two competing sociogenic principles, or political 
modalities of the human. William’s liberal individualism—consistent with the US social 
world that he inhabits and in which he thrives, and that he shares with nearly all of the 
novel’s other characters—grants him a kind of figural legibility and coherence within the 
narrative world of The Marrow of Tradition. It is in this way that the “character” that he 
possesses is figurally responsive to his environment—understood in Marrow as the 
infrastructural quality of the law qua sociogenic principle. But The Marrow of Tradition 
is ultimately a critique of Miller’s wounded logic of possessive individualism—as well as 
his faith in gradual inclusion and democratic progress. The cross-racial sympathetic 
recognition on which such a political imaginary relies is unavailable to black laborers like 
Sandy who are dehumanized and live in a permanent state of exception. Thus, at the 
novel’s conclusion the seemingly marginalized Janet wrests narrative agency and 
characterological depth, as she realizes (even if only momentarily and within the confines 
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her home) an alternative modality of the human rooted in shared suffering and material 
pain rather than the sympathetic recognition of possessive individualism. What Marrow 
dramatizes, then, is the infrastructural-environmental agency of the law to condition the 
emergence of personhood, the legibility of character. Chesnutt offers the novelistic-
representational complement to Weheliye’s insight that the US juridical assemblage—the 
law—“continues to be one of the chief instruments in creating and maintaining the 
racializing assemblages in the world of Man.”365 If this is the case, then merely to appeal 
to the law or demand recognition from the liberal state is to allow for the dehumanization 
at the heart of “nineteenth-century Humanity”—the adjudication of the human from the 
less-than-human—to continue uncontested. Chesnutt breaks realist convention and 
formally redistributes narrative agency and protagonism in an effort to dramatize the 
dynamic and co-constitutive relationship between legal infrastructure and the very 
conditions of personhood.   
 
 
 
 
365 Weheliye, Habeas Viscus, 82. 
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